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PRESIDENTIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE RULE OF LAW:
CAN THE PRESIDENT CLAIM IMMUNITY IF HE SHOOTS SOMEONE ON
FIFTH AVENUE?
Claire O. Finkelstein*
Richard W. Painter***
ABSTRACT
Can a sitting President be indicted while in office? This critical constitutional question has never been directly
answered by any court or legislative body. The prevailing wisdom, however, is that, though he may be investigated,
a sitting President is immune from actual prosecution. The concept of presidential immunity, however, has
hastened the erosion of checks and balances in the federal government and weakened our ability to rein in renegade
Presidents. It has enabled sitting Presidents to impede the enforcement of subpoenas and other tools of investigation
by prosecutors, both federal and state, as well as to claim imperviousness to civil process, extending even to third
parties. In an important recent case, the Supreme Court rejected the idea of presidential immunity as a
constitutional doctrine and reasserted that a sitting President is not above the law. In Trump v. Vance, the
Court made clear that a President’s Article II powers do not shield him from criminal investigation. In this
Article, we argue that the holding of Vance is reinforced by historical discussions from the early days of the
Republic, by important Supreme Court precedent, and by a sound understanding of the requirements of democratic
governance. As we argue, the Vance case suggests that a sitting President can be investigated and indicted while
in office. We argue that immunity from criminal prosecution for a sitting President would undermine all other
forms of accountability, such as impeachment and the ballot box, as Presidents will be able to commit crimes to
avoid the impact of these two important guardrails of democracy with impunity. In keeping with our argument,
we urge the Department of Justice to withdraw the two memos it has issued asserting that a sitting President
cannot be indicted while in office and revise its advice to make clear that a sitting President who commits a crime
should be investigated and potentially indicted. The Department should thus reiterate the basic principle the
Founders embraced and that the Court upheld in Vance, namely that no person is above the law.
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INTRODUCTION
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution created three branches of the
federal government with co-equal power. If no single branch could
dominate, they reasoned, each branch would serve as a constraint on the
other two.1 The Framers were also concerned to protect the states against
the arbitrary exercise of power at the hands of a runaway federal government
by balancing federal against state power, an aim embodied in the Tenth
Amendment.2 These two aspects of U.S. constitutional structure—
horizontal separation of powers at the federal level and vertical division of
power between state and federal government—have proven their worth over
the years and have provided the guardrails that ensure our fidelity to
democratic governance.
Yet through a series of incremental changes, one branch, the executive
branch, has come to dominate the other two federal branches as well as the
states. This is despite the great importance placed in democratic theory,3 as
well as in judicial opinions,4 on both horizonal and vertical checks and
balances. With this shift in the original structure of the republican ideal,
there lies a threat to democratic governance, a threat we see playing out daily
as we struggle to identify the essential features of a society that depends for
its political stability on fidelity to the rule of law. In 2020, the shifts were so

1

2
3

4

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (arguing that the branches of government must have
sufficient power to impose some restraints over each other to operate effectively). Historical
accounts of the Constitution’s treatment of the three branches are plentiful, including classics such
as MAURICE J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1967) (tracing the history of constitutional governance and examining
criticisms of the doctrine), and WILLIAM B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1965) (analyzing the doctrine of the separation of powers from
its origin to its adoption in the U.S. Constitution).
U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
See, e.g., CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 216 (Thomas
Nugent trans., London, Strand 1823) (1748) (“When the legislative and executive powers are united
in the same person, or in the same body of magistracy, there can be no liberty; because
apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute
them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated
from the legislative and executive powers.”).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) is the earliest and most famous case in which the Supreme
Court asserted the power of the judiciary to check the power of the executive as well as Congress.
Other contemporary and more recent cases are discussed in this Article.
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significant and the constraints on presidential power so reduced that the U.S.
seemed to be teetering on the brink of abandoning democracy altogether in
favor of autocratic rule.
The Framers anticipated that Presidents might become tyrannical, and
they accordingly conceived of two important mechanisms to hold Presidents
accountable: impeachment and the opportunity to vote Presidents out of
office on a regular basis.5 Because presidential elections only occur once
every four years, however, impeachment is structurally the only emergency
measure the Framers explicitly built into the Constitution to protect against
a despotic commander-in-chief. Yet experience dictates that it is nearly
impossible to remove a President from office via impeachment. No President
has ever been found guilty in a Senate impeachment trial, despite four efforts
to remove sitting Presidents from office through the impeachment process.
To date, elections have proven the only real safeguard against runaway
Presidents. With the 2020 election, however, we learned to question whether
even that method of accountability was beyond the reach of a President
determined to undermine the vote. We saw in dramatic fashion the degree
to which a sitting President can use his vast presidential powers to undermine
the integrity of the very elections that will determine his authority to govern.
In this Article, we make the case for the importance of a third means of
accountability, namely criminal investigation and indictment of a sitting
President.6 Indeed, we explain that indicting a sitting President is not just an
5

6

The Framers did not institute term limits. That was introduced into federal law with the Twentysecond Amendment in 1947. A third method of accountability also was not available at the time
of the Framers, namely the Twenty-fifth Amendment, which was introduced shortly after the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Jr. in 1963. Removal for incapacity is not properly
speaking a method of accountability at all, given that it is not a penalty but a provision allowing for
emergency removal in case the President is unable to govern.
Previous law review articles on this subject are few, most notably and recently W. Burlette Carter,
Can a Sitting President Be Federally Prosecuted? The Founders’ Answer, 62 HOW. L.J. 331 (2019) (discussing
how the Framers intended for a sitting President to be prosecuted for the commission of crimes).
Justice Kavanaugh briefly discussed the question of indicting a sitting President in two law review
articles in the late 1990s and early 2000s, both of which are discussed in a separate section of this
Article below. Most commentary has been in briefer formats such as blog posts and op-eds. See,
e.g., Walter Dellinger, Indicting a President Is Not Foreclosed: The Complex History, LAWFARE (June 18,
2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/indicting-president-not-foreclosed-complex-history
[https://perma.cc/JQ9Y-V7VK] (analyzing whether criminal prosecution of the President is
precluded); Jan Wolfe, Can a Sitting U.S. President Face Criminal Charges?, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-indictment-explainer/can-a-sitting-u-spresident-face-criminal-charges-idUSKCN1QF1D3 [https://perma.cc/HN3M-CAE2] (assessing
whether a President can constitutionally face criminal charges).
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option that can be fairly read into the text of a living Constitution. While
that may be true, we claim that there are sound arguments for seeing
presidential indictment as part and parcel of the original conception of
presidential accountability, and that this check on presidential power is a
necessary part of core constitutional safeguards. Federal prosecutors,
however, confront the long-standing policy on the part of the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) that it is unconstitutional to indict a sitting President, a
position that the DOJ first put forth in an Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”)
memorandum in 1973 and affirmed with a second memo in 2000.7 The
DOJ memos have led to broader and broader claims of immunity on the part
of sitting Presidents, culminating in the extreme position adopted by
President Donald J. Trump’s lawyers in seeking to shield his tax returns and
other financial documents from a New York grand jury—namely, that it
would be impermissible to arrest or investigate the President even if he had
“shot someone on Fifth Avenue.”8
The purpose of this Article is to expose the problematic nature of the
concept of personal presidential immunity, and to suggest that this theory is
not required by Article II of the Constitution, contrary to what a number of
scholars have claimed. Furthermore, we argue that the concept of
presidential immunity is profoundly antithetical to the mainstay of
democratic governance, namely the concept of the rule of law. The ability
to hold Presidents criminally accountable during their terms in office turns
out to be an essential feature of democratic governance, one that is
consistently supported by Supreme Court jurisprudence. The doctrine of
presidential immunity, therefore, conflicts with important Supreme Court
precedent. For both reasons of consistency with democratic principles and
to ensure that DOJ policies are congruent with constitutional jurisprudence,
we must repudiate any doctrine that places Presidents beyond the reach of
the law, particularly beyond the reach of criminal statutes. Accordingly, we
argue for a reversal of the position the OLC takes in the above-mentioned

7

8

See Amenability of the President, Vice President and Other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal
Prosecution While in Office, Op. O.L.C. (Sept. 24, 1973); A Sitting President’s Amenability to
Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, Op. O.L.C. (Oct. 16, 2000). Our discussion of the 1973 and
2000 DOJ memos, and another third undisclosed DOJ memo from 2019 on a similar issue, appear
in Section I.C of this Article below.
As we discuss below, President Trump’s lawyers made this claim in oral argument in the Second
Circuit in Trump v. Vance.
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memoranda, as well as a reconceptualization of the doctrine of presidential
immunity.
In what follows, we leave to one side questions relating to accountability
for presidential abuses of power that fall short of use of the criminal process,
as well as questions relating to particular crimes for which a sitting President
might be charged. Our central purpose is to expose the ways in which a
President who can commit crimes with impunity poses a unique danger, a
danger of which the Framers were clearly aware and which they accounted
for in the design of the Constitution. This is all the more so, as we so
chillingly learned during the Trump presidency, if presidential misconduct
has the purpose of enabling the President to protect himself against the
processes that would normally protect democratic governance from his
abuses—namely removal by impeachment or legally valid elections.
Representative democracy is at risk when the President encounters no
consequences for demanding that foreign countries assist him with his bid for
reelection, that local election officials falsify the vote tally in order to change
the results of the election, or that supporters resist the peaceful transition of
power after he has been defeated at the polls.
The Framers were well aware of the risk that authoritarian leaders might
commit crimes to remain in power. They were aware of examples from
history of political assassins9 and murderous leaders, many of whom have left
their indelible mark on Western literature, history, and myth.10 Even today,
in countries where democratic traditions are not firmly established, it is often
taken for granted that there will be political assassinations of opposition
candidates or retaliation against individuals who are in a position to damage
those in power prior to an election. The Kremlin is suspected of using lethal
force against political opponents, as the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal
9

10

See, e.g., Tim Thornton, More on a Murder: The Deaths of the ‘Princes in the Tower’, and Historiographical
Implications for the Regimes of Henry VII and Henry VIII, 106 J. HIST. ASS’N 4 (2021) (discussing political
complications in contemporaneous accounts of Richard of Gloucester’s [Richard III’s] 1483 seizure
of power by deposing his nephew the 12-year-old King Edward V, followed by the disappearance
and probable murder in the Tower of London of Edward and his younger brother Richard of
Shrewsbury, Duke of York).
See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK. Hamlet
revolves around whether Hamlet will avenge the death of his father, the former King, who was
murdered by the King’s brother Claudius, who has now ascended to the throne of Denmark by
marrying Hamlet’s mother, Queen Gertrude. Much of the play revolve around Hamlet’s efforts to
investigate Claudius’s crime and Claudius’s countermeasures against Hamlet, including poisoning
a dueling sword and a cup of wine.
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as well as that of opposition leader Alexei Navalny attest.11 It would not be
hard to imagine a bloodier variant of what Trump tried to do in seeking
Ukraine’s assistance to investigate the son of his political rival, Hunter
Biden.12 Conceivably, presidential immunity could shield, or even
incentivize, presidential crime at home in the United States, and for the same
purpose as we saw abroad, namely in order to retain control of the office of
the presidency by whatever means.13
For four years, we had a President who openly boasted that he could
shoot someone on Fifth Avenue without losing any voters,14 and also that
Article II of the Constitution allowed him to do whatever he wanted as
President.15 Those supercilious claims were combined and repeated by
Trump’s legal team in Trump v. Vance,16 in which Trump’s lawyers argued
that Article II barred a state prosecutor from enforcing a subpoena against
his former accountants to obtain Trump’s personal financial documents.
Under this theory, it would be impermissible to indict, or even to investigate,
a President caught in the middle of the commission of a crime, including a
President in the middle of a murderous rampage on Fifth Avenue.17 The
U.S. Supreme Court unequivocally rejected Trump’s view of presidential

11

12

13
14

15

16
17

See Natasha Bertrand, Biden Readies His First Major Penalties on Russia, POLITICO (Feb. 22, 2021),
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/22/biden-penalties-russia-470986 [https://perma.cc/
5VJM-9UKU] (assessing U.S. reaction to these poisonings).
Trump was impeached in 2019 for holding up military aid that Congress had voted for Ukraine in
order to use the aid as leverage to force Ukraine to announce an investigation into the business
activities of Hunter Biden, the son of Trump’s political rival, Joe Biden. The Republicandominated Senate, however, did not convict Trump following impeachment for this blackmailing
of Ukraine
In the United States, we have no known cases of political assassinations by Presidents of political
rivals, but U.S. operatives are alleged to have participated in such assassinations overseas.
Trump: “I Could Stand in the Middle Of Fifth Avenue and Shoot Somebody and I Wouldn’t Lose Any Voters”,
REALCLEAR POL. (Jan. 23, 2016), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2016/01/23/
trump_i_could_stand_in_the_middle_of_fifth_avenue_and_shoot_somebody_and_i_wouldnt_los
e_any_voters.html [https://perma.cc/6MLW-9V8C].
Michael Brice-Saddler, Trump Says Constitution Gives Him Right to “Do Whatever I Want”, WASH.
POST (July 23, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/23/trump-falselytells-auditorium-full-teens-constitution-gives-him-right-do-whatever-i-want/
[https://perma.cc/8F7B-V8TT] (reporting on a Trump speech about the wide breadth of power
the Constitution gives him).
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 6, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19–635).
See Trump v. Vance Oral Argument, C-SPAN, at 35:38 (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.cspan.org/video/?465172-1/circuit-hears-oral-argument-president-trumps-tax-returns [https://
perma.cc/D658-2W9N] (“[Trump] brings the case both as a private person and as the sovereign.”).
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immunity and made clear that sitting Presidents are not above the law.18 The
precise parameters and implications of the Vance decision, however, remain
unclear. In particular, Vance only addressed criminal investigation of a sitting
President, not indictment. Does the Vance decision imply that a sitting
President can be indicted? If so, does this apply equally to the states as well
as to the federal government? And what would be the implications of
actually proceeding to trial and sentencing a sitting President?
In this Article, we argue that it is critical to protect the other two methods
of accountability—impeachment and presidential elections—from criminal
interference by the executive branch when a President commits crimes that
undermine these constitutional processes in order to maintain his power. If
the legal boundaries on presidential authority cannot be enforced during the
presidency itself, the other methods of accountability the Framers built into
our government as effective hedges against despotism will not be maintained.
Combining presidential immunity theory with a capacious view of
presidential authority, such as we have increasingly seen in recent years,
ultimately exposes democratic governance to the risk of authoritarianism.
In the next part, we focus on debates about the meaning of Article II with
regard to presidential immunity, as well as on other constitutional provisions,
such as the Impeachment Clause in Article I. Finding no indication that the
Constitution contains a doctrine of presidential immunity, we consider the
views of the Framers on this question, which we believe supports our reading
of the Constitution. We then consider the two Justice Department
memoranda mentioned above and compare them to Supreme Court
precedent on presidential immunity, namely U.S. v. Nixon and Jones v. Clinton.
Finally, we turn to a careful examination of the Vance case, which dealt a blow
to the idea of presidential immunity from criminal process and by extension
to the idea that a sitting President cannot be indicted.
In Part II, we consider the independent question of whether and how a
sitting President can be investigated. We address the challenges of
investigating a sitting President against the background of the vast
presidential powers that can be marshaled to undermine those investigations.
We also consider how investigation of a sitting President relates to the pardon
power and the potential for Presidents to use that express constitutional
authority to shield themselves from accountability.

18

Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020).
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In Part III, we consider the possibility of state criminal investigations and
indictments of a sitting President. The Vance Court considered, and largely
rejected, the argument that heightened constraints are needed on state
criminal processes directed at a President. We discuss existing constraints
designed to minimize the risk of abusive state criminal investigations and
consider why state criminal processes are a critically important constraint on
presidential power in our federal system.
In Part IV, we address the question whether prosecuting a sitting
President after he leaves office provides sufficient deterrence against
presidential crime. We offer several reasons why, in our view, it does not.
We conclude that the concept of presidential immunity is badly out of
keeping with the Framers’ intent to equip the other branches of government,
as well as the states, with the ability to hold Presidents accountable for
misdeeds they commit while in office. We argue that presidential immunity
is also in tension with the structure of democratic governance more generally,
which depends critically on the principle that no person is above the law.
I.

CAN A SITTING PRESIDENT BE INDICTED?

The question whether the President is immune from indictment is not
directly answered by the text of the Constitution. As with many
constitutional questions, one must construct an answer from a combination
of minor indications contained in the text, constitutional history, legal
precedent and commentary, and finally the structure of democratic norms
and values and that which is needed to maintain them. While there are
different philosophies about how to approach constitutional questions, such
as textualism and originalism, we do not take sides in constitutional debates
about methodology. Rather, we hope that by providing a mix of evidence
drawn from a variety of sources, a picture will emerge that establishes a
compelling case for a single answer to our question, namely that there is no
constitutional immunity for sitting Presidents against criminal indictment.
A. What Does the Constitution Actually Say?
We begin with the text of the Constitution, of which the most significant
passage appears in the Impeachment Clause, namely Article I, Section 3:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal
from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor,
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Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless
be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.19

Some scholars, such as Cass Sunstein20 and Philip Bobbitt,21 see in this
phrase a precondition for a criminal indictment and trial of a federal officer,
namely that he must first be impeached, tried in the Senate and “convicted”
before he can be charged with a crime. They therefore believe that this
provision precludes the indictment of any President who has not already
been impeached and removed.
This interpretation, however, is highly problematic, given that the
Impeachment Clause extends to federal officers besides Presidents. Because
Article 1, Section 3 refers to the “Party” in “Cases of Impeachment,” it covers
other federal officers subject to impeachment. Article II, Section 4 identifies
who these persons are: “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers
of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.”22 The Impeachment Clause thus applies to all of these
federal officers. Under Sunstein’s and Bobbitt’s interpretation of Article I,
Section 3, none of these individuals could be indicted for a crime until they
were impeached by the House and convicted by the Senate.

19
20

21

22

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (emphasis added).
Cass R. Sunstein, A Sitting President Can’t Be Prosecuted, BLOOMBERG QUINT,
https://www.bloombergquint.com/view/a-sitting-president-can-t-be-prosecuted [https://perma.
cc/9PKM-Z8UB] (Aug. 1, 2017, 4:00 PM) (quoting the above language in the Impeachment
Clause and then stating “A reasonable interpretation of this provision [the Impeachment Clause]
is that it sets out a temporal sequence: Impeachment, then conviction and removal from office—
and only after that, indictment, trial, judgment and punishment.”).
Philip Bobbitt, Can the President Be Indicted? A Response to Laurence Tribe, LAWFARE (Dec. 17, 2018),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-president-be-indicted-response-laurence-tribe [https://perma
.cc/3QFH-659R] (“Professor Tribe’s argument depends on an artful reading of Article I, Section
3, which provides that ‘the Party convicted [by the Senate in an impeachment proceeding] shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment.’ The natural import of these words—their textual
meaning to the ordinary reader—would assume, I think, that ‘the Party convicted’ must be
someone who has in fact been convicted, i.e., who has gone through an impeachment process prior
to being subject to indictment.”).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. Although the term “all civil Officers” is not defined in the Constitution,
it is widely understood to encompass all civilian “officers of the United States” who are appointed
by the President pursuant to the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, including federal judges.
The Appointments Clause says that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the
Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Other constitutional law scholars, such as Laurence Tribe, and indeed
the OLC itself in its memos on indictment of a sitting President,23 read Article
I, Section 3 differently. The point of the Impeachment Clause reference to
criminal trial after impeachment and removal, they think, is to avoid an
argument that double jeopardy would preclude post-impeachment criminal
punishment of an impeached and removed official for the same criminal
conduct.24 As Alexander Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 65:
The punishment which may be the consequence of conviction upon
impeachment, is not to terminate the chastisement of the offender. After
having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem and
confidence, and honors and emoluments of his country, he will still be liable
to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law.25

Does the Impeachment Clause itself, and Hamilton’s explanation of it,
mean that an impeachable federal officer can only be convicted of a crime
after he has been impeached? Hamilton, like Article I, Section 3, does not
say.
There are compelling arguments against the Sunstein and Bobbitt view
of the Impeachment Clause and in favor of the interpretion supported by
Tribe and the OLC. First, consider the implications of Sunstein’s and
Bobbitt’s interpretation. No federal officer who is subject to impeachment
could ever be charged with a criminal violation, no matter how serious or
trivial, unless he were first impeached in the House and removed by the
Senate. As the OLC explains in its 1973 memo, this simply has not been
the practice over the two hundred years since the Constitution was ratified,
and we have seen federal officers other than the President indicted while in
office.26 As the OLC also points out, Congress in 1790 specifically provided

23
24

25
26

We discuss these OLC memos in a separate subsection below.
Laurence H. Tribe, Yes, the Constitution Allows Indictment of the President, LAWFARE (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/yes-constitution-allows-indictment-president [https://perma.cc/
3HMH-VXQ9] (“Without that language, it might have been argued that the ban on double
jeopardy would preclude such post-removal proceedings that seek to punish the removed official
criminally for the very same conduct that led to the official’s conviction and removal by the
Senate.”).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
Amenability of the President, Vice President and Other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal
Prosecution While in Office, Op. O.L.C. 4 (Sept. 24, 1973) (“During the life of the Republic
impeachment proceedings have been instituted only against 12 officers of the United States.
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, 93 Cong., 1st Sess., p. 402. In the same time, presumably scores,
if not hundreds, of officers of the United States have been subject to criminal proceedings for
offenses for which they could have been impeached.”).
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by statute that any federal judge convicted of bribery shall “forever be
disqualified to hold any office of honour, trust or profit, under the United
States.”27 This demonstrates that the First Congress believed criminal
conviction of a judge for bribery ordinarily should come first; then
impeachment and removal.28
Indeed, an interpretation of the Impeachment Clause that precludes
criminal indictment of a federal officer makes little sense. If this clause barred
pre-impeachment indictment of an impeachable federal officer, a vast array
of the most powerful executive and judicial branch officials could commit
crimes with impunity unless and until impeached and convicted by twothirds of the Senate. Such crimes might even include bribing members of
the House to avoid impeachment or members of the Senate to avoid
conviction. This idea of immunity of federal officers subject to impeachment
from criminal prosecution up until the point of impeachment and removal
therefore makes little sense if federal officers are to be held accountable to
the rule of law.
Consider also that making criminal indictment conditioned on a twothirds vote in the Senate places impeachable federal officers beyond the
reach of the criminal law for the duration of their terms in office. For Article
III judges, who enjoy lifetime tenure, it would be unthinkable that a judge or
justice would be immune from indictment for any number of crimes, such as

27
28

Id. at 5 (citing the Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, Pub. L. No.
1–9, 1 Stat. 117 (1790)).
Indeed, only two years before the OLC’s 1973 opinion on indictment of a sitting President, United
States Court of Appeals Judge Otto Kerner, former Governor of Illinois, was indicted by a federal
grand jury on charges of bribery, perjury and tax evasion. Seth S. King, Federal Judge Kerner Indicted
on
Bribe,
Perjury,
Tax
Charges,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
16,
1971),
https://www.nytimes.com/1971/12/16/archives/federal-judge-kerner-indicted-on-bribeperjury-tax-charges-judge.html [https://perma.cc/9VVP-D95T]. Judge Kerner did not resign
from his judicial office until July 22, 1974—after he had lost his final appeal of his criminal
conviction, and seven days before he went to prison. Seth S. King, Otto Kerner Goes to Jail Today His
Once
Shining
Career
at
End,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
29,
1974),
https://www.nytimes.com/1974/07/29/archives/otto-kerner-goes-to-jail-today-his-onceshiningcareer-at-end-income.html [https://perma.cc/44Q8-QKAF]. The same Justice Department that
indicted Judge Kerner before his impeachment could not, and did not, in the OLC memos ground
its conclusions about indicting a sitting President in the language of the Impeachment Clause.
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sexually assaulting law clerks or taking or paying bribes, as long as they had
the support of thirty-four senators. As the OLC concluded in 1973:29
[A] rule that impeachment must precede indictment could operate to
impede, if not bar, effective prosecution of offending civil officers. The
sensible course, as a general proposition, is to leave to the judiciary the trial
of indictable criminal offenses, and to Congress the scope of the overlapping
impeachment jurisdiction. The gross impracticalities of a rigid rule that
impeachment precede indictment demonstrate that it would be an
unreasonable, and improper construction of the Constitution.30

We discuss the OLC’s reasoning behind this conclusion more fully in
Section I.C below. We merely wish to point out here the irony of a
constitutional interpretation that would make federal judges, who are
charged with enforcing the law, categorically immune from prosecution
under the law. Add to that a similarly lawless cabinet and other superior
officers, and such an interpretation of the Impeachment Clause would start
to look highly implausible.
What this demonstrates is that the Impeachment Clause does not provide
the support for the blanket immunity of federal officers from criminal
prosecution for which some have argued. Whether the President is unique
and entitled to immunity because of some other constitutional principle is a
different question. But immunity of the President from criminal prosecution
would have to be found elsewhere in the Constitution, if at all.
The only place in the Constitution that does expressly confer immunity
from criminal prosecution on federal officers is the Speech and Debate
Clause of Article I, Section 6, which applies uniquely to members of
Congress. The general principle is that members of Congress may be
charged with crimes while in office, a principle amply reinforced by
numerous criminal indictments and convictions.31 The Speech and Debate
29

30
31

See Amenability of the President, Vice President and Other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal
Prosecution While in Office, Op. O.L.C. 7 (Sept. 24, 1973) (“In sum, the analysis of the text of the
Constitution and its practical interpretation indicate that the Constitution does not require the
termination of impeachment proceedings before an officer of the United States may be subjected
to criminal proceedings.”). An entire ten-page section of the 1973 OLC Memo is titled
“Troublesome Implications of a Proposition that Impeachment Must Precede Indictment.” See id.
at 7–17.
Id. at 16.
The most recent such criminal conviction was of a New York Congressman convicted of insider
trading. See Jerry Zremsky, Critics Outraged, Republicans Silent as Trump Pardons Ex-Rep. Chris Collins,
BUFFALO NEWS (Dec. 22, 2020), https://buffalonews.com/news/critics-outraged-republicans-
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Clause provides a narrowly crafted exception. Representatives and senators
“shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be
privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their
respective Houses, and in going to and from the same; and for any Speech
or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.”32
This grant of immunity explicitly exempts treason, felony or breach of the
peace and does not extend to arrest for any offense outside of the legislative
session.33 Most importantly, there is no parallel constitutional provision
providing any immunity, even from arrest, for the President.34 It is difficult
to conceive of the Founders having intended broader immunity for the
President than for members of Congress, without a clear provision
establishing such immunity in the text of the Constitution.
Senator Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, a Federalist who had been
a delegate to the Constitutional Convention and was later John Adams’s
running mate in the 1804 presidential election, explained the limited
immunity from arrest and other privileges given to members of Congress in
the Speech and Debate Clause in a speech in the Senate on March 5, 1800.
He emphasized that undefined privileges had been exercised oppressively in
Great Britain, that the Constitution had only specified and limited privileges
and that such privileges were not bestowed on the President.35 Pinckney

32
33
34

35

silent-as-trump-pardons-ex-rep-chris-collins/article_fef6b3cc-44b2-11eb-9842-f7428af473ae.html
[https://perma.cc/XZ2G-E5DK] (reporting former Congressman Chris Collins pled guilty to
insider trading charges and resigned from Congress).
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1.
Id. Moreover, this clause does not actually preclude criminal indictment or trial for any crime
whatsoever, but merely arrest.
See Tribe, supra note 24 (discussing the absence of any constitutional provision providing immunity
for the President parallel for the limited immunity given to members of Congress in the Speech and
Debate Clause).
CHARLES PINCKNEY IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE (Mar. 5, 1800), reprinted in RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, VOLUME III, 384–85 (Max. Farrand ed., 1911). Pinckney
said:
The remainder of the [Speech and Debate] clause respecting privilege is so express on the
subjects of privilege from arrest, government of members, and expulsion, that every civil
officer in the United States, and every man who has the least knowledge, cannot
misunderstand them. I assert, that it was the design of the Constitution, and that not only
its spirit, but letter, warrant me in the assertion, that it never was intended to give Congress,
or either branch, any but specified, and those very limited, privileges indeed. They well
knew how oppressively the power of undefined privileges had been exercised in Great
Britain, and were determined no such authority should ever be exercised here. They knew
that in free countries very few privileges were necessary to the undisturbed exercise of
legislative duties, and those few only they determined that Congress should possess; they
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observed that privileges should be quite limited in a representative
democracy and that the Framers were reluctant to bestow constitutional
privileges on federal officers because they were likely to be abused, as they
had been in Great Britain.36 As the Speech and Debate Clause shows, the
Framers knew how to bestow immunity on federal officers in the
constitutional text, and that they did so sparingly.
There being no support for presidential immunity from indictment in the
Impeachment Clause in Article I or elsewhere in the Constitution,
proponents of presidential immunity seek other constitutional validation.
Cass Sunstein, for example, argues that the Framers intended to deal with
presidential wrongdoing through impeachment alone.37 Justice Alito echoes
this view in his dissent in Trump v. Vance, in which he states: “[t]he
constitutional provisions on impeachment provide further support for the
rule that a President may not be prosecuted while in office.”38 As discussed
above, however, and as the OLC recognized in its 1973 memo discussed
more extensively below,39 impeachment and criminal adjudication are two
distinct processes and have two completely different objectives.

36

37

38
39

never meant that the body who ought to be the purest, and the least in want of shelter
from the operation of laws equally affecting all their fellow citizens, should be able to avoid
them; they therefore not only intended, but did confine their privileges within the narrow
limits mentioned in the Constitution . . . . Let us inquire, why the Constitution should
have been so attentive to each branch of Congress, so jealous of their privileges, and have
shewn so little to the President of the United States in this respect . . . . No privilege of this
kind was intended for your Executive, nor any except that which I have mentioned for
your Legislature. The Convention which formed the Constitution well knew that this was
an important point, and no subject had been more abused than privilege. They therefore
determined to set the example, in merely limiting privilege to what was necessary, and no
more.
The 1973 OLC memorandum is misleading in that it cites this speech in footnote 12 on page 18
without explaining Pinckney’s point, namely that the Founders were concerned about abuses of
privileges in Great Britain and did not want to mimic that aspect of British government here. Op.
O.L.C. 7 (Sept. 24, 1973).
Here, Pinckney uses the word “privilege” to refer to constitutional exemptions for high-ranking
federal officers from ordinary application of the law, including their immunity from arrest in
specified circumstances.
See generally Sunstein, A Sitting President Can’t Be Prosecuted, supra note 24 (“The drafters of the
Constitution spent a lot of time on the question of how to respond to presidential wrongdoing.
Their remedy was impeachment (by the House of Representatives) and then conviction (by the
Senate) which could only occur for ‘Treason, Bribery and other High Crimes and Misdemeanors.’
. . . . That means you can’t indict and try a sitting President. He has to be removed first.”).
Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2444 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
Amenability of the President, Vice President and Other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal
Prosecution While in Office, Op. O.L.C. 16 (Sept. 24, 1973).
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The impeachment process at most results in removal from office and
potential disqualification from future office following conviction in the
Senate by a two-thirds majority, with an additional majority vote to remove
from office. Impeachment cannot be combined with criminal punishment
in the same proceeding in the United States. Article I, Section 9 of the
Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from imposing criminal penalties
on anyone, including the President, in the form of a “Bill of Attainder,”40
namely a legislative bill that targets a particular individual for punishment.41
Older English statutes, by contrast, had given noblemen immunity from
prosecution by the King in whose name criminal process ordinarily issued,
substituting the guarantee of a trial before their peers in the House of
Lords.42 The Founders explicitly rejected the concept of legislative branch
criminal trials and punishment in the Bill of Attainder Clause, and there is
no language in the Constitution embracing immunity due to office or rank.
Criminal indictment of a sitting President or any other officer, moreover,
does not necessarily mean removal. Indictment is not trial; trial is not
conviction; conviction is not punishment; and punishment is not removal.
As we have seen with other countries, a President or Prime Minister indicted
and even convicted for some criminal offenses, particularly misdemeanors,
might be allowed to remain in office.43 Indeed, not all criminal convictions

40
41

42

43

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3 provides, “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law will be passed.”
Bills of Attainder were used in Great Britain, particularly for trials of persons of high rank, but have
not been seriously attempted since the House of Lords voted to convict Queen Caroline for adultery
in 1820, a bill which was then withdrawn in the House of Commons. A CORRECT, FULL AND
IMPARTIAL REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF HER MAJESTY CAROLINE, QUEEN CONSORT OF GREAT
BRITAIN, BEFORE THE HOUSE OF PEERS; ON THE BILL OF PAINS AND PENALTIES (J. H. Adolphus
ed., London, Jones & Co., 1820).
The Statute of Edward III, passed by Parliament in 1341, provided:
“Whereas before this time the peers of the land have been arrested and imprisoned, and
their temporalities, lands, and tenements, goods and cattels, asseized in the king’s hands,
and some put to death without judgment of their peers: It is accorded and assented, that
no peer of the land, officer, nor other, because of his office, nor of things touching his
office, nor by other cause, shall be brought in judgment to lose his temporalities, lands,
tenements, goods and cattels, nor to be arrested, nor imprisoned, outlawed, exiled, nor
forejudged, nor put to answer, nor be judged, but by award (sentence) of the said peers in
Parliament.”
Lysander Spooner, AN ESSAY ON THE TRIAL BY JURY 93 (Boston, Bela Marsh, 1852).
Consider the example of Benjamin Netanyahu, former Prime Minister of Israel, who continued to
serve, despite having been indicted for corruption, fraud and bribery charges. David M.
Halbfinger, He Indicted Netanyahu, but Sees No Reason to Bar Him from Office, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/30/world/middleeast/israel-netanyahu-corruptionmandelblit.html [https://perma.cc/T6HJ-BLYT].
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rise to the level of “High Crimes and Misdemeanors,” treason or bribery,
which is needed to justify impeachment and removal from office. A President
who committed a crime could be allowed to remain in office. And indeed,
some impeachable offenses might not be crimes at all, and therefore a
President could be removed without being subject to criminal indictment.
The criminal trial is separate from the process of impeachment and removal;
these are two different processes under the jurisdiction of two different
branches of government.44
The remaining question is whether there is something unique about the
office of the President such that jurisdiction in these two different proceedings
must be sequential, with impeachment always preceding indictment, rather
than the other way around. For answers to that question, both proponents
and opponents of presidential immunity often turn to Article II of the
Constitution.
B. What Did the Framers Think?
Having considered the language of the Impeachment Clause itself and
found no support for the doctrine of immunity of a federal officer from
criminal prosecution prior to impeachment, the question naturally arises
whether the Framers nonetheless intended for the President to be immune
from indictment and prosecution.
The textual source of presidential authority is found in Article II of the
U.S. Constitution. While Article II has many narrow and precise provisions,
most interpretations of presidential power depend on a small number of
broad provisions like the Vesting Clause (“The executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America”45), or the “Take Care
Clause” (the requirement that the President “take Care that the Laws be

44

45

W. Burlette Carter, Can a Sitting President Be Federally Prosecuted? The Founders’ Answer, 62 HOW. L.J.
331, 333 (2019). We are in agreement with Professor Carter with regard to her main conclusion,
namely that the existence of impeachment does not preclude criminal indictment of a sitting
President. Where we appear to differ, however, is with respect to the range of crimes for which a
sitting President can be indicted. Carter appears to argue that there could not be indictment of any
crime for which there could be impeachment, such as bribery, treason or anything that would count
as a high crime and misdemeanor, because indictment could result in incarceration, which would
be a kind of constructive removal. We do not see criminal conviction as a form of removal or as
implicating removal, and therefore we do not see any conflict with impeachment.
U.S. CONST. art 2, § 1, cl. 1, known as the “Vesting Clause.”
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faithfully executed”46). But if presidential immunity from criminal
indictment was a major point of disagreement among the Founders , written
records do not reveal it, given that there are no reported direct statements in
which any of them argued that a President could not be indicted while in
office.
The most that can be found on this subject is a handful of remarks by
Hamilton in the Federalist Papers about both impeachment and criminal
liability being methods for holding a renegade President accountable. Twice,
Hamilton uses language suggesting that he envisions impeachment and
removal of a President as preceding criminal trial and punishment, but he
never stated that it could not be the other way around. In Federalist No. 69,
Hamilton says:
The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried,
and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or
misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to
prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. The person of
the king of Great Britain is sacred and inviolable; there is no constitutional
tribunal to which he is amenable; no punishment to which he can be
subjected without involving the crisis of a national revolution. In this delicate
and important circumstance of personal responsibility, the President of
Confederated America would stand upon no better ground than a governor of New
York, and upon worse ground than the governors of Virginia and Delaware.47

Hamilton’s comparison of Presidents to governors is notable on the
question of immunity for the latter. To that point, the subject of a governor’s
arrest and criminal prosecution had gone unaddressed, and indeed was not
addressed until a prominent case involving the indicted but acquitted Illinois
Governor Len Small in 1920.48 That case was followed by the successful
46
47

48

U.S. CONST. art 2, § 3, cl. 1, known as the “Take Care Clause.”
THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (italics added). Much of Federalist No. 69,
including the sentence after the one quoted here is focused on distinguishing the U.S. President
from the King of Great Britain, who is absolutely immune from prosecution under British law.
Hamilton repeatedly refers to comparisons between the powers and privileges of the President and
the governors of the various states, often making the point that the President’s power and privileges
do not exceed those of a governor.
See Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, Immunity of State Executive from Arrest, 35 HARV. L. REV. 185, 185 (1921)
(stating that at the time of the arrest and indictment of then Illinois Governor Len Small “[t]he
question of whether the chief executive of a state may be arrested on a criminal charge during his
term of office has never been directly decided”). Governor Small was tried and acquitted on
corruption charges while in office, then reelected after eight of the jurors got jobs with the state.
Stephan Benzkofer, Len Small: Perhaps the Dirtiest Illinois Governor of Them All, CHI. TRIB. (June 19,
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indictment of more sitting governors in the hundred years since. If Hamilton
had written Federalist No. 69 today, perhaps he would have said that “the
President stands on no better ground than a governor of Illinois.”49
Hamilton also says that an impeached and removed President “would
afterwards be liable to prosecution,”50 a point enthusiasts of presidential
immunity seize on to support their interpretation that both the text of the
Constitution and the Federalist Papers support criminal conviction of a
sitting President only after impeachment. Thus Justice Samuel Alito in his
dissent in the Vance case pointed to the above passage in Federalist No. 69 to
support the proposition that Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 means precisely
that: “The plain implication is that criminal prosecution, like removal from
the Presidency and disqualification from other offices, is a consequence that
can come about only after the Senate’s judgment, not during or prior to the
Senate trial.”51 This passage in Federalist No. 69, however, does nothing
more than recapitulate the language in the Impeachment Clause itself.52
Nowhere does Hamilton state that a President is unlike other federal officers
with regard to prosecution prior to impeachment and removal.
The other Hamilton publication sometimes cited by proponents of
presidential immunity is Federalist No. 77, in which Hamilton references
impeachment and removal of a President and subsequent trial “in the

49

50

51
52

2011), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/ct-per-flashback-small-0619-20110619story.html [https://perma.cc/WEF5-AQXG].
A later sitting Illinois governor was not as lucky as Governor Small. See Jeff Coen, et al., Blagojevich
Arrested; Fitzgerald Calls It a Political Corruption Crime Spree, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 10, 2008),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-rod-blagojevich-1209-story.html [https://perma.cc/
RKB9-WLQR] (reporting the arrest of the sitting Governor Blagojevich by federal agents on
corruption charges). He was later impeached and removed from office. See Ray Long & Rick
Person, Impeached Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojevich Has Been Removed from Office, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 30, 2009),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-blagojevich-impeachment-removal-story.html
[https://perma.cc/5WWA-XQRX] (reporting senators unanimously voted to remove
Blagojevich).
See e.g., O.L.C. 1973 Memo at 19, note 11, quoting part of this passage from Federalist No. 69:
(“The President [unlike the king] would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction * *
* removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the
ordinary course of law.”). The OLC omits from its quote Hamilton’s comparison of Presidents to
governors in the very same paragraph of Federalist No. 69.
Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2444.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“[T]he Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.”)
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common course of law.”53 Proponents of presidential immunity infer that
Hamilton contemplated an impeachment-then-indictment order from the
word “subsequent” buried in this passage.54 Among defenders of this view
are attorneys in the OLC who defended this position in its 1973 memo on
presidential immunity.55 But this brief allusion by Hamilton to a criminal
trial after an impeachment and conviction does not preclude a criminal
indictment of a sitting President or any other federal officer before his
impeachment. Indeed, as noted in the previous Section, Hamilton used
similar language in Federalist No. 65 to describe the impeachment and
subsequent trial of any federal officer, not just a President. All he did was
reiterate the language of the Impeachment Clause applicable to all federal
officers. As also discussed in the preceding Section, the Impeachment Clause
almost certainly does not preclude the criminal indictment of these other
federal officers prior to their impeachment.
Furthermore, reading the entire passage, not just the single phrase
including the word “subsequent,” it is clear that Hamilton intended
Federalist No. 77 to be a “survey of the structure and powers of the executive
department.”56 If he truly believed that structure included presidential
immunity from criminal prosecution, he presumably would have said so
directly. Hamilton also ends this passage in Federalist No. 77 saying that
“these precautions, great as they are, are not the only ones which the plan of

53

54

55
56

In the last paragraph of Federalist No. 77, Hamilton says:
“We have now completed a survey of the structure and powers of the executive
department, which, I have endeavored to show, combines, as far as republican principles
will admit, all the requisites to energy. The remaining inquiry is: Does it also combine the
requisites to safety, in a republican sense, a due dependence on the people, a due
responsibility? The answer to this question has been anticipated in the investigation of its
other characteristics, and is satisfactorily deducible from these circumstances; from the
election of the President once in four years by persons immediately chosen by the people
for that purpose; and from his being at all times liable to impeachment, trial, dismission
from office, incapacity to serve in any other, and to forfeiture of life and estate by
subsequent prosecution in the common course of law. But these precautions, great as they
are, are not the only ones which the plan of the convention has provided in favor of the
public security. In the only instances in which the abuse of the executive authority was
materially to be feared, the Chief Magistrate of the United States would, by that plan, be
subjected to the control of a branch of the legislative body.”
THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton).
For example, the 1973 OLC Memo quotes a snippet from this passage from Federalist No. 77 in
footnote 13 on page 19: “The President is at all times liable to impeachment, trial, dismission from
office and to forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent prosecution in the common course of law.”
See discussion of the 1973 OLC memo infra Section I.C.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 53.
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the convention has provided in favor of the public security,”57 and that the
President is subject to the control of the legislative branch. One of the things
the legislative branch does is enact criminal statutes. Nowhere does
Hamilton say that these statutes do not apply to the President.
Finally, Hamilton’s views—whatever he thought on the immunity
question—were not necessarily the views of the majority of the drafters of the
Constitution or the state legislatures that ratified it. Many Jeffersonians
strongly disliked Hamilton, including President Jefferson’s Vice President
Aaron Burr who killed Hamilton in a dual in 1804. We do not know whether
Hamilton believed that a sitting President could shoot someone on the street
and escape criminal prosecution, but we do know that a sitting Vice President
shot Hamilton dead. Burr was indicted for murder in New Jersey and
apparently also in New York but was not prosecuted.58 Burr fled from New
Jersey as far as Florida and he was not impeached for the duel either.59 His
1804 murder indictment was dug up 170 years later to refute claims by
lawyers for another Vice President, Spiro Agnew, to argue that Agnew could
not be indicted while in office.60 The broader point is that constitutional
interpretation based on discerning the intent of the Framers from the stated
views of Hamilton, Burr or other men who so strongly disagreed with one
another, and occasionally even shot each other, can be an exercise of limited
utility, particularly when used to fancifully project onto the text of the
Constitution concepts like presidential immunity from prosecution, when the
Constitution itself does not support this view.
Lacking sufficient support from Hamilton and other Federalists, modern
proponents of presidential power sometimes turn to debunking the writings
57
58

59
60

Id.
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Could Aaron Burr Have Been Impeached for the Duel, LAW & LIBERTY (July
11, 2018), https://lawliberty.org/could-aaron-burr-have-been-impeached-for-the-duel/ [https://
perma.cc/E386-FNUG].
See id.
Burr’s indictment was resurrected from a library in New Jersey in 1973 when Vice President
Agnew’s lawyers raised constitutional questions about whether a sitting Vice President could be
indicted. “The [1804] Burr indictment, and a New York indictment against him deriving from the
duel, could become evidence in determining the legal precedents for the indictment of a sitting Vice
President, The New York indictment has not been found. Lawyers for Vice President. Agnew, who
is under investigation in Maryland, have gone to Federal court to challenge the authority of any
legal jurisdiction outside Congress to indict a sitting Vice President with a criminal act.” Indictment
of Burr Is Found in Trenton, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 1973), https://www.
nytimes.com/1973/10/04/archives/indictment-of-burr-is-found-in-trenton.html [https://perma.
cc/B4LX-JULL].
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of Anti-Federalists, many of whom feared the American President would
become like a European king: immune from criminal prosecution and all
powerful. These Anti-Federalists often wrote exaggerated descriptions of the
risks of presidential power, which two hundred and forty years later can be
distorted to claim that their opponents, the Federalists, believed that the
American President was in fact bestowed with the powers of a king. Citing
publications collectively known as the “Anti Federalist” papers, published
anonymously under the pen name “Cato,”61 for example, former OLC
lawyer John Yoo argues that the powers of the President were likely to be as
sweeping as those of the King of England, particularly where matters of war
and peace are concerned:
Cato correctly concluded that in the realm of practical politics, the
President’s authority under the Constitution did not differ in important
measure from that of the King. Antifederalists asked how Congress could
control the President if the executive in Great Britain had come to such
power even in the face of formal parliamentary powers over the purse. In
terms of practical politics, the President would have the same authority as
the British monarch to plunge the nation into war, or lead it into peace.62

Yoo’s argument here is problematic, both because of the misleading use
it makes of historical sources and because of the profoundly anti-democratic
nature of his conclusion. Although Yoo’s point here is about war powers,
not presidential immunity from prosecution, his backwards induction
argument is similar to that used by the Solicitor General in Trump v. Vance to
defend the concept of presidential immunity: If an Anti-Federalist attributes
to Federalists the view that the President, like a king, is all powerful and
immune from prosecution, that proves not only that Federalists actually
believed this, but that extremely broad presidential powers should be read
into the Constitution. As we point out below, Solicitor General Noel J.
Francisco in his 2020 amicus brief in Trump v. Vance similarly invoked a 1789
account of Federalist rhetoric by anti-Federalist Pennsylvania Senator
William Maclay for the proposition that the Constitution embodied the

61
62

The identity of “Cato” has not been proven but is widely believed to be George Clinton, the first
Governor of New York State.
John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84
CALIF. L. REV. 167, 275–76 (1996).
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presidential immunity that Maclay passionately believed was inconsistent
with representative democracy.63
In fact, there is every reason to think that the Framers were extremely
worried about replicating the monarchy they had just fought a war to reject.
They disagreed among themselves about the power of the federal
government vis à vis the states, and the powers of the President vis à vis the
other two branches of the federal government. But there is little if any
evidence that any of them wanted another king, even a king who served only
for a term of four years. Hamilton took pains to emphasize that a President
was no more like a king than the governor of a state.64 Others emphasized
even more emphatically that the President lacked the prerogatives and
privileges of a king.65
What evidence is there that in the face of their concerns about creating
another king, the Framers were simultaneously willing to immunize the
American President against criminal prosecution? In view of the substantial
impact presidential immunity would have for broader issues of constitutional
interpretation, proponents of presidential immunity surely bear the burden
of proof on this issue. What historical evidence there is, however, suggests

63

64

65

See Brief of the United States at 9, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19–635) (citing
and quoting from portions of the Journal of William Maclay that repeat statements allegedly made
in a private conversation by Vice President John Adams about immunity of the President from
prosecution).
Hamilton noted these comparisons at the beginning of Federalist No. 69: “The first thing which
strikes our attention is, that the executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single
magistrate. This will scarcely, however, be considered as a point upon which any comparison can
be grounded; for if, in this particular, there be a resemblance to the king of Great Britain, there is
not less a resemblance to the Grand Seignior, to the khan of Tartary, to the Man of the Seven
Mountains, or to the governor of New York.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
The OLC recognized this distinction of the President from the British monarch in its 1973 memo:
“The Framers of the Constitution made abundantly clear that the President was intended to be a
chief executive, responsible subject to the law, and lacking the prerogatives and privileges of the
king of England.”1973 OLC Memo. at 20 n.14, referencing “James Wilson’s statements that the
prerogatives of the British monarch were not to be the proper guide in defining Executive powers,”
in Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, Vol. I. p. 65, and also James Wilson’s statement
that “the President would not be above the law, nor have a single privilege annexed to his
character.” Id. at 20 n. 14 citing 2 Elliot’s Debates 480. The OLC also cited James Iredell’s speech
comparing the position of the King of England who “has great powers and prerogatives, and can
do no wrong, with that of the President who is no better than his fellow citizens and can pretend
no superiority over the meanest man in the Country.” Id. citing 4 Elliot’s Debates 109. We discuss
and quote Iredell in more detail in this Article below.

116

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24:1

the opposite to be the case. As noted historian Pauline Maier points out, 66
at least one Federalist, James Iredell, at his state ratification convention
explicitly argued that broad presidential powers under Article II were
justified because the President, like anyone else, could be charged with a
crime. Commenting on the role of the privy council in Great Britain and its
relationship with the monarch, Iredell remarks:
In that country, the executive authority is vested in a magistrate who holds
it by birthright. He has great powers and prerogatives, and it is a
constitutional maxim, that he can do no wrong. We have experienced that he
can do wrong, yet no man can say so in his own country. There are no
courts to try him for any high crimes; nor is there any constitutional method
of depriving him of his throne. If he loses it, it must be by a general resistance
of his people, contrary to forms of law, as at the revolution which took place
about a hundred years ago.

He proceeds to emphasize the rather different nature of the American
presidency:
Under our Constitution we are much happier . . . . No man has an
authority to injure another with impunity. No man is better than his fellowcitizens, nor can pretend to any superiority over the meanest man in the
country. If the President does a single act by which the people are
prejudiced, he is punishable himself, and no other man merely to screen
him. If he commits any misdemeanor in office, he is impeachable,
removable from office, and incapacitated to hold any office of honor, trust,
or profit. If he commits any crime, he is punishable by the laws of his country, and in
capital cases may be deprived of his life. This being the case, there is not the same
reason here for having a council which exists in England.67

Iredell’s basic point is that the President’s powers under Article II—
including his control over other federal officers and the absence of an
independent privy council—are justified precisely because the President is
fully answerable to the people under the law. He is answerable both to the
representatives of the people under the Impeachment Clause and to trial in
the courts for ordinary crimes. As Iredell suggests, a President who had the
immunity of a king would need to have his powers constrained, along the
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PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788 416
(2010).
Speech by James Iredell at the North Carolina Ratifying Convention 28 July 1788, in THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN
1787, 4:108–10 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1888), reprinted by Univ. of Chi. Founders Documents.
https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a2_2_1s13.html [https://perma.cc/
H59K-PJZP] (emphasis added).
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lines of the model that the British used to constrain their king, a model that
contemplated removal of a privy council officer only with the consent of the
legislature. But because the President is not a king, and therefore is not above
the law, the constraint of a privy council was deemed unnecessary and thus
was not included in the Constitution. If Iredell’s account of the constitutional
deliberations is accurate, the Framers gave the President unfettered control
over the executive branch because he would not be allowed to commit crimes
in office.68 Bestowing king-like privileges and immunities on a President is
not compatible with the way Iredell and others described the new
constitution to their respective states during the ratification process.69
Another important source from the time of the founding on this issue is
the famous Journal of William Maclay.70 Maclay, a Senator from Pennsylvania
in the 1789–91 Congress, was worried that George Washington would
exercise king-like powers with the support of the Federalists. Perhaps
exaggerating some of the arguments he had with his political opponents in
the Federalist party, Maclay details the debates between the parties about
presidential authority. On September 26, 1789, for example, Maclay had an
argument with three Federalists—Vice President John Adams, Senator
Oliver Ellsworth, and Representative Fisher Ames—about whether the
President was subject to the authority of the federal courts. The argument
started over the seemingly technical issue of whether the House of
Representatives had been correct in failing to require that all process served
by federal courts be issued in the name of the President, by analogy with the
way British courts issued summons and other process in the name of the
King. Then came discussion of the broader underlying issue of whether the
President presided over the federal courts or was subject to the authority of
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69
70

Whether Congress by statute can constrain the President’s control over the executive branch is
another question. We do not address in this Article the “unitary executive theory” holding that a
President may remove a superior federal officer in the executive branch at will regardless of a statute
protecting that officer’s tenure. See, e.g., Seila Law v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (holding that
the President has the constitutional power to remove the director of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau). The broader one interprets “unitary executive theory” the more compelling is
the point that Iredell made at the South Carolina ratifying convention that presidential power
should be checked by accountably under the law, including the criminal law.
Alexander Hamilton also distinguished the President from a king in the Federalists papers he sent
to the people of New York. See supra text accompanying note 47.
Maclay’s remarks were quoted, but distorted, by the Solicitor General in the Vance case. See Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct.
2412 (2020) (No. 19–635) [hereinafter Brief of the Solicitor General in Trump v. Vance].
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the courts like every other citizen. Maclay writes that following the departure
of Ames from the discussion:
[Adams and Ellsworth] said the President, personally, was not the subject of
any process whatever; could have no action whatever brought against him;
was above the power of all judges, justices, etc. For what, said they, would
you put it in the power of a common justice to exercise any authority over
him and stop the whole machine of government? I said that, although
President, he is not above the laws. Both of them declared you could only
impeach him, and no other process whatever lay against him.71

The debate recorded in Maclay’s journal that day then turns to precisely
the topic under discussion here, namely whether a sitting President could be
indicted before he has been impeached. Maclay firmly believed that the
President could be criminally charged, and he made this clear in a passage
using a hypothetical that is nearly identical to the hypothetical that Trump
himself raised of his shooting someone on Fifth Avenue during his 2016
campaign:
I put the case: “Suppose the President committed murder in the street.
Impeach him? But you can only remove him from office on impeachment.
Why, when he is no longer President you can indict him. But in the
meantime he runs away. But I will put up another case. Suppose he
continues his murders daily, and neither House is willing to impeach him?”
Oh, the people would arise and restrain him. “Very well, you will allow the
mob to do what legal justice must abstain from.” Mr. Adams said I was
arguing from cases nearly impossible. There had been some hundreds of
crowned heads within these two centuries in Europe, and there was no
instance of any of them having committed murder. Very true, in the retail
way, Charles IX of France excepted. They generally do these things on a
great scale. I am, however, certainly within the bounds of possibility, though
it may be improbable.72

In sum, the Framers disagreed about the powers and privileges of the
President, and although they rarely discussed the immunity question, at least
one person—Maclay—was adamant that a President could be charged with
crimes while in office. He was also adamant about the broader point that
had started the entire discussion, namely that the President was subject to
judicial process and that because a President could be charged with a crime
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WILLIAM MACLAY, JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY 166–67 (E. Maclay ed., 1890), quoted in the
Brief of the Solicitor General in Trump v. Vance at 9, and in Impeachment or Indictment: Is a Sitting President
Subject to the Compulsory Criminal Process? Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Const., Federalism, and Prop.
Rts of the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 11 (1998).
MACLAY, supra note 71, at 167.
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like anyone else it would make no sense for judicial process in a federal court
to issue in the name of the President. In fact, such has never been the case.
Judicial process does not issue in the name of the President, and the President
is subject to the rulings of the judges and justices, one of three coequal
branches of the federal government.
On the broader point, Maclay was ultimately vindicated by the Supreme
Court’s subsequent decision in Marbury v. Madison.73 Although the case was
brought against Secretary of State James Madison, not directly against
President Thomas Jefferson, the Court made it clear that both the President
and Congress are subject to the legal rulings of federal courts: “It is
emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what
the law is.”74 To the extent that Adams, Ames, or Ellsworth had argued as
Maclay said they did, namely that the President was beyond the authority of
the courts, that view did not prevail either in the text of the Constitution or
in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. Furthermore, if
these three men arguing with Maclay or other Federalists actually believed
strongly in presidential immunity from criminal prosecution, they likely
would have written those views down or spoken of them in a more formal
setting than a casual cloakroom discussion about whether federal courts
should issue process in the name of the President. Alternatively, it is also
possible that Maclay was exaggerating what Adams said to illustrate Maclay’s
own fears about the dangers of presidential immunity.
It is admittedly difficult to separate opportunistic arguments from
philosophical principle when it comes to the Framers, particularly when
there is so little writing from that period on the questions under
consideration. But assuming John Adams, George Washington’s Vice
President and Washington’s successor as President, did indeed say what
Maclay reported, we can at least partially dismiss those remarks as an effort
to strengthen offices which Adams himself held, at least until the Federalists
lost control of the Executive Branch in 1800. Adams was not the only one.
Even states’ rights advocate Thomas Jefferson could change his tune when
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Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
Id. at 177. The facts of the case are well-known. Jefferson’s Secretary of State, Madison, had acted
illegally by withholding from Marbury a judicial commission signed by the previous President John
Adams, but Congress also had violated the constitution by giving the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction instead of appellate jurisdiction over a case such as this one involving a writ of
mandamus.
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his own circumstances changed. In the 1807 case of United States v. Burr,75 for
example, in which President Jefferson defied a subpoena to produce evidence
in the prosecution of former Vice President Burr for treason, Justice John
Marshall also discussed the difference between the U.S. President and the
king of England, saying that in the case of the king, “it is said to be
incompatible with his dignity to appear under the process of the court . . . .”
Whereas in the case of the U.S. President, he wrote:
[I]t is not known ever to have been doubted, but that the chief magistrate of
a state might be served with a subpoena ad testificandum. If, in any court of
the United States, it has ever been decided that a subpoena cannot issue to
the [P]resident, that decision is unknown to this court . . . . If, in being
summoned to give his personal attendance to testify, the law does not
discriminate between the [P]resident and a private citizen, what foundation
is there for the opinion that this difference is created by the circumstance
that his testimony depends on a paper in his possession, not on facts which
have come to his knowledge otherwise than by writing? The court can
perceive no foundation for such an opinion. The propriety of introducing any
paper into a case, as testimony, must depend on the character of the paper, not on the
character of the person who holds it. A subpoena duces tecum, then, may issue to
any person to whom an ordinary subpoena may issue, directing him to bring
any paper of which the party praying it has a right to avail himself as
testimony; if, indeed, that be the necessary process for obtaining the view of
such a paper.76

As the Burr court emphasized, the judgment whether to issue a subpoena
pertains to the relevance of the material being subpoenaed, not to the identity
of the individual who must be sent such subpoena.
Defenders of presidential immunity have gone to great lengths to
minimize the importance of the holding in Burr. John Yoo, for example,
argues that the Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon put too much emphasis
on Burr.77 But the Supreme Court itself begs to differ. The Court’s 2020

75
76
77

United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
Id. at 3410–35 (emphasis added).
See John C. Yoo, The First Claim: The Burr Trial, United States v. Nixon, and Presidential Power, 83 MINN.
L. REV. 1435, 1464 (1999) (“The way that Burr has been read, however, is quite different than the
way in which it was resolved. It is difficult to interpret Burr as standing firmly for the propositions
that: 1) the judiciary has the power to compel [P]residents to obey its commands without question;
and 2) that the courts have the final say on questions of executive privilege.”); id. at 1465 (“In this
light, we can see that United States v. Nixon’s reliance upon Burr was somewhat misplaced. Burr does
establish the principle that the President is subject to judicial process, but only in the absence of a
conflict with the chief executive’s constitutional duties. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinions and
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opinion in Trump v. Vance, which we discuss more fully below, includes a
lengthy expose on Burr78 as well as the importance of that holding in assessing
the President’s amenability to criminal process over two hundred years later.
And while there was no doubt disagreement among the Framers about the
role of the judiciary in constraining the President, since Burr it has been clear
that the President is subject to both criminal and civil subpoena. The
question whether the President is also subject to criminal indictment and trial
while in office was rarely discussed—William Maclay’s journal being the
noted exception—and was never fully resolved. That question remains
largely unresolved today.
Looking at the political circumstances more broadly, there are good
reasons to believe that the Framers would not have accepted complete
presidential immunity from criminal prosecution.
The DemocratRepublicans were skeptical of a strong centralized government and likely
would have objected strenuously to an unaccountable President. But the
Federalists also had good reason to avoid a President who could not be held
accountable under the criminal law.79 The Framers were aware that
England’s brief experiment with Republican government after the English
revolution in the mid-17th century ended in dictatorship and eventual
restoration of the monarchy.80 The aristocratic Federalists strongly disliked
the more plebian Cromwellian persona. John Adams spoke of Oliver
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80

actions, however, as well as those of President Jefferson, provide little support for the Nixon Court’s
holding that the federal judiciary may exercise the power to determine the constitutional powers of
the executive branch.”).
See Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2421–24 (2020) (describing the district court’s holding that
President Jefferson was not immune from complying with Burr’s subpoena).
Julius Ceasar and later Roman consuls including Nero consolidated executive power by appealing
to the common people against the wealth and privilege of the senatorial class. See RICHARD W.
PAINTER & PETER GOLENBOCK, AMERICAN NERO: THE HISTORY OF THE DESTRUCTION OF
THE RULE OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES AND WHY DONALD TRUMP IS THE WORST
OFFENDER 1–2 (2020) (discussing increasing concentration of power in the hands of Roman consuls
and then emperors and Emperor Nero’s appeal to the masses in his political struggle with rivals).
Oliver Cromwell had appealed to his political base of religious fundamentalists, abused his role as
commander in chief, dissolved the Parliament by military force after a dispute over elections in
1653, pursued ethnic cleansing in Ireland—the “Cromwellian genocide” against Ireland’s Catholic
population—and installed himself as England’s “lord protector for life.” See generally PAUL LAY,
PROVIDENCE LOST: THE RISE AND FALL OF CROMWELL’S PROTECTORATE 155 (2020) (“By
conflating foreign and domestic policy, Cromwell hardened his anti-Catholic rhetoric. When he
accused the Spanish of being the enemy of ‘all that is God in you,’ he alluded to their influence at
home.”).
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Cromwell being antithetical to the republican ideal,81 and Hamilton in
Federalist No. 21 grounded his case for a strong central government in part
in fears that an unchecked Cromwellian leader could gain ascendency in one
or more of the individual states.82 It is unlikely that these Federalists, even
while advocating for a strong central government, would advocate for a
President who could commit crimes with impunity as long as he had the
support of one third of the Senate.
Furthermore, the Framers knew that the Constitution would bestow on
the President far more power and independence from the legislative branch
than, say, that possessed by a British prime minister. A British prime minister
cannot unilaterally stop a bill from passing the House of Commons; a U.S.
President can veto a bill subject only to override by two-thirds of both houses
of Congress. A British prime minister generally can be removed and
replaced by a majority vote in the Commons, whereas a U.S. President can
only be removed if impeached for “high crimes and misdemeanors” by a
majority of the House and convicted by two-thirds of the Senate. Having
given broad powers and protection of tenure to the President, the Framers
would not have wanted to allow the President to engage in criminal conduct
unchecked by prosecution for as long as he remained in office.
Since the founding there has only been one recorded instance in which a
President was charged with a crime, and that for a minor offense, namely
Ulysses S. Grant, who famously was arrested and paid a speeding ticket for
81

82

See Letter from John Adams to Unknown (April 27, 1777), in 6 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO
CONGRESS, January 1, 1777–April 30, 1777, 664 (“I make no Scruple to confess that I think Oliver
totally destitute of the Republican Principle of public Virtue. He thought himself honest and
sincere. So did Balaam, when he asked Leave to curse Israel. There never was a greater self
deceiver than Oliver Cromwell. The Man after Gods own Heart, to whom Nathan Said Thou art
the Man, deceived himself in the Same manner. How sincere was he, when he felt such honest
Indignation against the Man who had taken his poor Neighbours Lamb.”).
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 21. (Alexander Hamilton) (“Without a guaranty the assistance to be
derived from the Union in repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten the
existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation may rear its crest in each State,
and trample upon the liberties of the people, while the national government could legally do nothing
more than behold its encroachments with indignation and regret. A successful faction may erect a
tyranny on the ruins of order and law, while no succor could constitutionally be afforded by the
Union to the friends and supporters of the government. The tempestuous situation from which
Massachusetts has scarcely emerged, evinces that dangers of this kind are not merely speculative.
Who can determine what might have been the issue of her late convulsions, if the malcontents had
been headed by a Caesar or by a Cromwell? Who can predict what effect a despotism, established
in Massachusetts, would have upon the liberties of New Hampshire or Rhode Island, of
Connecticut or New York?”)
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driving his carriage too fast through Rock Creek Park.83 Admittedly, then, as
a nation we have not had to grapple much with the question of what to do
about a criminal President. But the weight of the text of the Constitution,
what little we know of the views of the Framers, and common sense all tilt in
the direction of accepting the possibility of criminal indictment of a sitting
President.
C. Office of Legal Counsel Memoranda
Since 1973, the Justice Department has been officially of the opinion that
it is unconstitutional to indict a sitting President and has guided its attorneys
accordingly. The Department made this clear in two memoranda issued by
the OLC, one in 1973 in the run up to the U.S. v. Nixon case, and the other
after the independent prosecutor investigation of President Clinton in 2000.
These two memos have done significant damage to the efforts to hold
Presidents accountable for their actions.
A third OLC memorandum on a closely related issue was written in
March of 2019 after Robert Mueller’s investigation of President Trump. The
memo addresses whether the evidence of obstruction of justice set out by
Robert Mueller in the second half of his report makes out a prima facie case
of criminal obstruction under federal law. Citizens for Responsibility and
Ethics in Washington (“CREW”) successfully sued the DOJ for release of the
memo under the Freedom of Information Act, and a federal court ordered
its release.84 The Justice Department appealed that order in 2021, thus
continuing the Department’s defense of presidential privilege and siding with
the Trump Administration’s approach to such matters.85 As of the time of
83
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See That Time a President Got in Trouble with the Police, NPR, (Dec. 22, 2018, 8:01 AM)
https://www.npr.org/2018/12/22/679448648/that-time-a-president-got-in-trouble-with-thepolice [https://perma.cc/ZZX9-9U8G] (last visited Sept. 15, 2021) (discussing President Grant’s
arrest for speeding and his payment of the fine).
See Citizens For Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No.19–1552 ABJ, Mem. Op. & J.
(D. D.C., May 3, 2021) (granting CREW’s request for Mueller’s March 24, 2019 memorandum to
the Attorney General).
We have been critical of the Biden DOJ’s policy of defending former President Trump’s executive
privilege with respect to this OLC memo as well as President Trump’s communications with his
White House Counsel Don McGahn. See Claire O. Finkelstein & Richard W. Painter, Trump Had
a Sweeping View of ‘Executive Privilege.’ Now Biden Is Defending It, WASH. POST (May 29, 2021, 6:00
AM) https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/05/29/executive-privilege-immunitybiden-trump/ [https://perma.cc/3Z4T-23RN] (last visited Sept. 15, 2021) (describing such a
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this writing, the memo has been released in heavily redacted form, with all
substantive analysis blacked out. The visible portion of the memo, however,
says that “the evidence described in Volume II of the [Mueller] Report is
not, in our judgment, sufficient to support a conclusion beyond a reasonable
doubt that the President violated the obstruction-of-justice statutes.”86
Despite the detailed description of Trump’s possible obstruction of justice
in Part II of the special counsel report, Mueller ultimately accepted the
OLC’s conclusion that a sitting President could not be indicted, in view of
“the role of the Special Counsel as an attorney in [the] DOJ and the
framework of the Special Counsel regulations . . . .”87 Mueller felt his hands
were tied by the DOJ memos, but he recognized grounds for holding Trump
accountable. First, he pointed out that the Department’s tradition of
refraining from indictment in the case of a President did not apply to a
criminal investigation during the President’s term; second, that a sitting
President does not have immunity from prosecution after leaving office;
third, that others might be prosecuted for obstruction if they were involved
in the President’s obstructive conduct; and fourth that there is a “strong
public interest in safeguarding the integrity of the criminal justice system.”88
Mueller concluded that there were grounds for identifying President
Trump’s behavior as obstructive, though his phrasing was rather elusive.89
In this case, the DOJ could have found that because the President is not
subject to criminal indictment, it did not need to consider the substantive
case for obstruction. Yet the OLC went out of its way to make a substantive
comment on Trump’s potential liability, maintaining that “were there no
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situation as common because “[w]hen the White House changes hands, preservation of
presidential privilege continues because of implicit understandings between [P]residents, even of
opposite political parties, that each successive [P]resident will prioritize the power and secrecy of
the office.”).
Memorandum for the Attorney General, Review of the Special Counsel’s Report, March 24, 2019.
https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/olc-mueller-report-memo/d5a8c423fee97ec3/full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G7WM-ZCN8].
ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REP. ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1 (2019) [hereinafter MUELLER
REPORT]. Released to the public in redacted form on April 18, 2019.
Id. at 1–2.
The Mueller Report put the point in elliptical fashion: “if we had confidence after a thorough
investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would
so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach that
judgment. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime,
it also does not exonerate him.” Id. at 446.
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constitutional barrier, we would recommend, under the Principles of Federal
Prosecution, that you decline to commence such a prosecution.”90
Mueller’s short treatment of the presidential immunity question did not
explore the OLC memos in any detail. The holding in Trump v. Vance,
namely that the President is subject to a state grand jury subpoena, had not
yet been delivered. One can only speculate about whether that holding
would have made a difference to Mueller’s willingness to adhere to the OLC
position on presidential indictment. It is our contention, however, that the
DOJ memos must be reevaluated in light of a tension that exists between
those memos and the holdings of the Nixon and Clinton cases, and most
importantly, in light of the most recent addition to the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on presidential immunity, namely the Vance case. In the
discussion that follows, we consider the 1973 and 2000 DOJ memos in some
detail and explain why we believe that even these memos do not establish
that a sitting President cannot be indicted. We then turn to the three
Supreme Court cases on the President’s amenability to judicial process—
Nixon, Clinton, and Vance. The weight of Supreme Court jurisprudence,
combined with the textual evidence and the limited evidence of the Framer’s
intent on this question, suggest that these DOJ memos should be withdrawn
and a new memorandum issued to bring the Department’s position more
into line with Supreme Court jurisprudence. The OLC’s categorical rule
against indicting a sitting President in the 1973 and 2000 memos should be
replaced by a more nuanced approach that acknowledges the constitutional
permissibility in appropriate cases of indicting a sitting President and gives
federal courts a role in ensuring that further criminal process does not unduly
interfere with the President’s Article II duties.
The 1973 memo was written during the investigations into President
Nixon’s role in the Watergate scandal and as well as a scandal engulfing Vice
President Agnew. As discussed above, this memo rejects the argument
offered by some enthusiasts of presidential immunity, including Professors
Bobbitt and Sunstein,91 that the Impeachment Clause of the Constitution
precludes criminal indictment of federal officers prior to their impeachment
and removal.92 The 1973 OLC memorandum states:
90
91
92

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 20–21.
1973 O.L.C. Memo at 2. See also supra, text accompanying notes 20–21 (discussing the
Impeachment Clause in Article I, Section 3).
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The suggestion has been made that Article I, [S]ection 3, [C]lause 7
prohibits the institution of criminal proceedings against a person subject to
impeachment prior to the termination of impeachment proceedings. . . .
Article I, [S]ection 3, [C]lause 7, however, does not say that a person subject
to impeachment may be tried only after the completion of that process.
Instead the constitutional provision uses the term “nevertheless.” The
purpose of this clause thus is to permit criminal prosecution in spite of the
prior adjudication by the Senate—i.e., to forestall a double jeopardy
argument.

The memo then goes on to explain the likely purpose of the constitutional
provision, citing originalist evidence to back up its point:
A speech made by Luther Martin—who had been a member of the
Constitutional Convention—during the impeachment proceedings of Justice
Chase shows that Article I, Section 3, [C]lause 7 was designed to overcome
a claim of double jeopardy rather than to require that impeachment must
precede any criminal proceedings.93

The 1973 OLC memo also observed that the Impeachment Clause
applies to all federal officers subject to impeachment, not just the President.
Making all of those officials immune from criminal prosecution while in office
is something that the Framers very likely would have said explicitly if they
had intended it. Indeed, the 1973 OLC memo recognizes that as of 1973
only twelve federal officers had ever been impeached, yet “scores, if not
hundreds,” of federal officers had been prosecuted for crimes for which they
could have been impeached.94
Another problem with the “impeachment is the only remedy” argument
is that impeachment is both broader and narrower than the body of statutory
crimes with which a federal officer might be charged. Impeachment can
follow offenses that are not necessarily statutory crimes, and at the same time
not all statutory crimes are impeachable. The 1973 OLC memo recites
authority for the proposition that impeachment is for wrongs of a political
nature, meaning the Impeachment Clause covers more than statutory crimes
but also does not cover “private” crimes “of the sort that a non-officer may
also commit.”95 This divergence of impeachment from the criminal code
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1973 O.L.C. Memo at 3, citing 14 ANNALS OF CONG., 432 (1805).
1973 O.L.C. Memo at 4.
Id. at 12–13.
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suggests that the two proceedings serve different purposes and are not
intended to interfere with one another.96
There are also different procedures as well as different remedies in
impeachment and in criminal trials. Prosecution by the House and trial by
the Senate are vastly different from trial by jury. The 1973 OLC memo notes
that the Constitution limits impeachment to removal and disqualification
from future office. The impeachment model used in Great Britain at the
time the U.S. Constitution was adopted, by contrast, allowed the House of
Lords to impose criminal sanctions, including the death penalty.97 These two
functions were disentangled in the U.S. framework. Accordingly, the
argument that impeachment is the sole remedy for crimes in office is
substantially weaker in the U.S. than it was in its British counterpart.
Furthermore, the 1973 OLC memo raises the complex topic of tolling
the statute of limitations for criminal charges against federal officers. It points
out the need for tolling if federal officers cannot be prosecuted until after they
leave office. Congress apparently has never seen the need to enact tolling
provisions by statute until recently. In December 2021, the U.S. House
passed the Protecting our Democracy Act, a bill aimed at curbing abuses of
presidential power.98 Following an amendment inspired in part by an op-ed
of the current authors,99 Section 202 of the bill implicitly acknowledges that
a sitting President or Vice President can be indicted in a criminal case by
authorizing a delay in the trial if it would “interfere with the performance of
the defendant’s duties while in office.”100 The bill also provides for equitable
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A federal officer charged with a crime, for example, cannot defend against conviction on the
grounds that the offense is not impeachable. Id. at 15.
Id. at 3 n.3, citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, vol. I, §§ 784, 785
(1833).
Protecting
Our
Democracy
Act,
H.R.
5314,
117th
Cong.
(2021),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5314/text [https://perma.cc/HHH27ZRG].
Claire O. Finkelstein & Richard W. Painter, Tolling the Statute of Limitations to Prosecute a Former
President:
A
Double-Edged
Sword,
Lawfare,
LAWFARE
(Sept.
30,
2021),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/tolling-statute-limitations-prosecute-former-president-doubleedged-sword [https://perma.cc/G6WV-A2HA].
Section 202 of the Protecting our Democracy Act provides:
(d) DELAY IN TRIAL OR OTHER LEGAL PROCEEDINGS.—In the case of an
indictment of any person serving as President or Vice President of the United States, a trial
or other legal proceeding with respect to such indictment may be delayed at the discretion
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tolling of the statute of limitations during a President or Vice President’s term
in office, an acknowledgment that the DOJ may nonetheless decline to
prosecute a sitting President. The Protecting our Democracy Act, which at
this time faces an uncertain future in the Senate, does not directly alter the
constitutional question addressed in this Article, but it is a clear indication
that the House, in passing the bill, believes that a President constitutionally
can be indicted while in office and constitutes an implicit rejection of the
OLC memos on this subject.
As we have argued elsewhere, such tolling provisions would be
problematic in the absence of an accompanying provision making clear that
congressional intent to toll the statute of limitations does not have
implications for the question of presidential indictment.101
The 1973 memo appears to adopt Professor Tribe’s side of the debate
over the meaning of the Impeachment Clause of the Constitution and against
the interpretation that under this language impeachment of a federal officer
must precede indictment,102 given that it appears to acknowledge that there
is no provision of the Constitution that expressly confers immunity upon the
President.103 Indeed, the memo even reinforces the point made by the Court
in Burr, namely that while the courts do not have the same jurisdiction over
the President as they do over an ordinary citizen, it remains the case that
Presidents are not absolutely immune from court proceedings.104 Instead,
the memo suggests that “[t]he proper approach is to find the proper balance
between the normal functions of the courts and the special responsibilities
and functions of the Presidency.”105 Accepting its own invitation to
of a court of competent jurisdiction to the extent that ongoing criminal proceedings would
interfere with the performance of the defendant’s duties while in office.
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(e) BURDEN OF PROOF.—With respect to an exercise of discretion under subsection
(d), the burden of proof shall be on the defendant to demonstrate that an ongoing criminal
proceeding would pose a substantial burden on the defendant’s ability to fulfill the duties
of the defendant’s office.”
Id. at 17. In September 2021 a provision that would toll the statute of limitations for prosecution
of a former President was proposed in the Protecting Our Democracy Act, which was introduced
in the House. The authors of this article have urged that the House, particularly if it chooses to
include this tolling provision, also expressly confirm that a President also can be indicted while in
office. See Finkelstein & Painter, Tolling the Statute of Limitations to Prosecute a Former President: A DoubleEdged Sword, supra note 99.
See supra text accompanying notes 20–21 (discussing the Tribe-Bobbitt debate).
1973 O.L.C. Memo at 18.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 24.
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“balance” the relevant factors, however, the second part of the 1973 memo
relies upon generalizations about indicting a sitting President to reach a
surprising conclusion: any indictment of a sitting President must be
considered categorically forbidden, as it would interfere with performance of
the President’s duties under Article II of the Constitution.
The 1973 OLC memo focuses heavily on the highly political nature of a
presidential trial, and the difficulty of assuring a fair trial.106 The memo
concludes that indicting a President, even if any criminal trial were
postponed, would create a politicized atmosphere that could make it
impossible for a President to govern.107 The memo worries that the majority
of a grand jury could force the resignation of a President.108 The memo goes
on to say that impeachment and removal from office is the only
“appropriate” way to deal with an alleged crime by a President while in
office. The perceived interference with a President’s Article II duties elevates
these concerns to the level of a constitutional principle. Taking today’s
circumstances into account in interpreting constitutional meaning, the OLC
notes that “[d]uring the past century the duties of the Presidency, however,
have become so onerous that a President may not be able fully to discharge
the powers and duties of his office if he had to defend a criminal
prosecution.”109 The OLC then endorses a categorical rule against indicting
a sitting President, namely that he must be impeached and removed prior to
indictment.
The OLC memo was written on September 24, 1973, two months after
federal district judge Sirica heard arguments over special prosecutor
Archibald Cox subpoena of White House tapes in July 1973,110 and a month
before Cox was fired by Nixon and impeachment proceedings began against
Nixon in the House on October 30, 1973. The memo does not mention any
evidence of a crime committed by President Nixon, what Nixon could have
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Id. at 25.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 28.
See R.W. Apple, Nixon Contests Subpoenas, Keeps Tapes; Hearing Set August 7 on Historic Challenge, N.Y.
TIMES, (July 27, 1973)
https://web.archive.org/web/20170909052727/http:/www.nytimes.com/1973/07/27/archives
/nixon-contests-subpoenas-keeps-tapes-hearing-set-a-ug-7-on-historic.html
[https://perma.cc/23ES-FKJV] (recounting the refusal of Nixon comply with the subpoena
requiring him to turn over tape recordings).
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been charged with if he were to be indicted by the special prosecutor and
how specifically any such criminal charges could have interfered with
Nixon’s Article II duties. Despite mounting evidence that crimes could have
been committed by President Nixon, and a DOJ special prosecutor who was
issuing criminal subpoenas to the White House, the OLC memo addresses
the question of indicting a sitting President purely in the abstract. Based
entirely on abstract assumptions about a hypothetical criminal trial of a
sitting President, the OLC concluded that criminal trial of a President was
constitutionally impermissible.
The memo concludes with a section finding that the same rule does not
apply to the Vice President and that he could appropriately be indicted while
in office. This was a bit less hypothetical. Two weeks after the September
24, 1973 OLC memo, Vice President Spiro Agnew resigned on October 10,
1973, the same day he pled “no contest” to a charge of federal income tax
evasion in exchange for federal prosecutors dropping charges of bribery and
other political corruption. Solicitor General Robert Bork had presented the
memo to the court accepting Agnew’s guilty plea five days earlier on October
5. It was clear that one purpose of the 1973 OLC memo was to allow federal
prosecutors to arrange their plea deal with Agnew. This purpose with respect
to the Vice President could have been accomplished without the OLC
reaching any determination at all about the prosecution of a sitting President.
It appears also, however, that another purpose of the OLC memo was to
preclude a federal indictment of Nixon in the midst of a rapidly escalating
constitutional conflict between the White House and the special prosecutor.
The Office of Legal Counsel’s view on presidential immunity was revised
and repeated in 2000 at the time of the investigation into President Clinton’s
sexual conduct with Monica Lewinsky.111 In 2000, it was time for the OLC—
staffed as usual with the President’s political appointees in the senior
positions—to provide cover for President Clinton. The October 16, 2000
memo confirms that “the conclusion reached by the Department in 1973 still
represents the best interpretation of the Constitution.” Much of this memo
reiterates the arguments made in the 1973 memorandum, conferring a new
blessing on each one.
The 2000 OLC memo then quotes excerpts from an intervening
Supreme Court case—Nixon v. Fitzgerald—to support the theory of
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A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Crim. Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222 (2000).
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presidential immunity.112 But Fitzgerald was entirely off point in this context:
that case involved a civil suit against a President after his presidency for official
acts he had committed while President. That question—whether a former
President had absolute immunity from suits for damages on account of
official acts in office while other federal officials had only qualified
immunity—is entirely different from the issue of a sitting President’s
immunity from criminal prosecution. Fitzgerald is a slender reed to lean on,
but that is what the 2000 OLC memorandum does. The OLC’s argument
was similar to the argument offered by law professor Akhil Amar who, in
1997, also picked up the Fitzgerald case to support his contention that a sitting
President could not be criminally indicted. Amar went so far as to say that
“[the President’s] temporary privilege from prosecution is less of a threat to
the rule of the law than the immunity given to Presidents acting in their
official capacities. President Nixon said that ‘if the President does it, it’s not
illegal’ and the Supreme Court (in the case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald) essentially
agreed with him.”113 Amar had written another article in 1995 saying that
following the logic in Fitzgerald, Paula Jones was constitutionally barred from
suing President Clinton.114 Amar’s articles were not cited by the OLC in its
2000 memo, though both appeared in Justice Alito’s dissent in Trump v.
Vance,115 even though Amar’s position on presidential immunity had been
rejected by the Supreme Court in Clinton v. Jones.116 With constitutional
scholars defending executive authority to this degree, as well as affirming
Nixon’s and Clinton’s immunity, it is no wonder that Trump believed he
could violate the law with impunity. Twenty years later the Solicitor General
in his brief in Trump v. Vance would do the same thing, citing Fitzgerald for a
broad presidential immunity principle. As we discuss below, however, that
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Id. at 240–41.
See Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The Presidential Privilege Against Prosecution, 2 NEXUS 11, 16
(1997) (opining that “[s]itting [P]residents cannot be prosecuted”).
Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immunities: The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108
HARV. L. REV. 701 (1995). Mr. Katyal was a student at Yale Law School at the time this article
was written.
See Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (Alito, J., dissenting), slip op. at 4, 12. (citing Amar to support
his opinion that “[w]ithout a President who is able at all times to carry out the responsibilities of
the office, our constitutional system could not operate.”).
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 684 (1997) (holding unanimously that except in highly unusual
circumstances, a sitting President is subject to civil suit despite burdens the suit might impose on
the time and attention of the president).
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was taking the immunity argument a bit too far, and ultimately this broad
interpretation of presidential immunity did not prevail.
The 2000 OLC memo then tries mightily to distinguish the more directly
relevant intervening case law—United States v. Nixon and Clinton v. Jones—two
cases that are both devastating for the theory of presidential immunity. United
States v. Nixon the 2000 memorandum distinguishes because Nixon was an
action to enforce a special prosecutor’s subpoena and a subpoena imposes a
substantially lesser burden on the presidency than a criminal trial. The
memo points out that the Nixon Court, by its own admission, might have
decided the case differently if the subpoenaed materials had involved
national security. The 2000 memo gave relatively little weight to the fact
that the Court’s language in Nixon rejects any categorical principle that as a
matter of constitutional law the President is absolutely immune from the
criminal justice process. And the 2000 OLC memo’s reference to the fact
that national security related documents were a qualifier in the Nixon holding
was largely a side point. This was particularly true in the context of President
Clinton’s legal exposure, which had to do with personal misconduct rather
than matters of state.
After a lengthy summary of the 1973 OLC memo, the 2000 memo cites
the Justice Department’s own brief in Jones for a proposition rejected by the
Court in that very case, namely that the President is immune from
prosecution. True, the 2000 OLC memo addresses criminal prosecution,
whereas the Jones court rejected presidential immunity from civil
prosecution. But, in many ways it appears that after the tortured path the
Jones litigation took—the President’s perjury in a deposition, a special
prosecutor investigation and an impeachment that put a substantial dent in
the Clinton presidency—the OLC did not want to give up on the losing
arguments that the Justice Department had made in Jones. The 2000 memo
appeared to want to revisit Jones, saying that there was interference with the
President’s Article II duties and arguing that at least criminal prosecution of
the President should be taken off the table. The argument is not very
convincing.
Finally, the 2000 OLC memo also inserts a largely tangential discussion
of reasons why a President cannot be imprisoned.117 This analysis, even if
correct, has little to do with the question of indicting a sitting President. The
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road from indictment to trial to sentencing and ultimately to punishment is
a long one. Arguing the case for presidential immunity backwards from
imprisonment is unconvincing.
So where do we stand with these two memoranda combined? The Nixon
Justice Department OLC was at least honest in pointing out that the Framers
did not intend to make impeachment the exclusive remedy for crimes
committed by a sitting President. The 1973 memo then listed many reasons
—all pragmatic—why it would interfere with Article II duties to indict a
President while in office. Then the Clinton Justice Department jumped in
25 years later with a memorandum that repeats all of these arguments from
the Nixon era, but also tries to distinguish intervening Supreme Court
precedent rejecting presidential immunity, and then repeats many of the
arguments that Nixon and Clinton both had tried before the Court—and
lost. Old wine in new bottles. Twenty years after that, it was the same thing
all over again in the Trump DOJ. A third undisclosed DOJ memo from
2019 apparently says much the same thing about the impermissibility of
indicting a sitting President. As the French are fond of saying, plus ça change,
plus c’est la même chose.118
It is clear from both the 1973 and the 2000 OLC memos that the reasons
given for the DOJ’s conclusion about presidential immunity are pragmatic,
and as such they are lacking in constitutional dimension other than the
OLC’s conjecture that a presidential indictment would unconstitutionally
interfere with performance of presidential duties under Article II. Moreover,
the OLC memoranda interpreting the law are advisory only; they do not
create binding legal precedent and as such are not owed deference by courts.
Moreover, the Justice Department is headed by an Attorney General who is
appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the President. Even in the absence
of such an articulated policy, the Justice Department would be unlikely to
indict the President to whom that agency is beholden, and thus the policy
articulated in the OLC memos comes as no surprise. But that does not
support parlaying an internal Justice Department policy into a principle of
constitutional stature as the OLC memos have been interpreted by many.
Finally, the deference by the DOJ to the President has nothing
whatsoever to do with the powers of the states to investigate and prosecute
the President. The fact that the Justice Department chooses to adhere to its
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own OLC memoranda does not mean that a state cannot investigate the
President in the exercise of its police powers. In the absence of exonerating
conditions, killing someone on Fifth Avenue is a crime under the laws of the
State of New York. In a country that lives by the rule of law, a person who
participates in a serious crime must be investigated and criminally charged
under the laws of that state. The President is not above the law. We discuss
the powers of the states to investigate and prosecute a President separately in
Part III of this Article.
D. What Nixon and Clinton Taught Us About Presidential Immunity
Decisions regarding presidential immunity are few and far between in
our constitutional jurisprudence. But the cases that exist are fairly uniform
in rejecting the notion of presidential immunity. The first in the series of
such cases was United States v. Aaron Burr,119 discussed above.120 Any debate
among the Founders about whether the President is answerable to the federal
courts was resolved in the affirmative by this case, in which the district court
held that President Jefferson could be served with a subpoena in the criminal
case against his own Vice President.
In the more than two hundred years since the Burr case was decided by
the district court, there have been exactly three significant Supreme Court
cases in this same line. Though each of the three cases addressed a rather
different aspect of presidential accountability, each held firm to the principle
first set out in Burr that a sitting President is not immune from the reach of
the coercive arm of the federal courts.121
United States v. Nixon122 arose forty-eight years ago when President Nixon
tried to obstruct the Watergate investigations to avoid his own accountability.
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United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
See supra Section I.B.
One case, however, held that a former President could not be civilly sued by private parties seeking
monetary damages for his official conduct in office. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S 731, 749
(1982) (holding that “petitioner, as former President of the United States, is entitled to absolute
immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts”).
United States v. Nixon held that a sitting President is not immune from judicial process. See United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (“[t]he President’s broad interest in confidentiality of
communications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily
shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases.”). United States v. Nixon is particularly
relevant in that it pertains to a criminal subpoena, as was involved in Trump v. Vance, and the Court
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Like his successor in presidential overreach, Donald Trump, Nixon invoked
his “unitary executive” powers under Article II of the Constitution to
demand that his Attorney General fire Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox in
the infamous “Saturday Night Massacre” in 1973, in which two successive
attorneys general refused to carry out Nixon’s order. The third, Robert
Bork, finally ceded to Nixon’s demands. The ultimate check on Nixon’s
abuse of power, however, came from Congress, when a bipartisan group of
senators called for his impeachment.123 The outrage in Congress led to the
appointment by the Justice Department of a new special prosecutor to
succeed Cox, namely Leon Jaworski. In the absence of this powerful
response from Congress on both sides of the aisle, Nixon would have
succeeded in ending an investigation into his own misdeeds through the
exercise of his “removal powers” under Article II.
Nixon then appealed to another staple of presidential power—executive
privilege—to withhold evidence from Jaworski. The famous showdown over
the White House tapes went all the way to the Supreme Court, which in
United States v. Nixon ordered Nixon to turn over the tapes.124 These tapes
contained incriminating statements by Nixon and were a large part of the
impeachment case that eventually drove him from office.
The foregoing events raise important questions about the nature of
executive power, such as the meaning of the “unitary executive” and whether
the President’s Article II power extends to the firing of executive branch
officials like Archibald Cox when such removal is primarily motivated by a
desire to obstruct justice. The question of the scope of the President’s
removal powers, however, is a separate issue from whether a sitting President
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is clear that “a generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and
nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional balance of ‘a workable government’ and
gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III.” See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707
(1974) (holding that the need for presidential confidentiality is plainly confined to circumstances in
which the interests of national security demanded it). Chief Justice Burger wrote,
[a]bsent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security
secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in
confidentiality of [p]residential communications is significantly diminished by production
of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be
obliged to provide.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
Jules Witcover, Pressure for Impeachment Mounting, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1973, at A01. Republicans
in both the House and Senate made public statements condemning Nixon’s actions.
United States. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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can be investigated or indicted.125 For present purposes, the important point
underscored by Nixon is that the President is subject to criminal process,
despite the fact that the subpoena in question came from an official of his
own DOJ. The 2000 OLC memo took into consideration the reasoning of
Nixon, yet, as discussed in the previous section, the OLC’s commitment to
preserving presidential immunity has been so strong that that office did not
alter its position between the first and the second memo.126
Clinton v. Jones presented another challenge for the OLC in holding that
a private plaintiff can sue the President for his personal conduct and demand
compliance with civil subpoenas. The case did not involve a criminal
indictment, and the 2000 OLC memo strains to explain how upholding the
civil suit in Jones is consistent with the OLC position that there is a categorical
constitutional impediment to charging a President with a crime. After Vance,
which we address in the next section, presidential immunity theory as
expressed in the two OLC memos must inconveniently coexist with Supreme
Court cases holding that a sitting President is subject to both federal and state
criminal subpoenas as well as civil actions by private plaintiffs.
Such a construction of Article II is counterintuitive. Suppose, for
example, a President had committed a criminal sexual assault while in office
or immediately prior to becoming President. The victim could sue the
President for damages under Jones. Why should there be an asymmetry with
regard to a criminal indictment? To justify presidential immunity from
criminal indictment, Jones either must be reversed or distinguished by making
a compelling case that criminal indictment of a President in all cases imposes
a greater burden on the exercise of Article II duties than a civil case.
Impeachment of course is provided for as a remedy in the Constitution, but
not all crimes are “high crimes and misdemeanors” warranting removal from
office, and arguably Clinton’s crimes are an example of that. Criminal
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An inferior federal officer who cannot be removed by the President and is entitled to civil service
protection can sue the government if wrongfully removed but cannot sue a former President in his
personal capacity for money damages. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982). But this
immunity to civil suit for official acts is far removed from the issue of whether a President is
criminally liable for official acts or personal acts. See supra text accompanying notes 112–116
(distinguishing Nixon v. Fitzgerald).
For a discussion about presidential privilege and the commitment of each successive
administration to preserving it, see Finkelstein & Painter, supra note 85 (describing efforts of the
Biden administration in “protecting the Trump administration’s assertions of executive privilege
to prevent information from reaching Congress and the public”).
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indictment of a sitting President also does not necessarily impose a greater
burden on Article II duties than the constitutional remedy of impeachment.
Reading into the Constitution a requirement that impeachment be the only
remedy for presidential crimes may in some cases impose a greater burden
on the presidency than allowing criminal indictment as an alternative. What
actually happened with Clinton shows that allowing a civil case against the
President followed by his impeachment can impose a great burden on the
exercise of Article II powers, possibly an even greater burden than a criminal
investigation and indictment.
One way out of this inconsistency between civil and criminal process
against the President would be for the Court to reverse Jones and hold that a
sitting President is not subject to civil process. But a closer look at our recent
experience with President Trump—the most litigious President in U.S.
history—has shown us that Clinton v. Jones was righty decided. With a highly
litigious President in the Oval Office, chaos in the litigation system could
ensue if the President could evade civil suit. Among the various questions
that this kind of immunity would raise, what would happen to all of the
President’s litigation during his presidency? Would all of it be put on hold?
Or only some of it? Would only the litigation against the President be stayed,
or would litigation against business entities controlled by the President be
stayed as well? What would happen to litigation against third parties that
hold property or records belonging to the President or to his businesses, such
as third-party stakeholders in the Vance case? A President who could not be
sued civilly would be permitted to commit torts throughout his presidency as
President Trump allegedly did according to a slander suit brought by E. Jean
Carroll who had also accused him of sexual assault.
There are numerous interesting and difficult questions about how a
reversal of Jones would work that we cannot fully explore here. One
particularly intriguing one is the question whether if a President cannot be
sued personally, or cannot be subjected to discovery in a lawsuit, would it
make sense to allow the President to sue others in return? Taking away the
President’s right to sue could be unconstitutional as a denial of due process.
But if a President does sue someone, and demands discovery in the lawsuit
should not the person sued by the President be entitled to reciprocal
discovery? Indeed, it was Trump who in Trump v. Vance sued to enjoin the
state grand jury subpoena of Trump Organization financial documents. On
the theory that any right to sue must be reciprocal, we might ask whether, if
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Clinton v. Jones were reversed, cases like Trump v. Vance would have to be stayed
until Trump left office. Without the rule in Clinton v. Jones, however, there
would be no way of holding a President accountable and hence no rule of
law for four years and potentially eight. The President and his businesses
could breach contracts with impunity, and other parties could breach
contracts between themselves and the President or his businesses with
impunity. The President and his businesses could commit torts with no
repercussions and other parties could commit torts against the President or
his businesses at will.127
The rule in Clinton v. Jones, which rejects the idea of any blanket
presidential immunity from civil process, thus appears to be the only
workable approach. Courts might constrain discovery requests of the
President on a case-by-case basis that are overly burdensome; that’s a
different issue. But a blanket stay on all civil litigation by or against the
President during his entire term in office is as unworkable as it is
unconstitutional.
Perhaps the most frequently heard objection to holding Presidents
accountable to both civil and criminal processes is that it would distract them
from the business of governing and thus interfere with the exercise of their
Article II duties. While this is a pragmatic argument, and not one that should
provide the foundation for immunity against all forms of presidential
investigation, it is as close as the arguments against investigating a sitting
President come to establishing a constitutional basis for presidential
immunity. Admittedly, there inevitably will be some impact on the
President’s Article II duties in civil suits such as Clinton v. Jones. That burden,
however, is not likely to prove substantially greater than would be the burden
imposed by a criminal trial for similar conduct.128
Furthermore, the constitution already has a mechanism for relieving a
President who, whether because of a criminal case or for any other reason,
believes he is incapable of carrying out his duties: the Twenty-Fifth
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Consider another favorite litigation venue of President Trump—divorce court. Should presidential
divorce cases be barred under the doctrine of presidential immunity? What if a future President
were to get divorced while in office? No divorce until the President leaves office, or can the
President only have a consensual divorce? Would there be a constitutionally mandated delay of up
to eight years in resolving contested property issues or custody of a minor child? Perhaps, if Clinton
v. Jones were reversed, any contested divorce involving the President would be unconstitutional.
Jones alleged that Clinton had exposed himself to her in a hotel room, a crime under Arkansas law.
Ark. Code Ann. § 5–14–112 (2019).
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Amendment provides for temporary transfer of power and duties of the
presidency to the Vice President.129 A President facing criminal investigation
or indictment could avail himself of this mechanism to manage the disruption
of his schedule.
The claims that the President’s Article II duties are unduly burdened by
his becoming the defendant in a civil or criminal trial were energetically
rejected by conservatives during the Clinton crisis. In oral argument in
Clinton v. Jones, for example, Justice Scalia heaped scorn on this suggestion:
JUSTICE SCALIA. But we see Presidents riding horseback, chopping
firewood, fishing for stick fish, playing golf and so forth and so on. Why can’t
we leave it to the point where, if and when a court tells a President to be
there or he’s going to lose his case, and if and when a President has the
intestinal fortitude to say, ‘‘I am absolutely too busy,’’ so that he’ll never be
seen playing golf for the rest of his Administration, if and when that happens,
we can resolve the problem.
MR. DELLINGER. Justice Scalia---JUSTICE SCALIA. But, really, the notion that he doesn’t have a minute to
spare is, is just not credible.130

Justice Scalia rightly suggests that playing golf is not among the Article II
duties of the President and that time lost on that activity for the sake of
answering a subpoena is not to be lamented.
Scalia may seem, however, to be ignoring concerns that civil litigation
against sitting Presidents is motivated at least in part by the desire to harass,
and that therefore the distraction from Article II duties can be intentionally
imposed by enemies of the President. This was no doubt the case in the
Clinton litigation, as was clear from the fact that Jones was represented by
attorneys paid for by Republican political opponents of Clinton.131 This
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131

See U.S. CONST., amend XXV, § 3 (“Whenever the President transmits to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that
he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as
Acting President.”)
Excerpts From Arguments Before the Supreme Court in Clinton Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 1997)
https://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/14/us/excerpts-from-arguments-before-the-supreme-courtin-clinton-case.html [https://perma.cc/7GTV-UT36].
See Murray Waas, Newsreel: The Men Who Kept Paula Jones Lawsuit Going: How Associates of Billionaire
Clinton-Hater Richard Mellon Scaife Kept Paula Jones’s Legal Battle Going, SALON (April 2, 1998, 5:42PM),
https://www.salon.com/1998/04/02/cov_02news/ [https://perma.cc/LXC8-EE45] (revealing
that the individuals funding the legal campaign of Jones “were involved with the Arkansas Project,
a three-year, $2.4 million campaign to investigate and discredit President Clinton”).
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concern, however, should be less acute where criminal prosecution is
concerned. Prosecutors unlike plaintiffs’ lawyers are paid for out of the
public purse. Ethics rules for prosecutors are different than they are for
private civil attorneys. Plaintiffs’ lawyers in civil litigation may not bring
frivolous suits and file frivolous motions,132 but plaintiffs’ lawyers are not
subject to the stricter rules of prosecutorial ethics that require prosecutors to
restrict criminal charges to those supported by probable cause,133 as well as
to disclose exonerating or mitigating evidence to the defendant,134 among
other standards that do not apply to attorneys representing private
litigants.135 Discovery in civil litigation generally is very broad, while
discovery is somewhat more limited in criminal cases. Refusing to testify
generally is not an option for a defendant in a civil case; it is an option in a
criminal case. Putting all of this together, we cannot be certain that a
criminal trial of Clinton on charges similar to the allegations made by Jones
would have imposed a higher burden on Clinton and on his presidency than
the civil trial that the Supreme Court approved of in Jones. We return to this
matter below.
Clinton’s alleged criminal conduct during the Jones proceedings, namely
perjury, is an example of a situation where the criminal justice system would
likely have provided a better tool for holding the President accountable than
impeachment and trial in the Senate. Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr136 did not indict Clinton for perjury, but Starr submitted a Report to
132

133

134
135

136

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (stating that “[a] lawyer shall
not bring or defend a proceeding . . . unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not
frivolous”).
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (stating that “[t]he
prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows
is not supported by probable cause”).
Id; see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (holding that a prosecutor’s suppression of
exonerating evidence is a violation of the defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process rights.)
See CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (stating
that the prosecutor “should act with integrity and balanced judgment”). The risk of harassing
litigation from prosecutors may be higher in the case of state criminal cases, as we discuss in Section
III.C below.
Starr was appointed under the now defunct Independent Counsel statute. We do not explore in
this Article the separate question of the constitutionality of that statute, upheld by the Court in
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) or how Justice Department lawyers would be involved in such
a case against the President under a new not-yet-enacted version of that statute or, alternatively, in
a criminal case pursuant to an indictment of a sitting President by a special counsel such as Robert
Mueller appointed under DOJ regulations. We also do not discuss here whether criminal

Feb. 2022]

PRESIDENTIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

141

Congress, 137 after which the House of Representatives voted to authorize an
impeachment inquiry. Clinton was impeached in the House, and he was
ultimately acquitted by the Senate, but meanwhile the political chaos
surrounding the Clinton impeachment lasted a full five months.
Impeachment was a great distraction from the President’s Article II duties,
which included, among other things, protecting the United States from
terrorist attacks following the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. We
will never know what would have happened if President Clinton, the White
House staff, the DOJ, and members of Congress, had spent October 1998
through February 1999 focused on the duties of their jobs rather than on the
drama of impeachment. Thus the argument that the claim that
impeachment is a better alternative to a criminal trial for a sitting President
because it involves less interference with Article II duties is not always
compelling.
The subject matter of Clinton’s alleged crime was arguably only
tangentially related to his official duties, namely lying under oath about sex
with a White House intern. However repugnant that conduct might have
been, it was arguably not “high crimes and misdemeanors” within the
meaning of the Impeachment Clause, or so the majority of the American
people seemed to think according to most polls,138 as did a majority of the
Senate.139 Now imagine that Starr had instead indicted President Clinton
for perjury and that no impeachment process had occurred. A criminal trial
for perjury would have been appropriate; perjury is a crime whether it relates

137

138

139

obstruction of justice statutes would bar the President from removing a special counsel such as
Mueller. The question we address here is whether any indictment brought by a federal or state
prosecutor would so unduly interfere with a President’s Article II duties that it categorically would
be unconstitutional, as the OLC memos suggest, or whether criminal process against a sitting
President should be assessed by courts on a case-by-case basis to assure accountability of the
President while at the same time not interfering with exercise of Article II powers.
KENNETH W. STARR, REFERRAL FROM INDEPENDENT COUNSEL KENNETH W. STARR IN
CONFORMITY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 595(C)
(Sept. 11, 1999).
Cf. Drew DeSilver, Clinton’s Impeachment Barely Dented His Public Support, and it Turned Off Many
Americans, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/10/03/clintons-impeachment-barely-dented-his-public-support-and-it-turned-offmany-americans/ [https://perma.cc/C8MN-5XTN] (finding that Bill Clinton’s approval ratings
did not significantly decrease during his impeachment trial, although the trial turned off many
Americans).
The vote was 55–45 for acquittal on the first Article of impeachment for perjury. The vote was 50–
50 for acquittal on the second Article of impeachment for obstruction of justice.
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to personal conduct or official duties. Anyone can commit perjury, including
a President. Clinton arguably had perjured himself twice—in the civil
deposition and then before the grand jury.140 While his crime had little to do
with performance of his duties as President, a criminal prosecution would
have been justified under the same reasoning the Court had invoked in Jones.
A criminal trial on the perjury charge would have been relatively
straightforward and might have lacked the political drama of the
impeachment process.
If a criminal trial threatened to interfere with Clinton’s official duties, a
federal court might have granted a request to postpone it until early 2001.
Even if a criminal trial of Clinton had occurred during Clinton’s presidency
it probably would have been less disruptive than his impeachment. If the
President had been convicted, any sentence imposed could have been stayed
until completion of his term in January 2001. Alternatively, Clinton could
have entered into a plea bargain with federal prosecutors. Without knowing
what would have been least disruptive of President Clinton’s ability to carry
out his Article II duties, it is worth considering that the arguments made to
that effect against criminal investigation and prosecution may not be
warranted as compared with other mechanisms of presidential
accountability.
E. The Supreme Court Speaks, Again: Trump v. Vance
On July 9 of 2020, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Trump
v. Vance,141 which arose out of a subpoena of a President by a New York State
grand jury in an effort to obtain President Trump’s tax records and other
financial documents from his former accounting firm, Mazars. As Chief
Justice Roberts explained in his opinion for the majority, this was a matter of
first impression:
In our judicial system, “the public has a right to every man’s evidence.” Since
the earliest days of the Republic, “every man” has included the President of
the United States. Beginning with Jefferson and carrying on through
Clinton, Presidents have uniformly testified or produced documents in
criminal proceedings when called upon by federal courts. This case
involves—so far as we and the parties can tell—the first state criminal
140

141

See Kenneth Starr, Official Report of the Independent Counsel's Investigation of the President: Narrative Pt. XIV:
The Deposition and Afterrward, WASH. POST (1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/special/clinton/icreport/6narritxiv.htm#L131 [https://perma.cc/852P-CDWJ].
Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020).
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subpoena directed to a President. The President contends that the subpoena
is unenforceable. We granted certiorari to decide whether Article II and the
Supremacy Clause categorically preclude, or require a heightened standard
for, the issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President.142

The Court’s answer was absolutely consistent with the three cases that
had preceded it on related themes: United States v. Burr, a district court opinion
by Chief Justice John Marshall, holding that a criminal defendant, in this
case Burr, had the right to subpoena the President for information relevant
to his case; United States v. Nixon, holding that the Constitution does not
preclude a criminal subpoena of the President in the course of the criminal
investigation; and Clinton v. Jones, holding that a sitting President is subject to
subpoena in a civil case.
Chief Justice Roberts began his analysis in Vance by categorically rejecting
the theory that the President is immune from service of process in a criminal
case, recalling the Burr case for that proposition. “In the summer of 1807,”
Roberts wrote, “all eyes were on Richmond, Virginia. Aaron Burr, the
former Vice President, was on trial for treason . . . .” President Jefferson,
Roberts made clear, was bound to comply with the criminal process and
President Trump was required to do the same. Neither, however, ultimately
complied: although Jefferson was ordered to turn over documents relating to
the Burr case, he apparently never complied with the court order, and the
same can be said of Trump, who continued to appeal, despite the clear
precedent against his desired outcome. As the Vance Court noted, President
Trump’s argument “runs up against the 200 years of precedent establishing
that Presidents, and their official communications, are subject to judicial
process, even when the President is under investigation.”143
A central issue with which the Vance court had to grapple, however, was
a more subtle one, namely whether the Manhattan District Attorney had to
meet a heightened standard of need to establish the right to subpoena a
sitting President’s financial records, or whether the President could be
subpoenaed like everyone else. The majority of the justices declined to
impose a heightened standard for a state criminal subpoena of a President’s
personal papers, reserving the higher showing required of the prosecutor in
United States v. Nixon for subpoenas of official records such as President
142

143

Id. at 2420 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted); See Tittha Sutta: Sectarians 1, (Ud 6:4)
(Thanissaro Bhikkhu, trans.), https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/KN/Ud/ud6_4.html
[https://perma.cc/5YDY-TE5V].
Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2427 (citations omitted).
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Nixon’s White House tapes.144 The Court dispensed quickly with Trump’s
argument that the President would be distracted from his official duties by
subpoenas: “Indeed, we expressly rejected immunity based on distraction
alone . . . in Clinton v. Jones.”145 The Court observed “two centuries of
experience confirm that a properly tailored criminal subpoena will not
normally hamper the performance of the President’s constitutional
duties.”146
The Court also rejected President Trump’s argument that the stigma of
being subject to a state criminal subpoena would interfere with official
duties,147 as well as the argument that such subpoenas should be categorically
barred because they could be used for “harassment” of the President and
take the President’s time and attention away from the business of
governing.148 The Court noted both federal and state law safeguards against
subpoenas used for harassment or subpoenas that unduly interfere with a
President’s official duties, holding that these arguments did not suffice to
justify making the President absolutely immune from a state criminal
subpoena.149
Trump’s lawyers and the Solicitor General tried to make some headway
quoting portions of the Court’s holding in Nixon v. Fitzgerald that the President

144
145
146
147

148

149

Id. at 2429.
Id.
Id. at 2426.
Id. at 2427 (“The President next claims that the stigma of being subpoenaed will undermine his
leadership at home and abroad. Notably, the Solicitor General does not endorse this argument,
perhaps because we have twice denied absolute immunity claims by Presidents in cases involving
allegations of serious misconduct.”).
Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2418 (2020) (“And, while we cannot ignore the possibility that
state prosecutors may have political motivations . . . here again the law already seeks to protect
against the predicted abuse.”).
The majority opinion notes that “First, grand juries are prohibited from engaging in ‘arbitrary
fishing expeditions’ and initiating investigations ‘out of malice or an intent to harass.’” Id. at 2428
(quoting U.S. v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991)); “And, in the event of such
harassment, a President would be entitled to the protection of federal courts.” Id. The majority
opinion also notes that “Second, contrary to Justice Alito’s characterization, our holding does not
allow States to ‘run roughshod over the functioning of [the Executive B]ranch.’” Id. “The
Supremacy Clause prohibits state judges and prosecutors from interfering with a President’s official
duties . . . . Given these safeguards and the Court’s precedents, we cannot conclude that absolute
immunity is necessary or appropriate under Article II or the Supremacy Clause.” Id. at 2428–29.
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could not be sued by a private plaintiff for his official acts.150 But the Court
in Trump v. Vance recognized that the Fitzgerald Court dealt with the adverse
impact on presidential decision making by the prospect of later civil suits
against a President for money damages, a completely different issue from the
question of whether the President must answer to a criminal subpoena.151
Despite his strong policy objections to investigating a sitting President,
discussed in the next part of this Article, Justice Kavanaugh joined the
majority in supporting the enforceability of the New York grand jury
subpoena in Trump v. Vance. In his concurrence with Justice Gorsuch, Justice
Kavanaugh said that he would have imposed on the prosecutors a higher
showing of need for the documents than the majority of the Justices did in
their opinion.152 Nonetheless Kavanaugh recognized that it is largely the
province of the legislature, rather than federal courts, to define the
permissible scope of any criminal investigation of a sitting President.
Justice Thomas also agreed with the majority of the Court that the
President has no absolute immunity from issuance of a grand jury
subpoena,153 but he dissented on the grounds that President Trump should
have been allowed to show in the court below that enforcement of the
subpoena would take up too much time or otherwise interfere with his Article
150

151

152

153

See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982) (holding that a former President cannot be sued
in his official capacity for official acts such as dismissal of a federal employee). In Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
Chief Justice Burger suggests in a concurrence that the Founders understood Article II “to protect
the ‘independent functioning’ of the President’s unique office.” Brief for Petitioner at 9, Trump v.
Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19–635) (citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 760–61
(1982) (Burger, J., concurring). Yet, as noted above, Nixon v. Fitzgerald is completely irrelevant to
the issue at hand. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled 5–4 that Nixon, by then a former
President, “is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts.”
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982). Fitzgerald has to do with civil suits against the
President in his official capacity for damages for his official acts, and has nothing to do with the
question of whether a sitting President can be investigated, subpoenaed and perhaps even indicted
for crimes he has committed in his personal capacity.
“But Fitzgerald did [sic.] not hold that distraction was sufficient to confer absolute immunity. We
instead drew a careful analogy to the common law absolute immunity of judges and prosecutors,
concluding that a President, like those officials, must ‘deal fearlessly and impartially with the duties
of his office’—not be made ‘unduly cautious in the discharge of [those] duties’ by the prospect of
civil liability for official acts.” Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2426, (quoting Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 752
(1982)).
“Because this case again entails a clash between the interests of the criminal process and the Article
II interests of the Presidency, I would apply the longstanding Nixon ‘demonstrated, specific need’
standard to this case. The majority opinion does not apply the Nixon standard in this distinct Article
II context, as I would have done.” Id. at 2432 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
Id. at 2434 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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II duties.154 Justice Alito also dissented. Although he like Justice Thomas did
not categorically reject the power of a state prosecutor to subpoena a
President, Justice Alito argued for a stricter standard of review for such
subpoenas, emphasizing his concern about distraction from the President’s
official duties as well as federalism concerns and potential abuses by
prosecutors of the state grand jury process when directed at a sitting
President.155 Justice Alito raised legitimate concerns about a prosecutor
unchecked by courts, but his dissent envisions the worst possible scenarios.
He discusses presidential fingerprinting and imprisonment156 to make his
case that Article II duties can be unconstitutionally burdened by a
prosecutor. The other justices in Vance, however, apparently recognized that
imprisonment is a different issue from the President’s amenability to criminal
process.
Furthermore, pronouncing a categorical prohibition on
imprisoning a sitting President is not helpful without thoroughly analyzing
the very rare circumstance in which such an extreme measure might be
needed: the unlikely but nightmarish scenario of a President attempting a
coup to extend his term or to broaden his power.157 Presidential
imprisonment would be extraordinary, and hopefully will never happen, but
should not be taken off the table entirely without a thorough discussion of
the consequences.
In the case of Trump v. Vance, however, no such extreme measures were
even contemplated. The discovery burden on the President was minimal.
The majority opinion observed:
154
155

156
157

“If the President is unable to comply because of his official duties, then he is entitled to injunctive
and declaratory relief.” Id. at 2436 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2450 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Court discounts the risk of harassment and assumes that
state prosecutors will observe constitutional limitations . . . and I also assume that the great majority
of state prosecutors will carry out their responsibilities responsibly. But for the reasons noted, there
is a very real risk that some will not.”); see also id. at 2448 (agreeing with the majority opinion that
not all state prosecutors’ subpoenas of a sitting President should be barred); id. at 2449 (articulating
a standard of review that would require a state prosecutor to provide a general description of the
offenses under investigation, describe how the subpoena relates to those offenses and explain why
it is important that the subpoenaed records be obtained now as opposed to after the President’s
term is over).
Id. at 2445.
The option of deploying the military to impose martial law and re-do the presidential election
apparently was discussed in a meeting in the White House in November 2020. Executing such a
plan probably would have been criminal sedition. Claire O. Finkelstein & Richard Painter, Invoking
Martial Law to Reverse the 2020 Election Could Be Criminal Sedition, JUST SEC. (Dec. 22, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/73986/invoking-martial-law-to-reverse-the-2020-election-could-becriminal-sedition/[https://perma.cc/P5GW-P973].
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[T]wo centuries of experience confirm that a properly tailored criminal
subpoena will not normally hamper the performance of the President’s
constitutional duties. If anything, we expect that in the mine run of cases,
where a President is subpoenaed during a proceeding targeting someone
else, as Jefferson was, the burden on a President will ordinarily be lighter
than the burden of defending against a civil suit.
. . . The President’s objection therefore must be limited to the additional
distraction caused by the subpoena itself. But that argument runs up against
the 200 years of precedent establishing that Presidents, and their official
communications, are subject to judicial process . . . even when the President
is under investigation.158

Unlike Clinton v. Jones, where the President was asked about his personal
conduct inside the White House, the New York grand jury subpoena in Vance
did not appear to concern anything that Trump had done during his
presidency. Furthermore, the discovery requests were not directed to Trump
at all. They were directed at a third-party accounting firm, Mazars, that had
custody of financial records and tax returns belonging to the Trump
Organization. Harkening back to Justice Scalia’s comments about
presidential golf in the oral argument in Clinton v. Jones,159 President Trump
didn’t miss much golf either. Forbes Magazine reported in 2019 that
President Trump’s golf trips could cost taxpayers over $340 million.160 In
any event, the President’s golf schedule is not a sufficient basis for a judicial
holding that the President can block a subpoena or otherwise is above the
law.
The Court’s decision in Vance thus categorically rejected the theory of
presidential immunity. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court “a king is
born to power and can ‘do no wrong.’ The President, by contrast, is ‘of the
people’ and subject to the law.”161 The President, the Court held, is subject
to criminal process while in office. The question is what the majority opinion
implies about the critical question of whether an investigation of the
President can constitutionally progress from investigation to indictment.
Justice Alito goes out of his way in his dissent to say that he believes a sitting

158
159

160
161

Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2427 (citations omitted).
Excerpts From Arguments Before the Supreme Court in Clinton Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1997
(excerpting Justice Scalia’s exchange with counsel about presidential golf in the oral argument of
Clinton v. Jones).
Chuck Jones, Trump’s Golf Trips Could Cost Taxpayers Over $340 Million, FORBES, July 10, 2019.
Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2422 (citations omitted) (quoting U.S. v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 27, 34 (C.C. Va.
1807) (Marshall, C.J.).
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President cannot be indicted,162 but the majority opinion does not expressly
discuss indictment of a sitting President.
Trump v. Vance constitutes a forceful rejection of presidential immunity
theory, and one way of reading that conclusion is to see it as rejecting the
idea that a sitting President cannot be indicted. Moreover, presidential
immunity theory has been repeatedly and soundly rejected in cases holding
there was no immunity from criminal or civil subpoenas. Although the issue
has not yet arisen as such in the courts, this precedent points strongly in the
direction of holding that a President also can be indicted while in office,
leaving questions of potential interference with the President’s Article II
duties to be resolved on a case-by-case basis rather than through a categorical
rule prohibiting indictment. Even if in a particular case, practical
considerations concerning performance of the President’s official duties
might, at worst, require a delay in his trial, the indictment alone is not likely
to interfere with presidential duties.163
The Vance ruling probably cannot be extended further to provide clear
guidance on the conduct of a criminal trial of a President while in office and
when such a trial would interfere with the Article II powers of the President.
That is a question for another day, but a question entirely apart from, and
not dependent upon, the simpler question of whether a President can be
indicted, whether or not the trial is postponed. Even here, however, most of
the arguments against criminal trial of a sitting President are pragmatic, not
inherently constitutional. There may be pragmatic reasons for delaying a
criminal trial of a sitting President. As discussed above, two memoranda
from the Office of Legal Counsel lay out the reasons for deferring any such
prosecution until after a President leaves office. The Office of Legal Counsel
memos turn these pragmatic arguments into a constitutional argument for
the DOJ’s refusal to indict a sitting President. Such a proposition—
categorical presidential immunity from criminal process—is rejected by the
Court in Vance.
The decision in Trump v. Vance is thus a repudiation of presidential
immunity theory. The Court held that even the simplest of criminal laws—
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Id. at 2444 (Alito, J., dissenting).
See Claire O. Finkelstein & Richard W. Painter, Trump’s Unitary Executive Theory Meets Cyrus Vance on
Fifth Avenue, BLOOMBERG LAW (July 17, 2020, 4:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-lawweek/insight-trumps-unitary-executive-theory-meets-cyrus-vance-on-fifth-avenue
[https://perma.cc/3D5W-RNMY].
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a state law requiring compliance with a grand jury subpoena—applies to the
President as it applies to everyone else. Article II of the Constitution defines
the duties of the President but does not put the President above the law.
There are still ways for a President to manipulate the legal system to delay
an investigation, reducing substantially the chances that the President
himself, or even anyone close to him, is indicted before he leaves office. But
delaying tactics rather than the immunity theory will have to be the resort of
future Presidents. Part II of this Article explores some of the ways that
Presidents can exploit expansive visions of presidential authority to try to
make themselves exempt from investigation and risk of indictment for as long
as possible.
In defining the scope of presidential authority, we should look not to
unsubstantiated arguments about absolute presidential immunity existing in
a vacuum, but to more general constitutional arguments, as well as structural
arguments having to do with separation of powers, the nature of the
executive branch, and general principles of accountability and the
importance of maintaining the rule of law. A basic part of the law is that a
person who commits a crime can and should be indicted for that crime. The
President is no exception. Impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors
is one response to criminal conduct by a federal official, including the
President. The Constitution says nothing that rules out a criminal subpoena
or an indictment while a President is in office and, barring any other
constitutional source of law on this question, the President should be treated
like any other citizen.
II. DOES CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OF A SITTING PRESIDENT
SUFFICE?
As we discussed in the previous Part, there is ample precedent to support
investigating a sitting President by both federal prosecutors and Congress.
Presidential immunity theory, which is invoked to defeat federal indictment
of a sitting President, does not apply to mere criminal investigation. As we
discussed in Part II, United States v. Burr and United States v. Nixon made this
clear. The Supreme Court also reinforced this message in a different context
in Morrison v. Olson,164 which upheld the Independent Counsel statute that
164

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the constitutionality of the independent counsel
provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978).
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Congress enacted specifically in order to allow the DOJ to investigate senior
administration officials, including the President. Then in Trump v. Vance, the
Supreme Court held that the susceptibility of a sitting President to federal
criminal process applies not only to federal criminal proceedings but to state
prosecution as well. But the Court does not address whether the same
conclusion would hold with respect to indictment as well.165 Justice Alito’s
dissent certainly seemed to think so, as he said that “[t]he scenario apparently
contemplated by the District Court is striking” and then immediately went
to great lengths to describe a scenario involving the charging, fingerprinting
and even imprisonment of a sitting President.166
Nevertheless, President Trump’s lawyers argued in the Vance case that if
a sitting President could not be indicted, he could also not be investigated,
since investigation might lead to indictment.167 Trump’s lawyers did have a
point: it is at least awkward to claim that a sitting President can be criminally
investigated if one is firmly of the belief that that investigation cannot
culminate in indictment. The Supreme Court did not opine on this point in
Trump v. Vance, but it did make clear, as the Supreme Court has in other cases,
that a sitting President can be investigated. If we believe the logic of the
former President’s lawyers, then, the holding in Vance implies that a sitting
President can be indicted after all.
Some will argue that there are good reasons to adopt the OLC approach
to this question and treat investigation and indictment differently.
Investigation during a President’s term, they argue, ensures that evidence is
not lost, but once an investigation has been completed, there is no reason
that indictment, trial and sentencing must take place before the end of a
President’s term. In this part we will explain why we believe this split
approach is a mistake. There are multiple reasons why investigation of a
putative criminal President must be accompanied by the possibility of
indictment during a President’s term, and why it is not adequate to
investigate and then leave the indictment phase until after the President has
165
166

167

Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020).
Id. at 2445 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“If a sitting President were charged in New York County, would
he be arrested and fingerprinted? He would presumably be required to appear for arraignment in
criminal court, where the judge would set the conditions for his release. Could he be sent to Rikers
Island or be required to post bail?”).
Brief for the Petitioner, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19–635); see also Trump v.
Vance Oral Argument Before the Second Circuit, C-SPAN (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.cspan.org/video/?475971-1/trump-v-vance-oral-argument [https://perma.cc/A7RC-UA58].
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left office. As we discuss below, our constitutional system could not tolerate
a sitting President under investigation committing crimes to undermine the
investigation itself, such as bribing the investigators or threatening the
personal safety of investigators or witnesses. The damage that could occur
from allowing such crimes to go unaddressed during a President’s term in
office is potentially devastating and could enable a President to engage in
extreme measures to remain in office with impunity.
In this Part, we focus on the demands of investigation and make clear
that the proposition that a sitting President can be investigated would be
meaningless if not accompanied in our system by the ability to prosecute a
President who illegally interferes with the investigation. In Part IV, we will
return to related themes when we consider the more general question of
whether sufficient accountability would be achieved if all prosecution of a
President occurred after the President left office.
A. Investigation of a President by the Department of Justice
Except for a handful of radical revisionists like Trump’s attorneys in the
Vance case, it is no longer subject to doubt that a sitting President can be
criminally investigated. As we discussed above, this was already clear from
the Nixon and Clinton cases, as well as from the decision in Morrison v. Olson168
upholding the provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, under
which independent counsels were appointed until those provisions expired in
1999.169 It is also clear from the common practice of the DOJ assigning
special counsel, such as Archibald Cox or Robert Mueller, to investigate
matters of proximity to the President even in the absence of an independent
counsel statute. If there was any doubt about criminal investigation of a
sitting President based on the interplay between prior Supreme Court cases
and the OLC memos, the Vance case should have fully laid such doubt to rest.
Nevertheless, it is not difficult for a sitting President to exert control over
investigations into his own wrongdoing, particularly when the investigation
is being conducted by his own Justice Department. The President has broad
authority over the DOJ, and most importantly, he has the power to remove
168
169

Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
28 U.S.C. §§ 591–599 (1987). The statute provided that the independent counsel would be
appointed by and be under the authority of a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. There were over a dozen investigations under the Independent Counsel
statute during the two decades while it was in force.
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the Attorney General nearly without explanation. A profound question is
how we should understand the putative clash between the President’s
removal power under Article II, and the authority of an independent
prosecutor, whether statutorily grounded or otherwise, to conduct a full and
fair investigation of the President without interference from the subject of the
investigation. Because the President’s removal powers are understood on
many accounts to be grounded in his constitutional authority over the
executive branch, he has a ready defense against a federal prosecutor whose
authority ultimately depends on the President himself, or at best is grounded
in a federal statute enacted by Congress. In 2017, for example Professor
Akhil Amar, adhering to a position on presidential power and immunity
similar to the position he had adopted during the Clinton Administration,
testified before the Senate about the “unconstitutionality” of Congress
passing a bill to constrain the President’s power to remove Special Counsel
Robert Mueller.170 Others also argued that it would not be an impeachable
offense for Trump to order the DOJ to fire Mueller.171 And thus it may seem
as though there is no protection against a sitting President who is determined
to upend an investigation into his own misdeeds other than the political
outrage that may ensue if the President seeks to end an investigation into his
own acts by removing the investigator.
There are limits to what the President can do to hobble an ongoing
investigation, despite his near absolute control over the DOJ. Federal
obstruction laws, which make it unlawful to interfere with an ongoing official
case or federal proceeding, should apply to the President as they would to
any other individual. Obstruction statutes therefore place at least theoretical
limits on what the President is free to do to obstruct an investigation into
himself. In practice, however, federal obstruction law only provides
protection against a sitting President if the latter can be investigated, indicted
170

171

See Special Counsels and the Separation of Powers: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 1–
2 (2017) (statement of Akhil Reed Amar, Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law
School) (stating, among other things, that a proposed bill protecting Mueller from being fired by
Trump would be unconstitutional). Professor Amar expressed strong disagreement with the
Supreme Court’s holding in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) that a statute preventing at will
removal of an independent counsel was constitutional. See supra text accompanying notes 113–15
(discussing Professor Amar’s position during the 1990s on the issue of the President’s amenability
to judicial process).
See Joe Concha, Dershowitz: Firing Mueller ‘Would Not Be an Impeachable Offense’, THE HILL (Nov. 29,
2018, 9:59 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/media/418870-dershowitz-firing-muellerwould-not-be-an-impeachable-offense [https://perma.cc/PLD9-DBU2].
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and tried for obstruction, since otherwise the President will be free to obstruct
the inquiry into the obstruction itself. In that sense, the possibility of indicting
the President for obstruction is a precondition to conducting a thorough
investigation into that President, since otherwise the President will face no
constraint when he attempts to dismantle the investigation or influence its
course.
The various attempts to investigate the Trump administration have
amply demonstrated the challenge of trying to investigate a President’s
misdeeds where there is no realistic chance of prosecuting that same
President for obstruction should he interfere with the investigation. The
investigations into the 2016 Trump Campaign by the federal government,
known as “Crossfire Hurricane,” were obstructed and stymied almost from
the beginning. The firing of former FBI Director James Comey was a
dramatic reminder that the President can invoke his control over the
executive branch, particularly his removal powers, to eliminate the threat of
accountability. President Trump was up front in his Twitter account, his
press conferences and interviews that he had fired Comey because of the
“Russia thing.”172 He also tweeted that firing Comey was “a great service”
and that Comey had been “insubordinate” in his handling of the Hilary
Clinton email investigation.173
Firing Comey was a grave miscalculation on Trump’s part, as the
appointment of Robert Mueller as special counsel followed hard upon it.
Mueller himself came to the conclusion that “a thorough FBI investigation
would uncover facts about the campaign and the President personally that
the President could have understood to be crimes or that would give rise to
personal and political concern.”174 The Report also detailed that the White
House had “advanced a pretextual reason to the press and the public for
Comey’s termination” based on the DOJ’s supposed recommendations, but
that the President had admitted that “he was going to fire Comey regardless
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Devlin Barrett & Philip Rucker, Trump Said He Was Thinking of Russia Controversy When He Decided to
Fire Comey, WASH. POST (May 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/trump-says-fbi-director-comey-told-him-three-times-he-wasnt-under-investigation-oncein-a-phone-call-initiated-by-the-president/2017/05/11/2b384c9a-3669-11e7-b4ee434b6d506b37_story.html [https://perma.cc/ZML7-GG3C].
Mary Clare Jalonick, et al., Trump Tweets That Firing James Comey Was a ‘Great Service’, PBS
NEWSHOUR (June 15, 2018, 9:01 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-tweetsthat-firing-james-comey-was-a-great-service [https://perma.cc/62J4-6BPG].
See MUELLER REPORT, supra note 87, at 76.
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of [the] DOJ’s recommendations.”175 The same sort of effort to obstruct
occurred with regard to the Mueller investigation. In that effort, claims of
presidential immunity, as well as privilege, in addition to other presidential
assertions of power, made truly independent investigations of a sitting
President a challenging undertaking.
In this case, attempts to interference with the Mueller investigation took
many forms, including a public relations campaign orchestrated by Attorney
General Bill Barr to control the public reception of the final report. Attorney
General Barr was pressed into service to control the roll out of the Mueller
Report as well as to prevent access to the full Report by Congress and
members of the public. For weeks all that was in the public domain was a
four-page letter from Barr to Congress describing the Report and
exonerating Trump,176 even though the Report expressly said that it did not
exonerate Trump.177 Mueller himself complained to Barr that Barr’s letter
was misleading.178 When the Mueller Report was finally released to
Congress and to the public, it was heavily redacted—particularly Part I of
the Report concerning Russian interference in the election and ties between
Trump and his 2016 campaign and the Russians.179 And, as we discuss in
the next section, House subpoenas for the unredacted Mueller Report were
simply ignored by the DOJ. The 1973 OLC Memo worries that an indicted
President would lose the capacity to govern “[g]iven the realities of modern
politics and mass media.”180 As demonstrated with the roll out of the Mueller
175
176

177
178

179

180

See id. at 77.
See Letter from William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., to Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House and
Senate Judiciary Cmtys. (Mar. 24, 2019) (“I have concluded that the evidence developed during
the Special Counsel’s investigation is not sufficient to establish that the President committed an
obstruction-of-justice offense.”).
See MUELLER REPORT, supra note 87, at 2, 8.
See Richard Gonzales & Sasha Ingber, Mueller’s Letter to Barr Complained that Trump-Russia Report
Summary
Lacked
‘Context’,
NPR
(Apr.
20,
2019,
11:12
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/30/718883130/muller-complained-that-barr-summary-oftrump-russia-probe-lacked-context [https://perma.cc/T92E-827D] (attaching letter from Mueller
to Barr dated March 27, 2019).
Shortly before the November 2020 election Judge Reggie Walton of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia ordered release of some of the previously redacted portions of
the Mueller Report in ruling on a Freedom of Information Act request by Buzzfeed News. See Jason
Leopold & Ken Bensinger, A Judge Has Ordered the Justice Department to Release More Portions of the Mueller
Report Before Election Day, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 30, 2020, 8:22 PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jasonleopold/judge-orders-more-mueller-reportunredacted [https://perma.cc/PYE6-Y4DR].
1973 O.L.C. Memo at 31.
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Report by Barr’s DOJ, the political reality is that the President controls
virtually all messaging from the DOJ, including messaging about DOJ
criminal investigations of the President.
In sum, there is ample support for the proposition that a sitting President
can be investigated by his own DOJ or by an independent prosecutor
assigned by the DOJ, but this formal legal permission to investigate does
ensure that a special prosecutor or other investigatory body can in fact
conduct a complete and unbiased investigation into presidential misdeeds.
As long as presidential immunity is thought to exist with respect to
indictment, particularly indictment for obstruction, and to the extent that
Presidents are afforded broad latitude with respect to presidential privilege,
immunity and related doctrines, they will be able to manipulate and control
the investigation by hobbling the effort to bring in witnesses and gain access
to documents. They will also have significant ability to control the public
reception of investigative findings and the dissemination of information
regarding them.
Presidents routinely invoke executive privilege to withhold documents or
witnesses from those conducting the investigation, thereby shielding
themselves from scrutiny. This forces the special counsel to decide between
going to court with a subpoena, as special prosecutors Cox and Jaworski did
in United States v. Nixon, and forgoing the evidence being withheld. Trump’s
stalling tactics with Mueller worked insofar as Trump avoided a personal
interview with Mueller. Rather than spend a year or more fighting the
presidential immunity issues with Trump, with uncertain results in the
Supreme Court, it may have been a reasonable decision on Mueller’s part to
decide to forgo the interview.
While a sitting President is not categorically immune from criminal
prosecution, a President has powerful tools at his disposal to frustrate a
criminal investigation of which he is the target. Simply refusing to provide
evidence, and asking others not to provide evidence, unless ordered to do so
by a court, is one of them. Whether such conduct by a President amounts to
criminal obstruction of justice is a topic for another day. But suffice it to say
here that such conduct, if permitted, makes it extraordinarily difficult to
ensure even the most rudimentary of criminal investigations into the conduct
of a sitting President while he is still in office.

156

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24:1

B. Did You Bring Your Handcuffs? Enforcing Congressional Subpoenas
Just as it is settled law that it is constitutional for the federal government
to investigate a sitting President, it should also be beyond question that
Congress possesses the constitutional authority to conduct its own
investigation of a sitting President. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
also recently made clear that Congress has the right to rely on the federal
court system to enforce its subpoenas for this purpose, though the latter
proposition has been much contested. The strongest case for the exercise of
congressional investigative authority over a sitting President occurs in the
context of an impeachment proceeding, where Congress’ authority relative
to the executive branch is at its height. Had Congress been involved in an
active impeachment inquiry when it sought to obtain Trump’s financial
records from the Mazars accounting firm, there is little doubt that the
Supreme Court would have enforced its subpoenas, as Chief Justice Roberts’
opinion in Trump v. Mazars, the companion to the Vance case, has recently
made clear.181
In Mazars, the Supreme Court held that Congress is entitled to have its
subpoenas enforced, even as against the President, and confirmed that no
heightened showing of need, such as the Court applied in Nixon, would be
necessary to enforce congressional subpoenas with regard to the President’s
personal papers or his private businesses.182
[Executive] privilege safeguards the public interest in candid, confidential
deliberations within the Executive Branch; it is “fundamental to the
operation of Government.” Nixon, 418 U. S., at 708. As a result, information
subject to executive privilege deserves “the greatest protection consistent
with the fair administration of justice.” Id., at 715, 94 S. Ct. 3090. We
decline to transplant that protection root and branch to cases involving
nonprivileged, private information, which by definition does not implicate
sensitive Executive Branch deliberations.183

181
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Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020) (explaining that Congress may subpoena
the President’s information for a legitimate legislative purpose); see also Claire O. Finkelstein &
Richard W. Painter, Trump’s Bid to Stand Above the Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/08/opinion/supreme-court-trump-executive-privilege.html
[https://perma.cc/MCA9-GNFK].
See Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2031 (“Indeed, from President Washington until now, we [The Supreme
Court] have never considered a dispute over a congressional subpoena for the President’s
records.”).
Id. at 2032–33.
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Despite the finding that in the particular circumstances of the Mazars
case, the requisite legislative purpose did not exist and the subpoena could
not be enforced, the Court reinforced the basic message of the Vance case
here as well: a sitting President is not above the law, and as such is subject to
investigation.
Immunity theory, however, crops up in the context of congressional
investigations of a sitting President, even in impeachment inquiries or
proceedings, and is often asserted as a basis for arguing against the ability of
Congress to use the federal courts to enforce its subpoenas where the
executive branch is concerned. The argument here takes a roundabout form:
instead of arguing that a sitting President is immune from congressional
investigations under Article II, which does not fly in the case of
impeachment, enthusiasts of presidential immunity argue that Congress is
limited to its own powers and resources for investigating a sitting President
and that federal courts should not enforce congressional subpoenas.184
Whether or not courts ultimately intervene, litigation often takes so long that
resistance to a congressional subpoena often outlives the presidency, and
most disputes over subpoenas are resolved with a negotiated settlement. For
example, litigation over the House Oversight Committee’s 2011 and 2012
subpoenas of President Obama’s Justice Department for documents related
to “Operation Fast and Furious” lasted until the matter was finally resolved
with a 2018 settlement in which many of the responsive documents were
finally produced by the Trump Administration.185 Litigation over the House
Judiciary Committee subpoena of President Trump’s White House Counsel
Don McGahn was finally resolved by the District of Columbia Circuit in an
en banc decision in 2020, but the testimony did not take place until June 4,
2021, four months into the Biden Administration.186 Few, if any
184

185

186

This was the position taken by the Trump Administration with respect to the House Judiciary
Committee subpoena of White House Counsel Don McGahn. The three-judge panel of the District
of Columbia Circuit agreed that the courts should not enforce the subpoena, which the panel
viewed as essentially a political dispute between the executive branch and Congress. The Circuit
Court reversed en banc. See discussion of these cases in text accompanying notes 194–201 infra.
See Conditional Settlement Agreement of Mar. 7, 2018, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform,
U.S. House of Representatives v. Jeff B. Sessions, II, No. 1:12–cv–01332 (D.D.C. 2018) (Berman
Jackson, J.) (case originally brought with Attorney General Eric Holder as named defendant).
McGahn’s June 2021 testimony before the House Judiciary Committee was constrained by the
DOJ which continued to assert executive privilege over communications between McGahn and
Trump on subjects other than those discussed in publicly released portions of the Mueller Report.
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congressional subpoenas contested by a President in the courts have been
judicially enforced resulting in production of the responsive documents
during the presidency in question.
The issue of witnesses was a deeply fraught one in both impeachment
proceedings brought against Donald Trump during his presidency. Had a
Senate vote been cast in favor of having witnesses in either of the
impeachment proceedings, Congress would have faced a further hurdle,
namely convincing reluctant witnesses to testify, or if necessary, issuing
subpoenas to compel them and then backing up its subpoenas with
enforcement by a federal court. In general, for impeachment investigations
to be effective, Congress must have the ability to subpoena witnesses and to
enforce those subpoenas strenuously, even in the face of a demand from the
sitting President that the witnesses defy Congress and refuse to testify.
Presidents George W. Bush187 and Barrack Obama,188 for example, on
isolated occasions allowed their appointees to ignore congressional
subpoenas. President Trump emphatically believed that he was entitled to
use his authority to prevent witnesses from testifying or to withhold
incriminating documents or other evidence, and he accordingly openly
encouraged witnesses to defy subpoenas,189 as well as asserted executive
privilege to block administration officials from testifying.190 These moves
were consistent with Trump’s view that Article II allowed him to do

187
188

189
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See Claire O. Finkelstein & Richard W. Painter, Why is Merrick Garland’s DOJ Covering for Trump,
SLATE (June 3, 2021, 2:12 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/06/don-mcgahntestimony-trump-doj-interference.html [https://perma.cc/4Y37-TNRQ].
See Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Harriet Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53,
62 (D.D.C. 2008).
See Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, U.S. House of Representatives v. Eric Holder, 979 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2013) (Berman Jackson, J.) (“The fact that this case arises out of a dispute
between two branches of government does not make it non-justiciable; Supreme Court precedent
establishes that the third branch has an equally fundamental role to play, and that judges not only
may, but sometimes must, exercise their responsibility to interpret the Constitution and determine
whether another branch has exceeded its power.”).
Charlie Savage, Trump Vows Stonewall of ‘All’ House Subpoenas, Setting Up Fight Over Powers, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/us/politics/donald-trump-subpoenas.html
[https://perma.cc/78NT-L2RM].
Brett Samuels, Trump Says He Would ‘Love to’ Have Officials Testify But Is ‘Fighting for Future Presidents’,
THE HILL (Nov. 26, 2019, 11:26 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/472084trump-says-he-would-love-to-have-officials-testify-but-is-fighting [https://perma.cc/7FPTSCZT].
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whatever he wants,191 but unfortunately, there are legal scholars who
reinforce these exaggerated claims about presidential power under Article II.
Defiance of congressional subpoenas reached new heights under the
Trump Administration, and a deeply problematic rejection of congressional
authority did much to damage Congress’ authority and its ability to engage
in oversight of the executive branch. As Attorney General Barr quipped to
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi when she complained that he was ignoring
House subpoenas: “did you bring your handcuffs?”192 If the Attorney
General refuses to comply with a subpoena, is the Speaker of the House
dependent upon whatever force she can muster with the Sergeant of Arms
and a pair of handcuffs? A similar problem awaits at Senate impeachment
trials. Although Senate Impeachment Rules provide that “[t]he Senate shall
have power to compel the attendance of witnesses” and to “enforce
obedience to its orders,” the Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate does not have a
jail or a police force at his disposal.193 Whether congressional subpoenas will
be enforced turns on whether Article III courts will intervene against the
executive branch to assist Congress in enforcing its subpoenas.
In United States v. Nixon, which we discuss above, the Supreme Court had
suggested an answer to this question: If a subpoena comes from a federal
prosecutor, it is appropriate for federal courts to enforce it. Trump v. Vance
upheld a subpoena of a President from a state prosecutor. The enforceability
of congressional subpoenas is not so clear. In two seminal cases—House
Judiciary Committee v. Donald McGahn, concerning a subpoena of President
Trump’s former White House counsel, and Trump v. Mazars, concerning a
House subpoena of Trump organization financial records from his
accounting firm—President Trump was able to frustrate enforcement of
House subpoenas until well past the 2020 election.
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Jason Lemon, Trump Insists the Constitution’s Article II ‘Allows Me to Do Whatever I Want’, NEWSWEEK,
(June 16, 2019, 2:58 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/trump-insists-constitution-allows-dowhatever-want-1444235 [https://perma.cc/366Z-8XFK].
Nicholas Fandos, Pelosi and Barr Share a Gag About Jail and Handcuffs, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.come/2019/05/15/us/politics/pelosi-barr.html
[https://perma.cc/7WWQ-Q5GP].
Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials, 99th Cong.
(1986).
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Despite the Nixon precedent, the three-judge panel in U.S. House Committee
on the Judiciary v. Donald McGahn194 decided by a 2–1 vote that it could not
force Don McGahn to testify before Congress and that the House had no
standing to sue in federal court.195 Had the initial decision been upheld in
McGahn, it would have meant that congressional subpoenas are not legally
enforceable in federal court. Disputes between the executive and legislative
branches over subpoenas would therefore be merely a political matter.
Fortunately, the full District of Columbia Circuit heard the McGahn case en
banc and reversed 7–2 on August 7, 2020.196 After the Supreme Court
decided Trump v. Vance, and particularly Trump v. Mazars in July 2020, it was
clear that the Court would enforce some subpoenas against the President,
including congressional subpoenas. The House did lose its bid to enforce its
subpoena in Mazars because the House had not met the necessity test, but
the Court strongly suggested that if there had been an open impeachment
investigation the result would have been different.197 As the McGahn en banc
opinion went on to observe: “As far back as 1796, George Washington, the
Nation’s first President, acknowledged that the House may compel the
President to turn over some executive branch information if sought as part
of an impeachment investigation.”198
This Article is not a complete discussion of these two cases, but we do
note that without support from the federal courts the power of Congress to
investigate a sitting President will be severely circumscribed. The Supreme
Court’s holding in Trump v. Mazars and the District of Columbia Circuit’s en
banc holding in McGahn together make the point that federal courts are
willing to enforce congressional subpoenas, but as Mazars makes clear, that
willingness is limited if there is not a strong congressional predicate for the
subpoena, such as a presidential impeachment investigation.
The en banc holding in McGahn left unresolved the question whether the
President could assert executive privilege over particular communications

194
195
196
197
198

See Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 510 (D.C.
Cir. 2020).
Id.
See Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 510 (D.C.
Cir. 2020) (outlining decision on rehearing en banc).
Trump v. Mazars USA, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020).
Comm. on Judiciary of U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir.
2020)
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with McGahn, and if so, what the scope of such privilege should be.199
McGahn was compelled to testify before the House by court order, but the
court did not determine which questions he had to answer. In 2021 the
Biden Administration, which now represents the interests of the White House
in the case, negotiated with the House to reach a compromise about the
extent of McGahn’s testimony.200 Given the chasm that separates the former
Trump administration from the Biden administration in nearly all matters,
it may seem curious that the Biden Administration would try to limit
McGahn’s testimony. However, this case will set a precedent on executive
privilege, and therefore may serve as a benchmark for testimony expected by
Congress if in the future a Biden Administration White House Counsel were
served with a similar subpoena. The Biden Administration indeed continued
to assert executive privilege over much of McGahn’s testimony.201
Historically, congressional subpoenas simply have not had the force that
special counsel subpoenas have, and it is thus difficult to draw any
conclusions about executive privilege in such cases, given the rather different
context in which they appear. The difference is of course illustrated by the
different outcomes in Trump v. Vance as compared with Trump v. Mazars: the
subpoenas from the Manhattan District Attorney in the context of a grand
jury investigation were enforceable in the Vance case, but the congressional
subpoenas at issue in the Mazars case were not. The upshot is that Congress
of course has no “handcuffs” to enforce its subpoenas, Presidents often assert
199

200

201

The Court thus observed that “[g]iven McGahn’s previous role as a close presidential advisor, it is
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a two-month delay in the case. Josh Gerstein & Kyle Cheney, Judges Order 2-Month Delay in Case to
Compel McGahn Testimony to House, POLITICO (Feb. 18, 2021, 8:55 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/18/delay-mcgahn-testimony-house-470023
[https://perma.cc/MP9H-2SZZ].
Finkelstein & Painter, supra note 186.

162

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24:1

“executive privilege” when refusing to comply with a subpoena, litigation in
federal courts to enforce subpoenas takes a long time with uncertain results,
and while the House might impeach a President for obstruction of Congress,
the chances of sixty-seven senators voting to convict the President of this
offense are slim to none.
Indeed, using executive privilege to flout congressional subpoenas has
become so routine that even a former President, Donald Trump, felt entitled
to use it to fend off congressional subpoenas to procure the testimony of
former officials and White House documents.202 There are countless
examples of Presidents turning the records of their predecessors over to
Congress.203 Former President Nixon sued to overturn a federal statute
providing for public access to his papers in the possession of the General
Services Administration, but he was unsuccessful.204 The ultimate decision
202
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204

See Letter from Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, Cong. Select Comm. to Investigate the Jan. 6th
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See Ryan Goodman, Christine Berger & Margaret Shields, Modern History of Disclosure of Presidential
Records: On the Boundaries of Executive Privilege, JUST SEC. (Sept. 30, 2021),
https://www.justsecurity.org/78413/modern-history-of-disclosure-of-presidential-records-on-theboundaries-of-executive-privilege/ [https://perma.cc/JR7C-VRV9] (detailing account of
instances in which past Republican and Democratic administrations have disclosed presidential
records to Congress, including records of prior Presidents). “As included in the lists below, the
historical record includes significant examples of incumbent [P]residents turning over a former
President’s records.” Id.
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). The Court noted that control of
the documents rested with Nixon’s successors. “We reject at the outset appellant's argument that
the Act's regulation of the disposition of [p]residential materials within the Executive Branch
constitutes, without more, a violation of the principle of separation of powers. Neither President
Ford nor President Carter supports this claim. The Executive Branch became a party to the Act's
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about assertion of executive privilege belongs to the current President. Yet
the Supreme Court has declined to rule on whether a former Presidentcan
assert the privilege, instead holding that Trump’s claim to privilege in the
investigation of the January 6 insurrection would not have passed muster
under United States v. Nixon even if he were still president.205
Resolution of these congressional subpoenas, even of a former President’s
records with the support of the current President, may take time. One former
Trump ally, Steve Bannon refused to testify before the U.S. House Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack, even though in January
2021 he had been a private citizen advising Trump three years after Bannon
left the White House in 2017; the House has found him in contempt and
referred the case to the DOJ for possible prosecution.206 Bannon has been
criminally charged for contempt of Congress, but whether Bannon or anyone
else who flouts congressional subpoenas will be criminally convicted or
compelled to testify remains to be seen.
C. Kavanaugh on Investigating a Sitting President
No justice of the Supreme Court has been more focused on questions
relating to the investigation of sitting Presidents than Justice Brett
Kavanaugh. Kavanaugh’s approach to such matters, however, has not
always been consistent.
As an attorney, Kavanaugh was a member of the legal team assembled
by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr to investigate President Clinton.
While working for Starr, Kavanaugh expressed great enthusiasm for the
independent counsel’s power to investigate the President, including for
conduct only tangentially related to core functions of the presidency. In a
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regulation when President Ford signed the Act into law, and the administration of President Carter,
acting through the Solicitor General, vigorously supports affirmance of the District Court's
judgment sustaining its constitutionality. Moreover, the control over the materials remains in the
Executive Branch.” Id. at 441. Subsequent to this case, the Presidential Records Act of 1978
negated the personal property interest in presidential records that Nixon had asserted by changing
the legal ownership of a President’s official records from private to public, and establishing a system
of managing the records by the National Archives. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–07.
Trump v. Thompson, 142 S. Ct. 680, 680 (2022) (denying Trump’s application for a stay of the
January 6 Committee subpoenas).
See Luke Broadwater, House Finds Bannon in Contempt for Defying January 6 Inquiry Subpoena, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/21/us/politics/bannon-contempt-jan-6subpoena.html [https://perma.cc/3BJX-HEY8].
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memo to Ken Starr dated August 1, 1998, Kavanaugh wrote: “I am strongly
opposed to giving the President any ‘break’ in the questioning regarding the
details of the Lewinsky relationship—unless before his questioning on
Monday he either (a) resigns or (ii) confesses perjury and issues an apology to
you.”207 The memo urged a searching evaluation of the President’s conduct
with Lewinsky: “[i]t may not be our job to impose sanctions on [Clinton],
but it is our job to make his pattern of revolting behavior clear piece by
painful piece . . . . Aren’t we failing to fulfill our duty to the American people
if we willingly ‘conspire’ with the President in an effort to conceal the true
nature of his acts?”208 Despite the fact that the Lewinsky matter was not
central to the original subject matter of the investigation, Kavanaugh saw no
reason to exercise constraint in the interrogation of a sitting President. In
particular, Kavanaugh included in the memo a series of graphic questions
for Starr’s team to ask Clinton about the affair.209
At the same time as he was drafting memos for Ken Starr on the Clinton
investigation, Kavanaugh paradoxically joined a chorus of conservative
lawyers who were highly critical of the independent counsel statute under
which Starr was exercising his authority. In a 1998 symposium in the
Georgetown Law Journal, Kavanaugh urged that the independent counsel
statute be amended to provide for appointment of the counsel by the
President and confirmation by the Senate, rather than having the
independent counsel appointed by a three-judge panel as provided for under
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.210 Kavanaugh also made the
207
208
209
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Memorandum from Brett M. Kavanaugh to All Att’ys at the Off. of the Indep. Counsel, Nat’l
Archives (Aug. 31, 1998) (on file with the National Archives).
Id.
For example, Kavanaugh drafted for Starr questions to be asked of Clinton in an interview or
deposition under oath. Kavanaugh’s proposed questions for Clinton included:
“If Monica Lewinsky says that on several occasions in the Oval Office area, you used your
fingers to stimulate her vagina and bring her to orgasm, would she be lying?”
“If Monica Lewinsky says that on several occasions you had her give oral sex, made her
stop, and then ejaculated into the sink in the bathroom of the Oval Office, would she be
lying?”
“If Monica Lewinsky says that you masturbated into a trash can in your secretary’s office,
would she be lying?”
“IS IT TOO GRAPHIC?” Kavanaugh asked in an August 31, 1998 memo to Starr aides.
“SHOULD IT BE MORE GRAPHIC (kidding)?”
See Memorandum from Brett M. Kavanaugh to Judge Starr and All Att’ys at the Off. of the Indep.
Counsel (Aug. 15, 1998); Josh Gerstein, Kavanaugh Proposed Graphic Questions for Bill Clinton During Starr
Probe, POLITICO (Aug. 20, 2018, 12:36 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/20/brettkavanaugh-bill-clinton-explicit-questions-lewinsky-789599 [https://perma.cc/H7B4-SMWX].
Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2157–61 (1998).
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problematic suggestion that the independent counsel should be removable
by the President in the same manner as any other federal officer: “[C]oncerns
about ‘accountability’ would be alleviated if the independent counsel were
appointed (and removable) in the same manner as other high-level executive
branch officials.”211 In short, he proposed that the President should have sole
power to appoint and remove the special counsel, a system that would pose
a severe problem for the integrity of any investigation conducted by such
counsel. Congress did not adopt Kavanaugh’s proposal. Instead, it simply
allowed the independent counsel statute to lapse according to the twentyyear sunset provision in the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.212
Accordingly, the two federal independent counsel investigations that have
occurred since Ken Starr’s time were both appointed simply by the Justice
Department, without express congressional authorization.213
In his 1998 article, Kavanagh went on to opine on the question whether
a sitting President can be indicted. Without reaching a definitive conclusion,
Kavanaugh expressed doubts about the constitutionality of indicting a sitting
President and urged Congress once again to lay ambiguities to rest by
explicitly providing a statute to speak to the issue:
Congress should establish that the President can be indicted only after he
leaves office voluntarily or is impeached by the House of Representatives
and convicted and removed by the Senate. Removal of the President is a
process inextricably intertwined with its seismic political effects. Any
investigation that might conceivably result in the removal of the President
cannot be separated from the dramatic and drastic consequences that would
ensue. This threat inevitably causes the President to treat the special counsel
as a dangerous adversary instead of as a federal prosecutor seeking to root
out criminality. Whether the Constitution allows indictment of a sitting
President is debatable (thus, Congress would not have the authority to
establish definitively that a sitting President is subject to indictment).
Removing that uncertainty by providing that the President is not subject to indictment would
expedite investigations in which the President is involved . . . .214

Once again Kavanaugh appears to have taken the side of presidential
authority, in contrast with his approach as a member of Ken Starr’s
independent counsel team. The suggestion that Congress should declare by
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Id. at 2136.
See 18 U.S.C. § 599.
Since Ken Starr there have been two independent counsels appointed: Nicholas Bua, who was
appointed by Attorney General William Barr, followed by Robert Mueller.
Kavanaugh, supra note 210, at 2137 (emphasis added).
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fiat that a sitting President cannot be indicted because this would help
expedite investigations involving the President is a point difficult to credit
given Kavanaugh’s own enthusiasm for a detailed and drawn out
investigation of a sitting President. Moreover, taken on its own, the
argument has little merit: investigations of wrongdoing can always be
accelerated if we make them less searching and less effective, thus rendering
them toothless. As Kavanaugh clearly understood, a detailed presidential
investigation seeking true accountability is slow and painstaking, and must
be undertaken, as Kavanaugh himself once urged, “piece by painful piece.”
In 2009, ten years before Kavanaugh joined the Supreme Court,
Kavanaugh wrote yet another law review article on investigating the
President, this one in the Minnesota Law Review.215 The 2009 article reiterated
Kavanaugh’s concern that indicting a sitting President might be
unconstitutional without taking a definitive position on that question. His
solution once again was to look to Congress: “Congress might consider a law
exempting a President—while in office—from criminal prosecution and
investigation, including from questioning by criminal prosecutors or defense
counsel.”216 Kavanaugh here stressed the importance of accountability,
saying that “the country needs a check against a bad-behaving or lawbreaking President.”217 But he believed that the Constitution provided that
check in the form of impeachment. “No single prosecutor, judge, or jury
should be able to accomplish what the Constitution assigns to the
Congress.”218 The new statute Kavanaugh envisioned would provide that
“temporary deferral also should excuse the President from depositions or
questioning in civil litigation or criminal investigations.”219 He recognized,
however, that his proposal might require an extension of the relevant statutes
of limitations,220 a matter we take up in Section IV.C below.
Nowhere did Kavanaugh argue that investigation of a sitting President
was unconstitutional or that U.S. v. Nixon should be overturned. He even
implied that Clinton v. Jones was correctly decided, despite urging Congress to
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Brett M. Kavanaugh, Separation of Powers During the Forty-Fourth Presidency and Beyond, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1454 (2009).
Id. at 1461.
Id. at 1462.
Id.
Id. at 1462, n. 35.
Id. at 1462, n. 32.
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bar civil suits against the President while in office. His argument strikes a
chord after the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks:
Looking back to the late 1990s, for example, the nation certainly would have
been better off if President Clinton could have focused on Osama bin Laden
without being distracted by the Paula Jones sexual harassment case and its
criminal-investigation offshoots. . . . But the law as it existed was itself the
problem, particularly the extent to which it allowed civil suits against
[P]residents to proceed while the President is in office. With that in mind, it
would be appropriate for Congress to enact a statute providing that any
personal civil suits against [P]residents, like certain members of the military,
be deferred while the President is in office.221

Kavanaugh seemingly felt no qualms about proposing federal legislation
eliminating civil suits against a sitting president, despite the fact that it would
have rendered his own investigation of Clinton either pointless or illegal.
Kavanaugh’s approach treats investigation of a sitting President as well
as the amenability of a sitting President to civil suit as a policy matter to be
resolved by Congress, rather than as a constitutional question to be resolved
by the courts. The only open constitutional question Kavanaugh recognizes,
without definitively resolving, is whether a sitting President can be
indicted.222 By proposing that Congress address the issue of indicting a sitting
President by statute, Kavanaugh is implicitly allowing that it could be
constitutional to indict a sitting President (he says in his article that it is
“debatable”). The statute Kavanaugh proposes, after all, would not be
necessary if Article II constrained the Justice Department from investigating
a sitting President.
Justice Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion in Trump v. Vance recognizes this
point. In that opinion, he raises no Article II objections to investigating or
even indicting a sitting president, and neither do most of the other justices.
Kavanaugh’s concurrence differs from the Court’s majority opinion only in
that it proposes applying to a grand jury subpoena the stricter standard of
heightened scrutiny articulated in United States v. Nixon,223 which requires the
prosecutor to demonstrate a specific need for the President’s information.
Because the subpoenaed information involved personal, not official
presidential records, as was the case with Nixon, the majority of the Court in
221
222
223

Id. at 1460–61.
See Kavanaugh, supra note 210, at 2137 (“Whether the Constitution allows indictment of a sitting
President is debatable.”).
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 700 (1974) (requiring the Special Prosecutor to clear the
hurdles of “(1) relevancy; (2) admissibility; (3) specificity” to obtain President Nixon’s tapes).
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Trump v. Vance was not willing to adopt the “heightened need” standard.224
Justice Kavanagh, along with the rest of the Court, recognized that proposals
to restrict criminal investigation of the President belong in bills introduced in
Congress. They are not part of a proper analysis of Article II presidential
powers under the Constitution.
D. Does the Pardon Power Immunize the President?
The President’s pardon power is one of the few aspects of presidential
authority that is expressly provided for in the text of Article II of the U.S.
Constitution. Because the pardon power is presented as nearly absolute,225
the possibility exists that a President might use the pardon power to
immunize himself against criminal investigation and indictment in a variety
of ways.
The first and most obvious example of self-immunization using the
pardon power is the possibility of self-pardon. A President who has the power
to pardon himself would stand in a unique position to the law. He alone
would be untouchable by the criminal law, not just for the duration of his
presidency, but with respect to crimes he may have committed prior to taking
office. He would be like the proverbial individual referenced by Glaucon in
Plato’s Republic who possessed a “Ring of Gyges,” which, when he wore it,
enabled him to turn himself invisible and thus commit any crimes he wanted
without risk of detection or punishment.226 A President with the power of
self-pardon could exempt himself from the law in this same sense, and thus
avoid liability for any crime he might have committed either prior to or
during his presidency. Most relevantly for the continued vitality of U.S.
democracy, he could engage in any number of criminal activities for the
purpose of remaining in office.
To date, there have been no instances in U.S. history of a President using
his pardon power to exonerate himself directly, but given the incentive that
a sitting President may have to commit crimes to stay in office, the distinct

224

225
226

See Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2430 (2020) (“Requiring a state grand jury to meet a
heightened standard of need would hobble the grand jury’s ability to acquire ‘all information that
might possibly bear on its investigation.’”).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President Shall . . . have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons
for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”).
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, BOOK 2, at 40 (G.R.F. Ferrari ed., Tom Griffith trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2000).
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possibility arises that a President will attempt to issue a self-pardon to avoid
liability for such crimes. Crimes such as bribery, solicitation of election fraud,
extortion of foreign powers, incitement of sedition, riot and insurrection, as
well as potentially even murder, are the types of crimes that Presidents
seeking to remain in office might have an incentive to commit. Is it plausible
that the Framers, with their fear of despotism, would have equipped the
President with so powerful a tool with which to manipulate the law in his
favor and thus avoid accountability?
According to Al Alschuler, there is reason to doubt that the Founders
would have wanted the pardon power to extent to self-pardons, given the
long-recognized principle that a man cannot be a judge in his own case.227
For this reason, the Founders would likely have included express language
providing that the President could pardon himself if they intended to include
an exception to the prohibition against self-judging.228 Moreover, the
implications of the availability of a self-pardon would be deeply antithetical
to our constitutional principles. As Alschuler observes:
A [P]resident who may pardon himself on his last day in office . . . knows
from his first day in office that he can commit any crime he likes without
risking prosecution. In effect, he has a blanket pardon for future crimes.
The [P]resident may assault selected Members of Congress with impunity.
He might even incite a mob to storm the Capitol and block Congress from
certifying his electoral defeat.229

The self-pardon is only the most obvious way in which a criminal
President could use the pardon power to immunize himself against liability
for his crimes. Another way is the use of the pardon power to interfere with
incriminating testimony by witnesses to alleged crimes. In the ordinary
course of a criminal investigation, prosecutors secure useful testimony by
striking a deal with potential witnesses to induce them to cooperate with lawenforcement in the hope of avoiding their own criminal liability. A President
might “dangle pardons” to persuade such witnesses not to cooperate.230
227
228
229
230

Albert Alschuler, Limiting the Pardon Power, 63 ARIZ. L. REV. 546, 555 (2021) (citing Dr. Bonham’s
Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P. 1610)) (articulating the long-standing prohibition on self-judging).
See Alschuler, supra note 227, at 556 (“The Constitution’s Framers almost certainly did not mean to
depart from the ancient prohibition of self-judging.”).
Id. at 558.
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (“Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades
another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person,
with intent to (1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding;
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Recall that the pardon power was used liberally by President Trump in the
middle of the Mueller investigation.231 Four high-profile recipients of
pardons from Trump—Michael Flynn, Roger Stone, Paul Manafort and
Steven Bannon—had previously been interviewed by prosecutors as
witnesses in the investigation. These pardons appeared to be rewards for the
loyalty of their recipients and their willingness to hold firm against the
invitation by investigators to implicate Trump. Mueller noted in his report
that such use of the pardon power to buy the silence of witnesses could
constitute obstruction of justice.232 If any of the pardons were offered or
given in exchange for false testimony or noncooperation with a federal
investigation, Trump’s decision to issue these pardons could constitute a
criminal act, most likely obstruction of justice.233
The question is a critical one. The pardon power is a strong one—one
of the few specific presidential powers articulated in Article II. But a
President who uses that power to immunize himself from civil or criminal
liability uses that power improperly. Can a President be guilty of a crime
such as obstruction of justice for exercising his pardon power for corrupt
purposes, such as ensuring that a witness fails to implicate him in a criminal
investigation? Constitutional scholars disagree on this. Alan Dershowitz, for
example, argues that because the pardon power is constitutionally absolute,
no statute—including the federal statute that criminalizes the obstruction of
justice—can supplant the Constitution: “[A] President may never be charged
with obstruction of justice for . . . pardoning potential witnesses against him
. . . . The [C]onstitution explicitly authorizes the President to pardon
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233

(2) cause or induce any person to— (A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or
other object, from an official proceeding; . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 20 years, or both.”).
See Alschuler, supra note 227, at 594–606 (discussing how President Trump used the pardon power
to pardon multiple associates, including Roger Stone and Paul Manafort).
See MUELLER REPORT, supra note 87, at 173 (2019) (discussing circumstances where dangling
pardons to witnesses can be obstruction of justice). See also Alex Whiting, Why Dangling a Pardon
Could be an Obstruction of Justice—Even if the Pardon Power Is Absolute, JUST SEC. (Mar. 28, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/54356/dangling-pardon-obstruction-justice-even-pardon-powerabsolute/ [https://perma.cc/W39D-GK5M] (discussing how dangling of pardons can be an
obstruction of justice).
Alschuler, supra note 227, at 604. (“Exchanging clemency for a witness’s noncooperation is a
criminal act twice over. . . . [I]t constitutes obstruction of justice. . . . Bribery, moreover, consists
of trading anything of value for an official act. Granting clemency is an official act, and a witness’s
silence and lies are ‘things of value.’”) (citations omitted).
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anyone.”234 Laurence Tribe disagrees235 and insists that a President could be
guilty of obstruction of justice:
A [P]resident who offers to keep the FBI Director in his job if but only if the
Director agrees to “go easy” on a national security director who has lied to
the FBI about his dealings with a hostile foreign power is both offering a
bribe and obstructing justice. And, if he does so with the motive of covering
up his campaign’s conspiracy against the United States in orchestrating
foreign interference with our presidential election, that [P]resident is
engaged in a particularly pernicious form of obstruction whether or not the
technical requirements for the federal statutory crime of bribery have been
met.236

Al Alschuler similarly opines that the pardon power “was not meant to
exempt the [P]resident from basic, broadly enforced criminal laws that
restrict him no more than they restrict private individuals.”237
A third way in which a corrupt President could use the pardon power to
immunize himself against liability is to use the promise of a pardon to induce
individuals in his entourage to commit a crime. This is in effect the transfer
of the Ring of Gyges from the President to others associated with the
president, in order to induce their participation in a criminal plan that most
benefits the President and ensures his hold on the office of the presidency.
Such instigation, backed up by a promise of a pardon, is particularly
damaging to the rule of law, since on this scenario, the President would quite
literally be soliciting others to commit crimes, and assuring them they will
not incur liability if they do so.
It is difficult to imagine that the Framers envisioned the President’s
pardon power being used to obviate his own criminal responsibility or that
of his associates in the foregoing ways. More sensibly, we should recognize
that there are limitations on the President’s pardon power, and that without
such limits, the pardon power would be both inconsistent with other core
constitutional provisions and antithetical to the rule of law. Extending
pardons in exchange for potential witnesses covering for the President or his
234
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Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Donald Trump Can’t Be Charged with Obstruction, MACLEAN’S (Dec. 14,
2017), https://www.macleans.ca/opinion/why-trump-cant-be-charged-with-obstruction/
[https://perma.cc/375N-TCWS].
See Laurence H. Tribe, Why Donald Trump Can Be Charged with Obstruction, MACLEAN’S (Dec. 15,
2017), https://www.macleans.ca/opinion/why-trump-can-be-charged-with-obstruction/
[https://perma.cc/P9SS-G3MZ] (discussing his belief that you can hold a sitting President fully
accountable for abusing his executive powers).
Id.
Alschuler, supra note 227, at 566.
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associates in the face of prosecutorial demands for cooperation with a
criminal investigation would be a serious threat to the rule of law–in some
ways an even greater threat than the President selling pardons for money. If
Article II powers, including the pardon power, were not constrained by
criminal law, including witness tampering statutes,238 the President could use
his pardon power to place himself beyond the reach of all accountability.
There are at least some internal limits on the President’s pardon power
all will acknowledge. To start with a straightforward example, even the most
ardent defenders of presidential power would presumably agree that a
President cannot pardon a crime committed after the date of the pardon.239
To think otherwise, one would have to believe that a President could
prospectively pardon himself for any crime he might commit after leaving
office, and thus immunize himself not just with respect to past acts, but with
respect to any future crimes he might contemplate in the future as a private
citizen. The same could be said of any offer the President might make to
immunize his associates for as yet unspecified future crimes. That the
criminal act take place by the time of the pardon is thus an obvious and
necessary limitation on the pardon power, despite the fact that such a
limitation appears nowhere in the text of Article II.
A related, but somewhat different question, is whether a President can
legally promise a pardon in order to induce one of his associates to commit a
crime. In addition to possible obstruction of justice or other crimes, a clear
impediment to such a use of the pardon power is the fact that a President
who did this would likely be an accomplice to the associate’s underlying
crime. As Alschuler observes:
A [P]resident who offered to pardon a future crime (and wasn’t kidding)
would be guilty of the crime as an accomplice if someone who received his
offer carried it out. The [P]resident would be guilty of conspiracy if the
recipient responded by agreeing to commit the crime. Making an
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See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (providing criminal penalties for anyone who “directly or indirectly, corruptly
gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any person, or offers or promises such person to give
anything of value to any other person or entity, with intent to influence the testimony under oath
or affirmation of such first-mentioned person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding,
before any court, any committee of either House or both Houses of Congress, or any agency,
commission, or officer authorized by the laws of the United States to hear evidence or take
testimony, or with intent to influence such person to absent himself therefrom”).
See Alschuler, supra note 227, at 552 (“Although the Constitution does not allow the President to
pardon future crimes, it does not block him from encouraging crimes by announcing that he will
pardon them.”).
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unaccepted offer might constitute a criminal solicitation or possibly an
attempt, and it could justify impeachment even if it was not criminal.240

However, the question of whether the use of the pardon power would be
valid is a separate question from whether the exercise of that power would
constitute a crime. Here we are mostly focused on the former question, and
our claim is that in some cases, the exercise of the pardon power would be
invalid, despite the fact that there is no express limitation on the use of the
pardon in those situations in the text of the Constitution.
Like the effort to self-pardon in order to immunize himself against
prosecution for a crime, the President’s issuance of a blanket pardon in
anticipation of, but prior to the commission of a crime, should not be a valid
exercise of the pardon power. We believe with Alschuler, moreover, that the
same can be said of offering someone a pardon in order to induce that person
to commit a crime. Such exercises of the pardon power would not only be
criminal, but they would also be invalid as far as the issuance of the pardon
was concerned. To recognize the possibility of a blanket, prospective pardon,
whether a self-pardon or a pardon of one of the President’s associates, would
undermine all semblance of the rule of law and place the President beyond
any legal process that might serve as a check on his activities. It is difficult to
believe that the Founders would have deliberately built in such an invitation
to lawlessness and knowingly undermine the ability of the Constitution’s
other accountability provisions to serve their function.
As a further example, note that the Constitution explicitly identifies
“bribery” as an impeachable offense. But bribery is also a statutory crime.
A President offering a pardon in exchange for official action also could be
guilty of bribery if the person to whom the pardon is promised is a public
official. As Alschuler points out, “offering a future pardon in exchange for
building a border wall or another official act also would appear to be a
bribe.”241 A President also cannot legally solicit or accept bribes for himself
in exchange for a pardon without being subject to prosecution for bribery.
Furthermore, a President who promised a pardon to military officers to
induce them to attempt a military coup would, along with military officers
who accepted the offer, be subject to prosecution for sedition or insurrection.
The Founders, when they gave the President the pardon power, likely
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Alschuler, supra note 227, at 553.
Id. at 7.
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contemplated that the pardon power would be used to forgive crimes, not to
commit additional crimes.
This is not the place for a detailed exploration of the presidential pardon
power and its impact on prosecuting obstruction of justice. We raise it here
because of its significance for the question we are addressing, namely whether
the pardon power confers on a President a kind of de facto immunity from
federal prosecution. This in turn seems to depend partly on whether a sitting
President may pardon himself, 242 as well as on whether he may use the
pardon power to pardon those who would otherwise implicate him, an issue
not addressed by the text of the Constitution.
Finally, a critical limitation on the use of the pardon power by the
President is that the federal pardon does not touch state prosecutions. There
the governor of each state holds the pardon power with respect to criminal
proceedings within that state. This is not a minor safeguard. Many crimes
are punishable under state, rather than, or in addition to, federal law. And
given the role that states and state laws play in the functioning of elections,
there are some limits to what a President who is willing to commit crimes can
do to induce criminal acts by others to interfere with an election. For
example, a President who asks an election official in Georgia to “come up
with” an extra 11,000 votes after an election could be prosecuted for
solicitation of election fraud in Georgia,243 as could the election official if he
complied. Politics in Georgia might or might not interfere with such a
prosecution, but the federal pardon power could not.
We read this and other limitations into Article II of the Constitution
because they are necessary from the standpoint of preserving democracy and
protecting the rule of law. But we also perceive such limitations as an
inherent part of the pardon power because we could not give effect to the
general operation of federal criminal law if the President were to self-exempt
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One of us, in an op-ed coauthored with former Ambassador Norman Eisen and Laurence Tribe,
has already concluded that the President cannot pardon himself. See Norman Eisen, Richard W.
Painter & Laurence H. Tribe, No, Trump Can’t Pardon Himself. The Constitution Tells Us so, WASH.
POST (July 21, 2017) (arguing that the President cannot pardon himself because no one is above
the law, including the president), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/no-trump-cantpardon-himself-the-constitution-tells-us-so/2017/07/21/f3445d74-6e49-11e7-b9e22056e768a7e5_story.html [https://perma.cc/KQV2-39RC].
See GA. CODE § 21–2–604 (2016) (Criminal Solicitation to Commit Election Fraud) (providing
criminal penalties for anyone who “solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or otherwise attempts
to cause the other person to engage in such conduct”).

Feb. 2022]

PRESIDENTIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

175

at will from their operation. Critically, not even the provisions in our
Constitution for the legitimate transfer of power could be reliably enforced if
the President could ensure his own reelection by committing crimes to
guarantee his continuation in office and then pardoning himself and those
associates who helped ensure his victory. That the states control the
operation of their own criminal offenses is one of the most essential aspects
of a federal system.
We now turn to consider one aspect of state criminal law, namely the
ability of a state to criminally investigate, and potentially indict, a sitting
President. The specter of a state prosecutor, without buy-in from the federal
government, crippling a U.S. President by saddling him with phony
investigations designed only to harass is one of the reasons frequently given
for the idea of presidential immunity. As we address in the next Part,
however, there is no reason to suppose that state prosecutors will ultimately
be more harassing than federal investigators, and there are many reasons to
recognize the vital role state sovereignty plays in defending and protecting
the rule of law.
III. INVESTIGATION AND INDICTMENT OF THE PRESIDENT BY THE
STATES
The Department of Justice has come under criticism in recent years for
its lack of independence vis à vis the White House, and the traditional
expectation of relative independence of the attorney general from the
President has been increasingly called into question. The Department
seemed reached its nadir during the tenure of Attorney General Bill Barr,
whose consistent defense of White House interests made the DOJ seem more
like a branch of the President’s reelection campaign than like a federal agency
with a mandate for independent thought in the service of the rule of law.
From Barr’s manipulation of the Mueller Report as it was first released to
the Department’s role in attacking peaceful protesters in Portland and
Lafayette Square, to its defense of Trump with regard to subpoenas to third
parties to turn over Trump’s personal financial records, to the Solicitor
General’s extreme defense of presidential immunity in the Vance case, the
Justice Department during the Trump Administration was anything but
independent from the White House. It was thus well understood during that
administration that there was no realistic possibility that the Department
would conduct any legal process against Trump based on the Mueller Report
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or any other revelation of potential legal violations on the part of the
President.
As a consequence, it was left to state and local prosecutors to take action
to hold President Trump and his associates accountable. State prosecutors
and attorneys general played an important role in investigating potentially
criminal activity on the part of the president,244 and states took the lead in
filing civil suits against some of the more extreme executive orders Trump
issued during the course of his presidency.245 The wisdom of the Framers in
designing a system of checks and balances that operates not only horizontally
within the federal government but vertically between state and national
government, was once again made apparent during the Trump years. The
reverse of the Civil Rights Era, when state and local governments were
aligned against civil rights and the rule of law, when the Department stood
up for them in the form of legal suits to defend school integration, voting
rights, and individual rights in a host of other domains, many states during
the Trump Administration served as a counterweight to the worst abuses of
both Trump officials and Trump Administration policies.
Where criminal prosecutions are concerned, the independence of the
states is critical to achieving accountability in the U.S. justice system in
several respects. First, as we discuss in the next section, the DOJ’s
prosecutorial guidelines do not apply to the states, and that gives state
244
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See Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2420 (2020) (discussing how the lawsuit stemmed from the
New York County District Attorney’s investigation into the Trump Organization). A year after the
Supreme Court decided this case upholding a state grand jury subpoena of financial records, the
Trump Organization may be indicted on tax charges. See Jonathan Dienst, Trump Organization
Expects to Face Criminal Charges in Manhattan, Attorney Says, NBC NEWS (June 25, 2021),
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/trump-organization-expects-toface-criminal-charges-in-manhattan-attorney-says/3125808/ [https://perma.cc/5CWD-VBVK]
(reporting that criminal tax charges were expected to be filed against the Trump Organization).
Georgia prosecutors are investigating President Trump’s alleged solicitation of election fraud. See
Richard Fausset & Danny Hakim, Georgia Prosecutors Open Inquiry into Trump’s Efforts to Subvert Election,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/10/us/politics/trump-georgiainvestigation.html [https://perma.cc/N8VK-6FE7] (reporting that prosecutors in Georgia started
a criminal investigation of President Trump’s attempts to overturn the 2020 election results in
Georgia).
See, e.g., Tony Barboza & Anna M. Phillips, California Sues Trump Again for Revoking State’s Authority to
Limit
Auto
Emissions,
L.A.
TIMES
(Nov.
15,
2019,
12:26
PM),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-11-15/california-trump-administration-lawsuitauto-emissions-climate-change [https://perma.cc/KCL7-NXBN] (discussing a recent lawsuit by
California and a coalition of other states who challenged the Trump Administration’s Executive
Order that restricted states’ ability to set tougher automobile emissions standards).
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prosecutors a degree of independence from national politics that federal
prosecutors lack. Second, the President’s pardon power does not apply to
state crimes, thus depriving the President of the ability to immunize himself
by dangling pardons. More generally, the structure of our federal system and
the role of the states in protecting democracy provides a vital check on the
presidency and the President’s ability to use federal executive branch
agencies to protect himself from scrutiny. Understanding how federalism
works in favor of presidential accountability is critical to maintaining the
guardrails on U.S. democracy.
The flip side of prosecutorial independence is the potential for abuse.
Accordingly, Section III.C will consider the safeguards needed to ensure we
can protect a good faith and rule of law-oriented President against an overzealous state prosecutor whose primary motive is to harass and incapacitate
legitimate federal governmental initiatives. It is to these important
dimensions of federalism in U.S. criminal justice that we now turn.
A. Department of Justice Guidelines Do Not Apply to the States
The first and most obvious difference between state and federal
investigations of a sitting President is that the two OLC memos disallowing
prosecution of a sitting President do not apply to their state counterparts.
Recall from our earlier discussion that the basis for their conclusions was not
specific textual language in the Constitution protecting the President from
indictment, but rather pragmatic factors having to do with interference with
the President’s duties and the impracticability of subjecting a sitting President
to the criminal process. Such DOJ guidance does not apply to state
prosecutors, particularly given the weakness of the constitutional rationale
for the DOJ’s position. Unless there is a constitutional basis for the
prohibition on indicting a sitting President that would supersede state law,
state and local prosecutors may treat a President like any other citizen within
their jurisdiction, at least when it comes to violations of state or local law such
as financial crimes or criminal interference with state elections. Such
violations are fair game for local prosecutors provided the alleged acts fall
outside the scope of the President’s official duties.246

246

We acknowledge that federalism issues, including the Supremacy Clause, would come into play if
a state were to prosecute the President or any other federal official for alleged crimes in connection
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Trump’s legal team in the Vance case argued strenuously that presidential
immunity applied to state criminal proceedings, at the same time that they
stressed the importance of the DOJ memos.247 This position made little
sense, given that DOJ guidelines were intended, by their very nature, to guide
the conduct of federal prosecutors. To Trump lawyers, however, this move
made sense, since they were casting the DOJ precedent as constitutionally
based, even though the constitutional rationale for the DOJ’s position is
weak, as we explain above.248 Were presidential immunity grounded in the
President inherent Article II powers, then immunity theory would pre-empt
state law. However, Article II contains no such provision bestowing any type
of immunity on the president, and the DOJ guidance is built around a litany
of pragmatic considerations from a hypothetical presidential prosecution that
hardly comprise a cogent Article II argument. State prosecutors have no
need to follow the DOJ’s guidance when deciding whether to prosecute a
President.
B. States Can Vindicate Their Own Laws, Even Against the President
General considerations of federalism suggest the importance of allowing
states to vindicate their own laws in their own courts, provided that the state
law matter in question is not preempted by federal law. The Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments bestowed critical powers on the federal government
to enforce certain individual rights against the states, but those changes did
not touch the jurisprudence of Article II. The Founders intended for the
states to control the manner in which presidential electors are chosen, and
for the states to enforce their laws insofar as they were not inconsistent with
federal law. Although much has been written about the overlay of federal
and state law in many contexts, including elections, it is evident that if a state
prosecutor cannot prosecute a President for criminal violations of its own
election law, we will have abandoned the constitutional republic the
Founders envisioned.
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with performance of official duties. We do not address those substantive law questions here, rather
our focus in on whether a sitting President is subject to criminal process in state court, regardless of
the nature of the alleged offense.
See Trump v. Vance Oral Argument Before the Second Circuit, C-SPAN (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.cspan.org/video/?475971-1/trump-v-vance-oral-argument [https://perma.cc/D77W-LRW3]
(containing the audio recording from the Trump v. Vance oral argument).
Id.
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Allowing states to police their own laws is critical for federalism, but it is
also critical for protecting certain areas of federal law as well. As Herbert
Wechsler once argued in a famous 1954 article:
The continuous existence of the states as governmental entities and their
strategic role in the selection of the Congress and the President are so
immutable a feature of the system that their importance tends to be ignored.
Of the Framers’ mechanisms, however, they have had and have today the
larger influence upon the working balance of our federalism. The actual
extent of central intervention in the governance of our affairs is determined
far less by the formal power distribution than by the sheer existence of the
states and their political power to influence the action of the national
authority.249

Recent events have underlined the importance of Wechsler’s words: the
basic machinery of our presidential and congressional elections is governed
by state and local law. The Elections Clause of the Constitution specifically
provides: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.”250 Giving this
power to the state legislature is meaningless if state criminal law cannot
regulate the conduct of federal elections and if candidates, including the
president, who appear on the ballot with senators and representatives, can
commit crimes with impunity.
The U.S. presidential election is in effect fifty different elections plus
another in the District of Columbia, run by each state for the purpose of
selecting the electors whose votes will determine the electoral college
certification. The fact that the integrity of the presidential vote turned on
state law questions in most cases meant that state courts were in charge of
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Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection
of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 544 (1954). Wechsler published this the year the
Court decided Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), a case that
fundamentally altered the relationship between state and federal law in the area of racial
segregation, which the Court held was barred by the Fourteenth Amendment. In a much-criticized
law review article, Wechsler later was unable to identify a satisfying neutral principle underlying
the legal reasoning in Brown even if he agreed with the result. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). We do not delve into this or other areas
of law where federalism can undermine constitutional principles, but we observe here that
Wechsler’s words still are a powerful rebuttal to arguments trivializing the rights of states to enforce
their criminal laws when a President is committing a crime.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.

180

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24:1

determining most of the 60 plus lawsuits filed by President Trump as part of
his effort to overturn the election results. For example, the U.S. Supreme
Court agreed with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that questions of
Pennsylvania election law should be determined by Pennsylvania courts
alone. The High Court twice declined to hear challenges to Pennsylvania’s
Act 77, which allowed for no excuse mail-in voting, which Republicans
claimed violated a provision of the Pennsylvania state Constitution.251
Admittedly, federalism has not always been a force for good in election law,
as recognized by the drafters of the Fifteenth Amendment.252 But this much
is true of any of the checks and balances that are built into the U.S.
Constitution. State election laws, including criminal laws designed to
prevent election fraud and voter intimidation, are designed as one set of
guardrails on a renegade President trying to manipulate federal elections.
For purposes of this Article, we are most concerned with one category of
state crime, namely crimes Presidents can potentially commit for the purpose
of remaining in office, such as crimes connected with elections or acts of
obstruction designed to impede a state investigation. The phone call
President Trump had with Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger,
for example, in which he asked the Georgia Secretary of State in a phone call
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See, e.g., Barbara Sprunt, Supreme Court Rejects GOP Bid To Reverse Pennsylvania Election Results, NPR (Dec.
8, 2020, 6:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/12/08/944230517/supreme-court-rejects-gop-bidto-reverse-pennsylvania-election-results [https://perma.cc/QB6L-7KY5] (discussing the Supreme
Court’s rejection of the lawsuit brought by Mark Kelly challenging Pennsylvania’s Act 77); Robert
Barnes & Elise Viebeck, Supreme Court Denies Trump Allies’ Bid to Overturn Pennsylvania Election Results,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
8,
2020,
5:45
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com
/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-trump-pennsylvania-election-results/2020/12/08/4d39e16c
-397d-11eb-98c4-25dc9f4987e8_story.html [https://perma.cc/6LTH-GED5] (explaining the
Supreme Court’s denial of a requested injunction in the Pennsylvania lawsuit brought by President
Trump’s allies); Melissa Quinn, Supreme Court Rejects GOP Bid to Overturn Biden’s Victory in Pennsylvania,
CBS NEWS (Dec. 9, 2020, 7:36 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/supreme-court-rejectspennsylvania-gop-suit-overturn-presidential-election-results/ [https://perma.cc/YR6Z-7XQN]
(describing the lawsuit challenging Pennsylvania’s Act 77 and the order denying the requested
injunctive relief). See also Kelly v. Pennsylvania, 141 S. Ct. 950, 950 (2020) (“The application for
injunctive relief presented to Justice Alito and by him referred to the Court is denied.”).
The premise of states’ rights under the Tenth Amendment was used to perpetuate racial
discrimination in denying voting rights. The Fifteenth Amendment sought to cure that problem
but was not enforced by Congress until the 1965 Voting Rights Act. The Supreme Court in a
highly controversial decision in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), struck down Section
4(b), a key provision of the Act, holding that it was no longer necessary.
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to “come up with” 11,000 votes,253 is the perfect case in point. Had Trump
won the election and was now in his second term in office, he would not be
subject to criminal investigation under a theory of presidential immunity for
another four years, at which point the statute of limitations on his crime may
have run, and at the very least, the case would be markedly more difficult to
prosecute. As a former president, however, he is now under investigation in
Georgia for criminal solicitation of election fraud, a time-sensitive
investigation that would have been difficult to defer even if technically still
prosecutable four years from now.254 Our argument from democratic
structure and the defense of the rule of law, then, particularly identifies the
importance of investigating and potentially prosecuting a sitting President for
state crimes that go to the President’s ability to hang on to power.255 The
ability of New York, Georgia and other states to enforce their criminal laws
against a sitting president, particularly, but not exclusively in connection with
election-related crimes, is an important check on a President’s ability to
engage in a criminal enterprise and to use the powers of his office to ensure
his own immunity.256
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See Amy Gardner & Paulina Firozi, Here’s the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and
Raffensperger,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
5,
2021,
1:15
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgiavote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html
[https://perma.cc/UD3P-VBXU] (containing the audio recording and transcript of the call where
President Trump asked Secretary of State Raffensperger to investigate allegations of election fraud
and “come up with” 11,000 votes).
See GA. CODE § 21–2–604(a)(1) (2016) (describing Criminal Solicitation of Election Fraud, stating
in part: “A person commits the offense of criminal solicitation to commit election fraud in the first
degree when, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a felony under this
article, he or she solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or otherwise attempts to cause the other
person to engage in such conduct”).
See discussion of Trump v. Vance, supra, Section I.E of this Article. Vance’s investigation of the
Trump Organization pertaining to the alleged use of New York financial institutions for violations
of campaign finance laws in the 2016 Presidential Election are also critically important, but for
reasons other than we discuss in the current Article.
Note, however, that an assault upon an immigrant in a detention center might nevertheless be
prosecutable under state law. See, e.g., Victoria López & Sandra Park, ICE Detention Center Says It’s
Not Responsible for Staff’s Sexual Abuse of Detainees, ACLU (Nov. 6, 2018, 1:15 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/immigrants-rights-and-detention/ice-detentioncenter-says-its-not-responsible [https://perma.cc/A52S-F42F] (discussing how all 50 states and the
District of Columbia impose criminal liability on correctional facility staff who have sexual contact,
regardless of the use of force, with people in their custody). Some official capacity conduct of federal
employees is beyond the reach of state prosecutors, not because federal employees are immune, but
because the law governing their conduct is preempted by federal law.
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An argument made repeatedly is that state criminal jurisdiction over a
President is precluded because of the Supreme Court ruling in the famous
case of McCulloch v. Maryland,257 a case involving an attempt by the State of
Maryland to tax the Bank of the United States, a predecessor to the Federal
Reserve System. McCulloch ruled unconstitutional state laws that have the
effect of “arresting all the measures of the [federal] government,”258 meaning
that if the federal government had the power to establish a national bank, the
state did not have the power to undercut that federal power by taxing the
bank. This extrapolation from McCulloch appears in a 1998 article by law
professor Akhil Amar.259 Amar writes: “Ordinarily, in other words, states
can enforce their laws and prosecute federal officials without ‘arresting’ and
‘prostrating’ the normal functions of the federal government. But this is not
so with the President, and so under McCulloch they cannot prosecute him until
he has left office.”260 The same argument appears again in the Solicitor
General’s amicus brief in Trump v. Vance,261 as well as in Justice Alito’s
dissent.262 As we pointed out in our own amicus brief in Vance, however,
McCulloch is inapposite.263 There is no mention in McCulloch of a sitting
President being immune from criminal process, only broad language about
the states not being allowed to interfere with the operations of the federal
government. As the majority in Vance recognized, McCulloch stands for a
proposition that states may not interfere with the execution of laws passed by
Congress, not for the unconstitutionality of subjecting the President to
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17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Id. at 432.
See Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The Presidential Privilege Against Prosecution, 2 NEXUS 11, 11
(1997) (exploring the concept of federalism and whether a sitting President can be criminally
prosecuted).
Id. at 14.
See Brief of the Solicitor General in Trump v. Vance, supra note 70, at 12 (arguing that there is no
precedent for the issuance of a state criminal subpoena for a sitting President’s personal records).
Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2444 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing McCulloch and how
those principles relate to the prosecution of a sitting President).
See Brief for Claire Finkelstein & Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law at the University of
Pennsylvania as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 24, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412
(2020) (No. 19–635) (“The shibboleth of states’ rights, previously repeated by political conservatives,
has now been summarily swept aside with not even a passing glance in the direction of the main
source of checks and balances on the executive branch, namely the principle of federalism.”).
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criminal process of a state grand jury.264 Likewise, the impermissibility of a
state taxing a bank established by Congress, says nothing about the
constitutionality of indictment of a sitting President by a state prosecutor.
C. Fear of Presidential Harassment
An argument advanced by Trump through his Solicitor General in the
Vance case was that with over 2300 state prosecutors’ offices nationwide,265
allowing states to subpoena the President or his records “would pose a serious
risk of both harassment and diversion.”266 The concern is that if states could
investigate and ultimately prosecute a sitting president, the President would
be subject to large numbers of bogus investigations, prosecutions and civil
suits. Is this a reasonable concern? Justice Alito reiterates this concern about
state investigations of a sitting President in his dissent in Trump v. Vance.267
Justice Alito, in his dissent in Trump v. Vance, also points to the harassment
factor, speculating that a state prosecutor could use subpoenas for politically
motivated reasons, going to extreme means such as seeking to obtain and
execute a search warrant on the President’s residence in the White House or
getting a state court order for surveillance of a telephone the President was
known to use.268 But even Justice Alito does not endorse a categorical rule
that state criminal subpoenas of a sitting President should never be enforced;
his quibble with the majority opinion in Vance is over the standard of review
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See Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2425 (majority opinion) (citing McCulloch for the proposition that the states
lack the ability to control the operation of the laws enacted by Congress or to impede the President’s
execution of the laws but not for the proposition that the President is not subject to a state criminal
subpoena or indictment).
National Survey of Prosecutors (NSP), BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. (May 26, 2009),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/data-collection/national-survey-prosecutors-nsp#publications-0
[https://perma.cc/P64F-4ZNE] (“The 2007 NSP data collection was a census . . . [that] included
2,330 prosecutors’ offices.”).
Brief of the Solicitor General in Trump v. Vance, supra note 70, at 16. The Solicitor General
argues, “[t]he risk of harassment is particularly serious when, as here, a State uses criminal process
for the President’s personal records to investigate the President himself, not just to obtain evidence
for use in the prosecution of another.” He says that “[i]n routine criminal investigations, a
prosecutor’s legal and ethical obligations provide a sufficient check against the prospect of abuse.”
See supra text accompanying notes 155–156 for a discussion of Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion in
Vance.
See Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2446 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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to be applied to such subpoenas, with Justice Alito favoring a standard far
more deferential to the President.269
It is not unreasonable to be concerned that the President could be subject
to harassment by local prosecutors if they had the ability to prosecute him
while he is in office. However, the risk of pretextual prosecutions that could
interfere with the President’s ability to govern has to be counterbalanced
against the risk of presidential crimes going unaddressed. Which poses the
greater risk? Without a doubt, the risk that Presidents will commit crimes for
the purpose of remaining in office looms larger than the risk that a President
will be subject to pretextual prosecutions by a county prosecutor or state
attorney general. First, it is harder to fabricate criminal charges than it is to
duck the prosecution of a powerful political leader who has committed
crimes. In addition, both federal and state courts rein in prosecutors who
pursue defendants solely for purposes of harassment, the demonstration of
which could subject a prosecutor to discipline for violating ethics rules.
Additional constraint of state prosecutors lies in the fact that they can be held
accountable under ethics rules prohibiting conflicts of interest, abusing
charging of criminal cases, harassment, and other misconduct.270
Consider the same worry with respect to harassment of a state governor.
Despite the fact that governors are in roughly the same position as Presidents
with regard to the possibility of political harassment, no one argues that
governors should enjoy absolute immunity against prosecution. Consider,
for example, Peter Lucido, a former Michigan state Senator who successfully
campaigned for election as Macomb County Michigan prosecutor with a
promise to investigate Governor Whitmer for “criminal” neglect in
implementation of her COVID-19 protocols for nursing homes in Michigan.
Upon assuming office, Lucido took initial steps to open a criminal
investigation of the Governor. The two authors of this Article joined a
Michigan ethics expert in filing an ethics complaint against Lucido grounded
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See id. at 2448 (“I agree with the Court that not all such subpoenas should be barred.”). See also id.
at 2449 (proposing that a state prosecutor should be required to provide a general description of
the offenses, describe how the subpoena relates to those offenses, and explain why the information
is needed now as opposed to at the conclusion of the President’s term).
See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (establishing special
responsibilities of the prosecutor); MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020)
(prohibiting concurrent conflicts of interest); MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2020) (prohibiting a lawyer’s obstruction of the opposing party and counsel).
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mostly in his personal conflicts of interest and attempt to criminalize a
political dispute.271
As of the publication of this Article, it appears that much of Lucido’s
efforts to investigate the Governor have receded. Most relevantly for present
purposes, nobody has suggested that the Governor needs to be exempt from
criminal prosecution in order to prevent harassment by political enemies.
Courts, bar disciplinary boards and other authorities are fully capable of
addressing the situation without needing to protect executive branch officials,
whether state or federal, by placing them beyond the reach of the criminal
law.
Indeed, a very uneven playing field would result if a President were
immune from criminal prosecution while a governor or other high-ranking
official who could be the President’s opponent in an election were not
immune from prosecution. Curtailing politically motivated prosecutions is
important, but the cure is not to immunize the President from prosecution
but nobody else. A President immune from prosecution could use bribery,
coercion and other criminal means to induce federal and state prosecutors to
investigate and even indict his political opponents while himself being
beyond the reach of the criminal law for as long as he stayed in office.
Making Presidents alone immune from state prosecutions is an invitation to
such mischief.
This Article argues that a categorical rule against indictment is not
necessary to protect a President against harassment by a politically motivated
prosecutor, any more than is a categorical preclusion of indictment of a
sitting governor needed to protect the constitutional duties of the governor.
State courts, state supervision of prosecutors’ offices, and if necessary federal
courts, are all capable of implementing the necessary checks and balances to
protect against the grossest abuses of prosecutorial discretion. Our
conclusion here aligns with the majority opinion in Trump v. Vance, in which
the Court held federalism concerns do not support a President’s claim to
absolute immunity from a state grand jury subpoena.
[W]hile we cannot ignore the possibility that state prosecutors may have
political motivations . . . here again the law already seeks to protect against
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See Letter from Lawrence Dubin, Claire Finkelstein, and Richard Painter to the Michigan Att’y
Grievance Comm’n (Mar. 29, 2021) (on file with authors) (alleging conflicts of interest and other
ethics violations in Macomb County D.A. Peter Lucido’s efforts to open a criminal investigation of
Governor Whitmer).
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the predicted abuse. First, grand juries are prohibited from engaging in
“arbitrary fishing expeditions” and initiating investigations “out of malice or
an intent to harass.” . . . And, in the event of such harassment, a President
would be entitled to the protection of federal courts. . . . . Second, [t]he
Supremacy Clause prohibits state judges and prosecutors from interfering
with a President’s official duties. . . . Any effort to manipulate a President’s
policy decisions or to “retaliat[e]” against a President for official acts through
issuance of a subpoena . . . would thus be an unconstitutional attempt to
“influence” a superior sovereign “exempt” from such obstacles . . . .
[F]ederal law allows a President to challenge any allegedly unconstitutional
influence in a federal forum . . . . Given these safeguards and the Court’s
precedents, we cannot conclude that absolute immunity is necessary or
appropriate under Article II or the Supremacy Clause.272

A similar logic should apply not only to a state grand jury subpoena but
to the decision of a state grand jury or prosecutor to indict a sitting President.
Furthermore, shifting focus to federal prosecution, it seems more likely
that conflicts of interest would affect the work of DOJ officials investigating
the President who appointed them than the work of state attorneys general
who are independent of the President and elected by the people of their
states.273 As shown by firings and reassignments in United States Attorneys’
offices in New York in 2020,274 and an earlier 2006 scandal involving firings
of United States Attorneys during the Bush Administration,275 the President
can influence investigations in U.S. Attorney’s offices all over the country.
Against this backdrop, we can assume that state prosecutors might behave
with greater integrity than federal prosecutors in the situation we have
addressed, namely a case in which a U.S. President is seeking to misuse his
office and other agencies of the federal government for the sake of remaining
in power.
272
273
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Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2428–29.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (describing the special
responsibilities of a prosecutor); N.Y. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 (N.Y. BAR ASS’N 2021)
(describing special responsibilities for prosecutors and government lawyers within New York); see
also CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
See Claire O. Finkelstein & Richard W. Painter, Opinion, The ‘Friday Night Massacre Spells’ the Downfall
of William Barr, NEWSWEEK (June 23, 2020, 5:08 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/friday-nightmassacre-spells-downfall-william-barr-opinion-1512935 [https://perma.cc/H74C-SBEV]
(discussing the controversy over the firing of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York by the Trump Administration).
See Ari Shapiro, Timeline: Behind the Firing of Eight U.S. Attorneys, NPR (Apr. 15, 2007, 3:07 PM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=8901997 [https://perma.cc/X2MHU7A7] (discussing the circumstances behind the Bush Administration’s firing of several U.S.
attorneys on a single day).
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Returning to the broad principles of federalism with which we began our
discussion in this Part, state prosecutors have a legitimate role in holding the
President accountable to the criminal law, and this function is an important
corollary to the right of states to run their own elections. With the exception
of that provided by the Speech and Debate Clause, which is explicitly
articulated in the Constitution, no Member of Congress is constitutionally
immune from prosecution by the states, including the states that sent them
to Congress,276 and neither is the President.
IV. PROSECUTING A PRESIDENT AFTER HE LEAVES OFFICE
While criminal prosecution of a sitting President is legally contentious,
the same cannot be said of the prosecution of a former President. There is
no immunity for a President once he leaves office—a point the 1973 and
2000 OLC memos both make clear. Indeed, as we discussed above, the
Impeachment Clause itself expressly states that an impeached and removed
federal officer, including a president, can be criminally charged after leaving
office.277 Although there is no immunity for a former president, there are
doctrines that former Presidents can invoke as a practical matter in order to
immunize themselves. We discuss such impediments to post-presidential
prosecution in Section IV.C below.
An initial question arises in this area. Given that it is always possible to
prosecute a former president, and that presidential immunity for personal
crimes ends with the office, why is it ever necessary to prosecute a sitting
president? Why not just avoid the thorny issues of prosecuting a sitting
President and wait until he leaves office? After all, we have the impeachment
process for crimes committed while in office. We discussed above the reasons
why impeachment is not sufficient to protect the country from a President
who abuses his office, perhaps impeachment, combined with the power to
prosecute a President once he leaves office, is adequate. In this Part, we
explain why the combined availability of impeachment during office and
prosecution after office still cannot protect against a despotic President who
is willing to use every means at his disposal to remain in office.
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277

We discuss the very limited immunity of members of Congress in the Speech and Debate Clause of
the Constitution at Section I.A supra. The Constitution references no such immunity for the
President.
See supra text accompanying notes 22–83.
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A second question is as follows: Suppose the Justice Department were to
maintain a compromise position. Suppose it is possible to indict a sitting
president, but not possible to try or sentence him until he leaves office. In other
words, the Department could allow for indictment while in office, but defer
other legal proceedings until after a President has left office. As we discuss
below, however, this weaker version of the deferral of presidential criminal
justice will also prove inadequate to protect the democratic process. While in
some cases, this bifurcated method may prove adequate, this will not always
be the case. The question is when it is imperative to be able to indict and
prosecute a sitting President.
A. Why Impeachment Does Not Suffice
As we touched on in the Introduction, impeachment and voting elected
officials out of office are sometimes thought to be the only methods for
protecting against abuse of presidential authority. After all, impeachment is
the only method the Founders explicitly identified in the Constitution, other
than presidential elections every four years, for ridding the nation of a
corrupt or despotic President. Moreover, once the people of the United
States elect a president, the argument is that an unelected prosecutor, judge
and jury should not have the power to incapacitate a democratically elected
President or force him from office before his term has expired.278 This
argument is even sometimes made with regard to indicting a former
President.279 The claim is that using the criminal law to punish presidential
misconduct, whether during or after his term in office, is necessarily a
partisan activity, used primarily to score political points by impugning the
party whose candidate won the prior election.280
278

279

280

See, e.g., Craig Sandler, Impeachment Is the Only Remedy for a Corrupt and Lawless President, PUB. CITIZEN
(Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.citizen.org/news/impeachment-only-remedy/ [https://perma.cc/
4PS2-XQWG] (contending that the Constitution provides impeachment as the sole method of
removing a President).
See Conor Shaw, Yes, Trump Could Be Indicted if He Leaves Office In 2021, But Is That Likely?, JUST SEC.
(Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/65772/yes-trump-could-be-indicted-if-he-leavesoffice-in-2021-but-is-that-likely/ [https://perma.cc/4J4U-J92F] (discussing reasons, mostly
political, why an indictment and trial of a former President could be difficult and unlikely).
See, e.g., Aaron Blake, The GOP’s Looming Impeachment Strategy: Focus on the Constitution, Not Trump,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
23,
2021,
7:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/23/can-you-impeach-former-president/
[https://perma.cc/GGE5-BXXG] (discussing the political undertones of the impeachment
arguments made by each political party).
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Yet, as the last two impeachments taught us, impeachment turns out to
be completely ineffective as a method of actually removing a sitting President.
As such, it provides much less protection against presidential misconduct
than the Framers likely intended. Thus despite two impeachments by the
House and two impeachment “trials” in the Senate, impeachment utterly
failed to address plausible allegations of criminal activity by Donald Trump.
Instead, or in addition, he might have been indicted for any of the following
crimes, among others: (1) obstructing justice as identified in the Mueller
investigation,281 (2) bribing282 and/or extorting283 Ukraine with military aid
to investigate his political opponent Joe Biden and conduct another
investigation undermining the Mueller investigation,284 (3) coercing cabinet
members and other federal employees to engage in partisan political activity
in violation of the criminal political coercion provisions of the Hatch Act,285
281

282

283

284

285

See MUELLER REPORT, supra note 87 (enumerating acts of President Trump that probably violated
the federal obstruction of justice statute 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), and repudiating arguments that
Article II of the Constitution precludes application of this statute to official acts of the President).
See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (stating that whoever “(2) being a public official or person selected to be a
public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive
or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for: (A) being
influenced in the performance of any official act” commits the crime of bribery). 18 U.S.C. § 2
provides that if one person “solicits” another person to commit a crime, the first person will be
treated as though he had committed the crime himself. The federal solicitation statute contains
two requirements: the circumstances must suggest that the defendant had the intent to engage in
conduct amounting to a violent felony and that he “solicits, commands, induces or otherwise
endeavors” to persuade others to engage in such conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 373.
See 18 U.S.C. § 872 (“Whoever, being an officer, or employee of the United States or any
department or agency thereof, or representing himself to be or assuming to act as such, under color
or pretense of office or employment commits or attempts an act of extortion, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.”).
The obstruction of justice statute cited supra at note 230 might also apply to the Ukraine phone call
if the requested acts would interfere with other ongoing investigations. Also, President Trump
mentioned Attorney General Barr on the phone call as well as Rudy Giuliani. If Trump pressured
Justice Department officials to give assistance to his reelection campaign, this would be a violation
of the criminal provisions of the Hatch Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 610 (“It shall be unlawful for any person
to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or
coerce, any employee of the Federal Government as defined in section 7322(1) of title 5, United
States Code, to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity.”).
See 18 U.S.C. § 610 (coercion of political activity); Letter from Claire O. Finkelstein and Richard
W. Painter to Corey Amund, Chief Pub. Integrity Section, Dep’t of Just. (Oct. 26, 2020),
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/10951-trump-criminal-hatch-act-complaint
[https://perma.cc/EV2V-EE8A] (documenting multiple instances in which President Trump
coerced political activity by cabinet members and other federal employees before the 2020 election);
Claire O. Finkelstein and Richard W. Painter, Could a New Government Report Spell Felony Charges for
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(4) soliciting election fraud in a phone call to the Georgia Secretary of State
in November 2020,286 (5) criminal sedition287 in authorizing preparation of
the unsigned draft Executive Order dated December 16, 2020 pursuant to
which President Trump would have ordered the Secretary of Defense to seize
voting machines in certain states to look for evidence of election fraud,288 and
(6) inciting insurrection at the Capitol on January 6, 2021.289 These alleged
politically-related crimes are over and above the financial crimes being

286

287

288

289

Trump: It’s Time for Merrick Garland to Appoint a Special Prosecutor to Investigate Possible Criminal Hatch Act
Violations, SLATE (Nov. 16, 2021), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/11/trump-felonycharges-government-hatch-report.html [https://perma.cc/S7EJ-6EKA] (discussing continuation
of coerced political activity by the DOJ and other agencies in Trump’s effort to overturn the 2020
election as well as pre-election Hatch Act violations of 13 senior officials documented in an Office
of Special Counsel investigation); U.S. OFF. OF SPECIAL COUNS, INVESTIGATION OF POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES BY SENIOR TRUMP ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DURING THE 2020 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION (Nov. 9, 2021), https://osc.gov/Documents/Hatch Act/Reports/Investigation%25
20of Political Activities by Senior Trump Administration Officials During the 2020 Presidential
Election.pdf [https://perma.cc/2A2F-W9BL].
See GA. CODE § 21–2–604(a)(1) (2016) (“A person commits the offense of criminal solicitation to
commit election fraud in the first degree when, with intent that another person engage in conduct
constituting a felony under this article, he or she solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or
otherwise attempts to cause the other person to engage in such conduct.”).
18 U.S.C. § 2384 (conspiracy “to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of
the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by
force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States , or by force to seize,
take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof”); Claire O.
Finkelstein & Richard W. Painter, Invoking Martial Law to Reverse the 2020 Election Could be Criminal
Sedition, JUST SEC. (Dec. 22, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/73986/invoking-martial-law-to-reverse-the-2020-election-could-becriminal-sedition/ [https://perma.cc/KC56-2JGB].
Presidential Findings to Preserve Collect and Analyze National Security Information Regarding
the 2020 Presidential Election (Dec. 16, 2020) (unsigned draft executive order)
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21183521-jan-6-draft [https://perma.cc/SM4MRDH5].
The crime of “rebellion or insurrection,” 18 U.S.C. § 2383, can be formulated as a conspiracy
crime, 18 U.S.C. § 371, or “conspiracy to engage in rebellion or insurrection.” Alternatively,
Trump could have been charged with “seditious conspiracy,” 18 U.S.C. § 2384, based on the
concept of “sedition” rather than “rebellion.” The federal complicity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2,
provides that if one person “solicits” another person to commit a crime, the first person will be
treated as though he had committed the crime himself. The federal solicitation statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 373, contains two requirements: the circumstances must suggest that the defendant had the intent
to engage in conduct amounting to a violent felony and that he “solicited, commanded, induced or
otherwise endeavored” to persuade others to engage in such conduct. The federal solicitation
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 373, contains two requirements: the circumstances must suggest that the
defendant had the intent to engage in conduct amounting to a violent felony and that he “solicits,
commands, induces or otherwise endeavors” to persuade others to engage in such conduct.
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investigated by the Manhattan District Attorney, who has already indicted
the Trump Organization and its chief financial officer.290
Among other difficulties, members of Congress of the President’s own
party can be so closely aligned with the President that they decline to exercise
their powers under the Impeachment Clause, siding instead with assisting the
President to avoid accountability in order to remain in power. When this
occurs, the tools of congressional oversight lie fallow, and there is no political
will in Congress to investigate the President’s conduct, let alone impose
consequences for his lack of fidelity to the Constitution. This was made
abundantly clear in 2019 during the first impeachment proceeding against
Donald Trump, in which nearly all members of his own party in the Senate
voted against conviction. The lone exception, Senator Mitt Romney, was
attacked for his decision by others of his party nationwide, including in Utah
where they drew up a petition for censure.291 Moreover, because they held
a majority in the Senate, members of the GOP were able to hobble the
impeachment process itself, by blocking the ability of House managers to call
critical witnesses who might have helped to prove the allegations against the
President. The second impeachment proceeding against Trump for his role
in inciting the January 6 attack on the Capitol building drove the point home
all the more forcefully. Shockingly, within an hour of a successful vote to
hear witnesses at the impeachment trial, Democratic and Republican leaders
cut a deal agreeing that there would be no live witnesses.292 Despite
controlling both houses of Congress and the White House and needing only
a majority to call witnesses, Democrats were forced to abandon their trial
plans. Needless to say, they were also unable to command the two-thirds
super-majority needed for conviction, despite the fact that the January 6
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See Indictment, People v. Trump Corp. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., June 30, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/07/01/nyregion/trump-organizationindictment.html [https://perma.cc/2UPD-GU3N].
See Justine Coleman, Petition Seeking Romney Censure Circulating Among Utah Republicans, THE HILL (Feb.
15, 2021, 3:48 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/538895-petition-seekingromney-censure-circulating-among-utah-republicans [https://perma.cc/E5Y3-LVHK]
(discussing a petition by Utah Republicans to censure Senator Romney for his vote to convict
former President Trump during his impeachment trial).
See Brian Naylor, Agreement Reached to Avoid Witnesses in Trump’s Impeachment Trial, NPR (Feb. 13, 2021,
1:20 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/trump-impeachment-trial-live-updates/2021/02/13
/967650922/agreement-reached-to-avoid-witnesses-in-trumps-impeachment-trial [https://perma
.cc/6TYH-HFCS] (reporting that two hours after the Senate voted to call witnesses, the leaders of
both parties reached an agreement not to call witnesses).

192

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24:1

attack on the Capitol targeted members of Congress and the Republican
Vice President himself.293 Even more troubling was the fact that several of
the senators may themselves have actively contributed to the incitement in
the run up to January 6, according to complaints filed with the Senate Ethics
Committee.294
The reality of impeachment, then, is quite different from the theory.
While the theory may present an attractive thesis about why we should
regard impeachment over prosecution as the only alternative to presidential
elections for addressing the crimes of a corrupt president, the reality is that
impeachment cannot truly be considered a method of removal. At best,
impeachment is a means of enabling the House and potentially the Senate to
conduct discovery on a President who may have committed crimes, because
Congress’s powers to engage in oversight of White House officials, for
example by demanding testimony and subpoenaing documents, is at its
height during an impeachment inquiry.295
B. Why Post-Presidential Prosecution Does Not Suffice
If impeachment does not provide the protection against despotism for
which the Framers might have hoped, what other protections might be
compatible with our constitutional design short of prosecuting a President
while he is still in office? In particular, does the prospect of prosecuting a
President after he leaves office, coupled with investigations while that
President is still in office, provide the deterrent efficacy needed to forestall
presidential crimes and ensure that other mechanisms of presidential
accountability are able to function as intended?
The main problem with relying on post-presidential accountability, as we
have stressed throughout this Article, is that the crimes a sitting President is
most likely to commit if he is immune from prosecution are the crimes that
293

294
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This time seven Republican senators voted to convict former President Trump. Dareh Gregorian,
Trump Acquitted in Impeachment Trial; 7 GOP Senators Vote with Democrats to Convict, NBC NEWS (Feb. 13,
2021,
10:44
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-acquittedimpeachment-trial-7-gop-senators-vote-democrats-convict-n1257876 [https://perma.cc/MXE5LMP4].
See Burgess Everett, Secretive Ethics Panel Will Judge Hawley and Cruz, POLITICO (Jan. 31, 2021, 7:00
AM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/31/senate-ethics-hawley-cruz-investigation463806 [https://perma.cc/3P8P-8D5M] (describing the Senate investigation into the role Senators
Cruz and Hawley may have played in inciting the January 6th insurrection).
See supra Section II.B (discussing Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020)).
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will most increase his chances of remaining in office. A President who is
immune from criminal prosecution thus poses a very real danger that he will
commit crimes that will secure not only his continuation in office, but also
thereby allow him to protect himself against impeachment during his (next)
term and immunize himself against prosecution once he is no longer in office.
Prosecution that takes place after a President leaves office thus fails to address
the central and most concerning danger, namely that a President will commit
crimes to avoid having to leave office or for the purpose of avoiding
accountability once he is out of office.
Immunity from criminal prosecution invites illegal conduct, and the
longer it takes to prosecute the formerly immune individual, the more
additional crimes may be committed. For example, if a lawyer pleads guilty
to campaign finance violations for making secret payoffs on behalf of a client,
but the co-conspirator (“Individual 1”) remains unindicted, the chances
increase that Individual 1 will commit another crime, simply because he is
undeterred, or in order to cover up the first crime before his role in it is
discovered. If a President obstructs justice in an investigation into his initial
electoral victory, for example, is not impeached or indicted at the time, the
chances increase that the same President will seek to induce or coerce
interference by another country in the next election. In addition, he might
engage in crimes of obstruction to cover up his commission of the first crime.
We know from history that presidential crimes tend to escalate if left
unchecked. If President Nixon could hire burglars to break into Democratic
Party Headquarters in the Watergate Hotel, and then commit further crimes
to cover up his participation in the first one, it is not unthinkable for a future
President to hire hitmen to murder witnesses or to intimidate investigators
looking into his prior crimes. Absolute rulers murdering political opponents
throughout history296 may have been more the norm than the exception, at
least in an earlier age. And crimes committed to cover up other crimes or to
impede investigations is standard fare. Presidential crimes must be addressed
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See, e.g., Tim Thornton, More on a Murder: The Deaths of the ‘Princes in the Tower,’ and Historiographical
Implications for the Regimes of Henry VII and Henry VIII, 106 J. HIST. ASS’N 4–5 (2021) (discussing
political complications in contemporaneous accounts of Richard of Gloucester’s [Richard III’s]
1483 seizure of power by deposing his nephew the 12-year-old King Edward V, followed by the
disappearance and probable murder in the Tower of London of Edward and his younger brother
Richard of Shrewsbury, Duke of York).
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as close to the time they occur as possible, or the momentum they create can
send a nation into a downward spiral of criminality and corruption.
In addition, each President knows that whatever his vulnerability to
criminal process, once he leaves office there will be little incentive on the part
of the new administration to prosecute the President from the former
administration. Indeed, prosecuting, or even investigating, the former
administration often seems to be counterproductive from the standpoint of
the new administration’s aims. It takes time and energy away from the
priorities of the new administration. But it may also be seen as an attack on
executive power and thus create vulnerabilities for the new President. Where
federal prosecution is concerned, a former President’s de facto immunity is
thus virtually assured, and knowing that in advance, the vulnerability to
prosecution after leaving office will not carry much deterrent efficacy. Thus,
despite major examples of illegal conduct in various presidential
administrations, political resistance on the part of the Department of Justice
to pursuing accountability for any member of the executive branch, whether
current or former, remains formidable.
The case for prosecuting a former President is as strong as it has ever
been in the case of Donald Trump, and thus the actions of the Biden
Administration’s DOJ provide a test case of the feasibility and potential
efficacy of federal prosecutions of a former President. Yet as of this writing,
there is no indication that Donald Trump or any members of his inner circle
are targets of a DOJ criminal investigation, despite the wide-ranging
investigation that the Department has undertaken into the events of January
6, 2021, on the one hand, and state and city investigations of the Trump
Organization and Trump himself, on the other. The failure on the part of
the DOJ to announce an investigation of the former president, or announce
the appointment of a special council to do the same, attests to the degree of
resistance federal attorneys general have to seeking accountability for
members of a prior administration. We witnessed the same in the transition
from the administration of George W. Bush to Barak Obama, where,
confronted with massive evidence of widespread violation of U.S. and
international laws forbidding torture, President Obama announced he
preferred to look forward, not backwards and declined the clear mandate to
appoint a special counsel to investigate the Rendition, Detention and
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Interrogation program instituted by the previous administration shortly after
the attacks on 9/11.297
The apparent unwillingness of the current administration to appoint a
special counsel to investigate the events of January 6, 2021 is similarly
puzzling, given that many of the defendants under indictment for breaching
the Capitol Building have provided testimony that they were part of an
extensive and organized effort that tracks back to several Republican
members of Congress, members of the President’s inner circle, and ultimately
to the President himself.298 The same can be said for the extensive evidence
provided by Robert Mueller in Part II of the Mueller Report, which
indicated Trump obstructed justice and evidence that he may have
committed election related crimes following the 2020 election.299
Recent developments at the DOJ suggest that the current Justice
Department is not inclined to prosecute or even investigate Donald Trump’s
possible legal violations. At times the DOJ has gone so far as to defend his
position in litigation. With the exception of President Biden’s decision not to
assert executive privilege vis à vis Congress’s request for White House
documents in its investigation of the January 6 insurrection, the DOJ has
taken a stance on a wide variety of issues in which the Department is adopting
the same line of argument as the Department pressed under Garland’s
predecessors in the Trump Administration. The common theme of these
cases is the protection of presidential privilege and the defense of the
principle of presidential immunity, two doctrines that have helped Presidents
across time retain their hold on power and control the executive branch.
Presumably this explains why, despite his deep ideological differences with
his predecessors, Merrick Garland has repeatedly sided with the former
administration and the principle of executive power over the rule of law.
The current Department began its support for the Trump Justice
Department initiatives by appealing a federal judge’s order that it release an
Office of Legal Counsel memo from 2019, in which DOJ lawyers had
297

298
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See CLAIRE FINKELSTEIN & STEPHEN N. XENAKIS, INTERROGATION AND TORTURE 493, 504
(2020) (describing the implications of declining to investigate the use of torture and its basis in
political expediency).
See Hunter Walker, Exclusive: Jan. 6 Protest Organizers Say They Participated in ‘Dozens’ of Planned Meetings
with Members of Congress and White House Staff, ROLLING STONE (Oct 24, 2021),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/exclusive-jan-6-organizers-met-congresswhite-house-1245289/ [https://perma.cc/Y7LS-65K4].
See supra text accompanying notes 176–82.
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concluded that Trump should not be prosecuted for obstruction of justice
following the release of the Mueller Report.300 The DOJ continued to assert
executive privilege over communications between former White House
Counsel Don McGahn and Donald Trump, despite a congressional
subpoena from the House Judiciary Committee demanding that McGahn
testify to the Committee301 and an en banc decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upholding the subpoena.302
The DOJ also continued to defend the Department’s actions in June 2020 in
which Attorney General Barr ordered federal officers to assault peaceful
protestors in Lafayette Park in advance of an appearance in the park by
President Trump, who passed through en route to the famous photo-op
outside St. John’s Church. There are four cases against the government and
current and former officials arising out of the Lafayette Park incident seeking
damages and injunctive relief, one of which is now captioned Black Lives
Matter v. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President of the United States of America.303 Rather
than acknowledge wrongdoing, the Department has continued to litigate and
has urged a federal court to dismiss the cases against former Trump
officials.304 At the urging of the DOJ, one of the cases was dismissed by a
Trump appointed federal district judge in June of 2021.305
We see a similar logic at work in the E. Jean Carroll defamation case
brought against Trump in his personal capacity in New York state court.306
While not a criminal matter, the Department’s stance on the case helps to
reveal the Biden Administration’s sympathies with regard to claims of
executive authority. Carroll claimed that Trump raped her in a New York
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See Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 19-1522, at
19 (D.D.C. May 3, 2021); Finkelstein & Painter, supra note 85 (referencing the Justice Department’s
2019 memorandum about the legality of indicting the President).
See Finkelstein & Painter, supra note 186 (assessing the DOJ’s continued assertion of executive
privilege over Don McGhan’s congressional testimony).
See Comm. on Judiciary of U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 778 (D.C.
Cir. 2020) (upholding the enforceability of the subpoena and explicitly leaving open the question of
whether portions of McGahn’s potential testimony would be privileged).
Notice Regarding Preliminary Settlement Discussions, Black Lives Matter v. Biden, No. 20-1469
(D.D.C. June 16, 2021).
Celine Castronuovo, DOJ Asks Judge to Dismiss Cases Against Trump, Barr for Lafayette Square Clearing,
THE HILL (May 29, 2021), https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/556077-doj-asks-judgeto-dismiss-cases-against-trump-barr-for-lafayette [https://perma.cc/K589-MUSX].
Black Lives Matter v. Trump, No. 20-1469 at 49, 51 (D.D.C. June 21, 2021).
See Complaint and Jury Demand, Carroll v. Trump (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019) (alleging Trump made
defamatory statements about plaintiff Carroll).
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City department store twenty years ago. Concerned about the impact of this
allegation on his reelection campaign, Trump called Carroll a “liar” and
added, “she’s not my type.”307 When Carroll sued Trump for defamation,
the DOJ intervened on Trump’s behalf, removing the case to federal court
and claiming that the DOJ’s engagement was appropriate because this was
“a lawsuit against an ‘employee’ of the United States for something done in
the course of employment” under the Westfall Act.308 Although Clinton v.
Jones309 makes clear that a sitting President cannot avoid a civil suit for
personal wrongdoing, the matter is otherwise with regard to liability for
official acts. In the latter case, first, a President will be immune from suit for
official acts under Nixon v. Fitzgerald.310 And second, he will be entitled to
DOJ representation in any civil action against him to which he is not
immune. The question then boils down to whether the President’s verbal
attacks on E. Jean Carroll constitute official capacity acts, as both his legal
team and the DOJ claimed, or whether they constituted private conduct.
Against the Biden DOJ’s position, a federal district judge rejected the official
capacity argument and with it, the claim of absolute immunity.311
The Carroll case is currently on appeal to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, and with a federal judiciary often protective of presidential power,
backed up by President Biden’s DOJ, Trump’s position might just prevail.312
But the DOJ’s position in this case, which would treat a President’s denials
of a personal accusation as official presidential business, threatens to swallow
307
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Id. at 19–20.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (making the Federal Tort Claims Act the only means of perusing claims
for civil damages for the official acts of a U.S. government employee). The Westfall Act modifies
the Federal Tort Claims Act to protect federal employees from common law tort suit while engaged
in their duties from government. It also commits the federal government to representing the federal
employee if sued. In the Carroll case, the representation was questionable because Donald Trump’s
comments on Carroll arguably were not offered in the course of his employment, but rather were
personal in nature.
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 692–93 (1997) (“We therefore hold that the doctrine of separation
of powers does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President before he
leaves office.”).
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 758 (1982) (defining the scope of an official’s absolute privilege).
Carroll v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 422, 457 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2020). See also Reply Brief of
Appellant at 16, Carroll v. Trump, (Nos. 20–3977 & 20–3978) (arguing Trump’s statements were
within the scope of his employment).
See Mark C. Niles, What’s the Justice Department Doing in the E. Jean Carroll Lawsuit, LAWFARE (June 21,
2021),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/whats-justice-department-doing-e-jean-carroll-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/YJH3-Z7P6] (discussing the DOJ’s purported interest in expanding the scope
of presidential immunity for official acts by broadening the definition of an official act).
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up the line of cases according to which a sitting President is subject to civil
and criminal process for personal wrongdoing.313 The DOJ clearly thinks it
can draw a sensible line just beyond the Carroll case. Mo Brooks, for
example, argued the same thing Trump did when both he and Trump were
faced with a lawsuit by Eric Swalwell relating to his role in the January 6th
insurrection. Brooks had fanned the flames by encouraging an angry mob
to storm the Capitol, and his claim was that he was doing so as official
congressional business. Here, unlike in the Carroll case, the DOJ took the
more sensible position and said that Brooks’ statements were not issued in his
official capacity.314 But the ability of the Department to draw a consistent
line and the dangers of an overly broad interpretation of presidential
statements and actions as “official” are significant. In support of Trump’s
motion to dismiss the complaint, his attorneys had argued that Trump’s
conduct in encouraging the mob to attack the Capitol building fell within the
“outer perimeter” of his official presidential duties,315 a claim District Court
judge Amit Mehta thoroughly rejected.316
Imagine a President who harasses a woman as Clinton allegedly harassed
Jones while he was Governor of Arkansas. Or a President who orchestrates
a fraudulent securities transaction for his personal brokerage account when
calling his stockbroker from the White House. Or a President who
negligently shoots someone on a hunting trip, as Vice President Cheney did
in 2007. Or a President who tells his supporters to beat up protestors at a
campaign rally, or who incites his supporters to storm the Capitol where they
kill a police officer and threaten the lives of members of Congress. Are all of
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A President is subject to criminal prosecution for crimes committed in a personal or an official
capacity; whether that prosecution occurs during his presidency or thereafter is the subject of this
Article. Nonetheless, official acts of a President are within his Article II powers, creating an
arguable conflict between Article II and statutory crimes. We analyze one such potential conflict,
involving obstruction of justice statutes, in a separate article. We point out here however, that
identifying a President’s acts as official, whether Trump defaming Jean Carroll in statements to the
press or his firing the F.B.I. Director in the middle of an investigation of his presidential campaign,
is a first step in additional legal arguments made to shield the President from both civil and criminal
liability.
See United States’ Response to Defendant Mo Brooks’s Petition to Certify He Was Acting Within
the Scope of His Office or Employment at 1, Swalwell v. Trump (D.D.C. July 27, 2021) (No. 21
Civ. 586), ECF No. 34.
See Memorandum in Support of Donald J. Trump and Donald J. Trumps Jr.’s Motion to Dismiss
at 8–11, Swalwell v. Trump (D.D.C. May 24, 2021) (No. 21 Civ. 586), ECF No. 14-1.
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Swalwell v. Trump (D.D.C. Feb. 18, 2022) (No. 21 Civ. 586),
ECF No. 56, https://perma.cc/RE9M-AK6U.
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these “official” acts of the President and therefore not amenable to civil suit,
either while the President is in office or after he leaves office? If everything
the President does is an official act within the meaning of Fitzgerald, then
Clinton v. Jones would not apply to any acts of a President while he is in office,
since any act performed by a sitting President would be considered official
action.
As of this writing, it is unclear what position the DOJ will take with regard
to civil litigation over the deadly insurrection at the Capitol on January 6,
2021. But the logic of the DOJ’s position in the Carroll case would suggest
that the incendiary statements Trump made at a campaign rally on the
White House lawn might also be considered official acts.317 The mere
possibility that the DOJ could apply its approach to official acts to defending
Trump for his incendiary remarks on January 6 shows just how damaging
the DOJ’s current position on this matter is. Among other things, such a
position would threaten the holding in Clinton v. Jones and would seriously
impede the ability to hold a sitting President to the law. It would also
undermine the rationale for the 2020 holding in Trump v. Vance, namely the
proposition that a sitting President is not above the law.
To its credit, the DOJ in July 2021 notified former Trump
Administration officials that they could testify before congressional
committees investigating efforts to subvert the 2020 election and the January
6 insurrection.318 President Biden also decided not to assert executive
privilege over Trump White House documents requested by Congress in its
investigation of the insurrection of January 6. Trump has sued to prevent
release of the documents.319
The foregoing political considerations underscore the importance of the
Department of Justice rescinding its prior advice and instructing its attorneys,
including any future special counsel in Mueller’s position, that they can
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See Peter Eisler & Joseph Tanfani, Analysis: Biden’s Justice Dept May Defend Trump in Capitol Riot
Lawsuits, REUTERS (June 23, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/bidens-justice-dept-maydefend-trump-capitol-riot-lawsuits-2021-06-22/ [https://perma.cc/HZC4-VJ3V] (reporting that
Trump’s lawyers adopt the Justice Department's reasoning to argue that the former President was
speaking on “matters of public concern” in his Jan. 6 speech).
See Katie Benner, Trump Officials Can Testify in Inquiries Into Efforts to Subvert Election Outcome and Jan. 6
Riot, Justice Dept. Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/27/us/politics/trump-officials-jan-6-testify.html
[https://perma.cc/RY4K-XDND].
See Savage & Broadwater, supra note 202.
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prosecute a sitting president, as well as the importance of protecting the
ability of states, who are not bound by DOJ policy, to investigate and if need
be indict current or former Presidents. The Framers showed foresight in
anticipating that in addition to the three branches of government serving as
a check on one another, the states and the federal government might
mutually hold one another in check in addition to the checks and balances
built into the structure of the federal government. Reigning in presidential
power is one area in which states may play a critical role. The challenge of
calling the extraordinarily powerful office of the U.S. President to account
cannot be accomplished by one mechanism alone.
C. Legal Impediments to Deferred Prosecution
Were there no legal impediment to prosecuting a sitting president, a
federal prosecutor or special counsel might still choose to wait until a
President has left office to bring charges. There are, after all, several
advantages of waiting to prosecute a President until after he leaves office.
Quite apart from the protection a sitting President receives from the DOJ’s
current ban on presidential prosecution, there are a number of doctrines that
purport to stem from presidential Article II powers that a sitting President
could use to protect himself in case of criminal investigation or prosecution.
As discussed above, assertions of privilege available to a sitting President are
largely unavailable to a former President. And the ability of a President to
control the actions of his attorney general, through threats of firing or other
means, equips a sitting President with multiple mechanisms for impeding
investigations.
The ability of a sitting President to use the powers of his office to interfere
with a criminal investigation must be weighed against the obstacles to
prosecuting a former President. These require careful consideration. Below
we identify six factors that would likely interfere with any criminal
investigation or prosecution of a former President.
First, there is the possibility that the President will obtain a pardon from
his successor, particularly when his successor is from his own political
party.320 This is famously what happened with President Nixon, who was
pardoned by Gerald Ford, despite the fact that Nixon’s crimes were flagrant,
320

The pardon need not come from an immediate successor and a former President could condition
his support for presidential candidates on their promise to him of a pardon.
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and he was on the verge of being removed from office by senators from both
major parties at the moment that he resigned. This “pardon effect” already
interferes with the ability to gain cooperation from potentially useful
witnesses against a criminal President while in office.
That same logic applies to prosecuting Presidents after they leave office,
both because they themselves may receive a pardon, but also because they
may already have pardoned, or their successor may pardon, those in their
cabinet and inner circle who would be the most likely witnesses against them.
For example, George H.W. Bush pardoned Casper W. Weinberger less than
two weeks before the latter was due to stand trial on charges that he lied to
Congress about his knowledge of the Iran-Contra Affair.321 President Bush
also pardoned five other individuals involved in the Iran-Contra scheme who
could have served as witnesses against both Weinberger and Reagan, much
to the chagrin of independent prosecutor Lawrence E. Walsh, who was at
the time in full swing of investigating Weinberger and others for their role in
the scheme.322
A second impediment to prosecuting a President after he leaves office is
that it will always be politically difficult for a President to authorize the
prosecution of his predecessor. There is significant pressure to move on and
treat the dangers of criminality from a former President as having passed.
Indeed, deferring prosecution of presidential crimes foists upon the
successor’s attorney general politically fraught questions, complicating the
new President’s relationship with Congress and arguably interfering with
other items on his agenda.
State prosecutors may make similar
determinations about prosecuting a former President on political grounds,
depending on the signals they are receiving from their federal counterparts.
Third, a former President can try to assert executive privilege to prevent
discovery of relevant evidence by congressional committees or prosecutors,
as Donald Trump already has. As discussed above, Trump’s claims of
executive privilege over documents sought through subpoenas issued by the
January 6 committee have been wending their way through the federal court
system. The D.C. District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
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David Johnston, Bush Pardons 6 in Iran Affair, Aborting a Weinberger Trial; Prosecutor Assails ‘Cover-Up’,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 1992), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/97/06/29/
reviews/iran-pardon.html?_r=2&oref=login&oref=slogin [https://perma.cc/AS84-P8VS].
Id.
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Circuit323 rejected Trump’s claim of privilege which did not have the support
of the Biden Administration. The Court of Appeals did not believe a former
President could assert privilege in these circumstances, but also held that
Trump’s privilege claim did not meet the United States v. Nixon standard that
would have applied were he still President. In January 2022, the Supreme
Court refused Trump’s request for a stay of the lower court injunction solely
on the grounds that the Nixon standard had not been met.324 The Court
expressly stated that it was not deciding the issue of whether a former
President can assert executive privilege without the support of the current
President. This leaves open the possibility that a former President who met
the Nixon standard might persuade the Supreme Court to uphold a claim of
privilege even without support from the current President. In other
situations, a former President may be successful in persuading a current
President to accept his assertion of executive privilege. Indeed, as we note
above, even the Biden Administration has at times acted to protect Trump
Administration executive privilege.325
Fourth, in cases where prosecution of a sitting President is deferred until
he leaves office, statutes of limitations on the former President’s crimes may
expire, absent a statutory provision tolling the statute of limitations. Federal
or state prosecutors who defer prosecution of a sitting President may not be
able to count on an “equitable tolling” of the statute of limitations during the
period in which the President was in office.326 The statute of limitations issue
323
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Trump v. Thompson, No. 21-CV-2769, 2021 WL 5218398 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2021), aff'd, 20 F.4th
10, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
Trump v. Thompson, 142 S. Ct. 680, 680 (2022). The Court, in denying the application for a stay
explained: “Because the Court of Appeals concluded that President Trump’s claims would have
failed even if he were the incumbent, his status as a former President necessarily made no difference
to the court’s decision. . . . Any discussion of the Court of Appeals concerning President Trump’s
status as a former President must therefore be regarded as nonbinding dicta.” Id. Justice Thomas
would have granted Trump’s request for the stay, and Justice Kavanaugh wrote a statement
accompanying the Court’s order stating that in his view in circumstances where the Nixon test is
met “[a] former President must be able to successfully invoke the [p]residential communications
privilege for communications that occurred during his Presidency, even if the current President
does not support the privilege claim.” Id.
See text accompanying notes 299–300 supra, discussing the DOJ’s continued assertion of privilege
over a 2019 DOJ memo on potential criminal charges against then President Trump, as well as the
DOJ’s assertion of privilege with respect to portions of the subpoenaed congressional testimony of
former White House counsel Don McGahn.
See Amanda Lineberry & Chuck Rosenberg, Equitable Tolling and a Prosecution of a President, LAWFARE
(Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/equitable-tolling-and-prosecution-president
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is particularly pointed for a President who serves two terms; the five-year
statute of limitations common in federal criminal law would expire before
the end of the second term for many crimes committed during the first term.
In his dissent in Trump v. Vance, Justice Alito dismisses these concerns with the
suggestion that the problem can be dealt with by a waiver of the statute of
limitations,327 but he provides no explanation for how a President would
effectuate such a waiver, why a President would ever incur the negative
political implications of entering into any agreement with prosecutors with
respect to a crime that he had committed, and what possible incentive a
President would have to do this if there were a categorical rule that a
President could not be indicted while in office.
Although the 1974 and 2000 OLC memoranda opining that the
President should not be criminally charged while in office mention the
possibility of tolling the statute of limitations,328 such tolling would have to
be specifically authorized by Congress to be reliably asserted. Such a tolling
provision is included in proposed legislation, the Protecting Our Democracy Act,
passed by the House in December, 2021.329 Thus far, the rare cases in which
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[https://perma.cc/M2RV-KTH3] (discussing Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43 (2002) in which
Justice Scalia observed that all statutes of limitations are subject to equitable tolling). See also United
States v. Midgley, 142 F.3d 174, 178–79 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that criminal statutes can be subject
to equitable tolling but then denying equitable tolling to prosecutors who sought to charge crimes
that had been dropped in a plea bargain later broken by the defendant). The Court in Midgley,
however, refused to toll the statute of limitations, noting that Congress had the statutory authority
to make an exception tolling the statute and had declined to do so. See also United States v. Grady,
544 F.2d 598, 601–02 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that the statute of limitations tolled when “a
superseding indictment [is] brought at any time while the first indictment is still validly pending, if
and only if it does not broaden the charges made in the first indictment”).
See Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2449 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Even if New York law
does not automatically suspend the statute of limitations for prosecuting a President until he leaves
office, it may be possible to eliminate the problem by waiver.”). To support this proposition, Justice
Alito cites People v. Parilla, 8 N.Y. 3d. 654 (2007), a case in which a defendant waived the statute of
limitations by entering a guilty plea, a situation completely inapposite to that of a President accused
of a crime that he has no intention of pleading guilty to.
See Amenability of the President, Vice President and Other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal
Prosecution While in Office, Op. O.L.C. 1, 32 (1973) and A Sitting President’s Amenability to
Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222, 232 (2000) (discussing the statute of
limitations as a “drawback” to deferred prosecution of a President).
Section 202 of the Protecting Our Democracy Act, H.R. 8363, amends 18 U.S.C. § 3282(c) to toll
the statute of limitations for prosecution of a sitting President during his term in office. See also
Finkelstein & Painter, supra note 101, urging that Congress add to this bill express language
confirming that a President can also be indicted while in office, an amendment that was eventually
introduced by Congressman Jaimie Raskin and was added to the House bill prior to passage.
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federal courts have used a doctrine resembling equitable tolling for criminal
statutes of limitations involve the unique circumstances of a superseding
indictment brought outside the statute of limitations while an original
indictment brought within the statute of limitations is validly pending.330
Under the Protecting Our Democracy Act, however, the statute of
limitations on presidential crimes could be tolled, within the court’s
discretion, but only where criminal prosecution of the President while in
office must be deferred to avoid interference with the President’s Article II
duties. Moreover, the President would have the duty of demonstrating that
such interference would occur if prosecution were not delayed. If this bill
passes the Senate and is signed into law, it would constitute a clear statement
that Congress rejects the DOJ policy of barring the prosecution of a sitting
President. Without such a statement, as we have argued elsewhere, a tolling
provision would create misleading support for the DOJ memos, and thus
would reinforce the incorrect impression that it is unconstitutional to indict
a sitting President.331
Yet a fifth factor is that for an effective prosecution of a former President
to take place, statutes of limitations, even if amended to specifically provide
for tolling in the case of the president, would also need to toll with regard to
other individuals whose testimony might be needed to implicate the
President. Unless a criminal investigation is allowed to proceed while the
President is in office, the evidence required to pressure, and ultimately indict
various witnesses may only surface after the statutes of limitations have run.
Extending all such persons within the ambit of a statutory tolling provision
would likely be unworkable, moreover, because the scope of potential
criminal conduct involving a President is potentially vast, with rather grey
edges. A related concern is how far presidential immunity theory might
extend outside of the White House and the cabinet to members of the vast
business empire controlled by the President and his family. Should
businesses in joint ventures with the President’s businesses also be immune
from subpoenas and indictment while he is in office? If a business entity
currently under criminal investigation were to be sold to a business
organization controlled by the president, would that entity become immune
from criminal process? How wide would the tolling of the statute of
limitations need to extend for prosecutors to conduct an effective
330
331

United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1976).
See supra note 101, as well as discussion in supra note 326.
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investigation into the nexus of activities between a former President and
those involved in his criminal activities? It becomes quickly clear that
attempting to prosecute the President’s entire criminal network only after he
left office would make what is necessarily a challenging task nearly
impossible.
In addition, if a constitutionally immune President were to solicit others
to commit a crime, those other persons would normally not be immune from
prosecution under federal law, even if the president, as principal, had
immunity. But under the type of broad presidential immunity for which
Trump and his lawyers argued in the Vance case, third parties could be
immune if they committed their crimes at the behest of the President. Targets
of criminal investigations could claim presidential involvement in the alleged
crimes and refuse to turn over documents. A lawyer in the position of
Michael Cohen, for example, might have a colorable claim that like the
Mazars firm in the Vance case, the President had the right to prevent him
from cooperating with any federal investigation into the President’s actions.
A sixth factor is that even if statutes of limitations were to toll against all
defendants, including the president, prosecutors would still be required to
deal with stale evidence and witnesses who may be deceased or unavailable
once the President’s term expires. A presidential immunity theory so broad
as to prohibit not only prosecution of the President but also subpoenas of a
sitting president—and perhaps even business entities owned by the
president—would make many criminal investigations touching on the
President practically impossible.
Taken all together, these impediments to prosecuting a former President
and members of an extended criminal enterprise surrounding his activities
suggest a nearly insurmountable series of obstacles to prosecuting a President
and his associates after he leaves office. Some of these impediments are
present in the case of the prosecution of a sitting President as well, but some
multiply once the President in question leaves office. The two biggest factors
relate to the effects of the President’s pardon power, on the one hand, and
the impact of the passage of time and the statute of limitations on the other.
The prospects for blunting the impact of either are dim, and thus realistically
Presidents are unlikely to be prosecuted once they leave office by the
succeeding administration.
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D. The Insurgent President and Disqualification from Future Office
As recently as two years ago, the topic of presidential insurgency might
have seemed like a far-fetched law school classroom hypothetical, and likely
would not have been considered suitable publication material for a serious
law review article. Then in November 2020, we heard of a meeting Trump
had in the Oval Office to consider a plan to send the military in to assist in
reversing the presidential election.332 This was followed by the President’s
repeated baseless claims of “election fraud,” as we are increasingly learning,
a concerted plot involving the President, law professors and lawyers like John
Eastman, and a number of the President’s aides, members of Congress and
other individuals within the President’s orbit to overturn the results of the
2020 election. Then on January 6, 2021 during the counting of the electoral
college votes, a mob invaded the U.S. Capitol Building for the purpose of
halting the vote count and seeking to do violence to the Vice-President and
to the Speaker of the House, among others.333 We do not here address
whether these acts were part of a criminal seditious conspiracy involving the
president, but we know now that prospect of a president—whether motivated
to remain in office, or at the behest of a foreign power, or for any other
reason—leading an insurrection to overthrow the workings of our democracy
is a possibility we can no longer consider fanciful.
At a critical moment in our nation’s history, just after another
insurrection of much greater proportions, namely the Civil War, Congress
passed a new amendment inspired in part by events of the day. A critical
passage in the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 3 was designed to prevent
participants in that insurrection or any other future insurrection from
332
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See Claire O. Finkelstein & Richard W. Painter, Invoking Martial Law to Reverse the 2020 Election Could
be Criminal Sedition, JUST SEC. (Nov. 22, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/73986/invokingmartial-law-to-reverse-the-2020-election-could-be-criminal-sedition/ [https://perma.cc/Y87439FB] (“Following Flynn’s public remarks, the idea of a military coup took shape in earnest last
Friday, when the [P]resident met with Flynn and Flynn’s (and the Trump campaign’s) former
lawyer, Sidney Powell, as well as with executive branch staff, to discuss various methods for
overturning the results of the election, including the use of martial law.”).
After House Republicans refused to support a bipartisan commission to investigate the riot of
January 6, 2021, Speaker Pelosi appointed a panel with Democrats and some Republicans willing
to serve. See Chris Marquette & Niels Lesniewski, Pelosi’s Picks for January 6 Select Committee Include
Liz Cheney, ROLL CALL (July 1, 2021), https://www.rollcall.com/2021/07/01/pelosis-picks-forjan-6-select-committee-include-liz-cheney/ [https://perma.cc/2ENF-3EN8] (“Speaker Nancy
Pelosi on [July 1] announced her eight appointments to the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol.”).
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holding office in the United States government.334 The provision disqualifies
anyone who has engaged in “insurrection, rebellion or giving aid or comfort
to the enemies of the United States” and says that such acts “shall disqualify
a person from holding public office.” An “office” for purpose of this
provision includes the presidency. The Fourteenth Amendment does not
expressly identify the body—Congress or a court—that is empowered to
adjudicate whether a person is guilty of insurrection and thus whether
disqualification should ensue. But a criminal conviction for participating in,
inciting or aiding and abetting an insurrection or rebellion would clearly
suffice. Presumably so also would impeachment and removal by two-thirds
of the Senate for any of the enumerated offenses, but that method of
adjudication requires a two-thirds vote to convict in the Senate.
Yet Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment appears to say the opposite,
namely that if a person commits any of the listed offenses, the constitutionally
mandated disability from holding office can only be waived by a two-thirds
vote of both the House and Senate. The usual way to determine whether
someone has committed a crime is that he or she has been found guilty of
that crime. Thus the suggestion of this disqualification clause clearly seems
to be that, as an alternative to disqualification through impeachment, a
federal officer, including the president, can be found guilty of insurrection
and in this way disqualified from holding public office ever again. That
speaks in favor of proceeding with prosecution in the particular case of an
insurgent president: if he cannot be impeached because he has conspired
with members of his own party in Congress to hobble the impeachment
process, and he is seeking to extend his time in office by any means necessary,
the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism by which he would be
disqualified from holding future office if culpability for betraying the country
can be shown.

334

What would happen to a country that allowed an insurrectionist to remain or to become its chief
executive? We know of one notorious example in the 20th century; Germany allowed Adolf Hitler
to be appointed Chancellor in 1933 despite his prior criminal conviction and prison sentence for
inciting the Beer Hall Putsch in 1923. Even the New York Times opined in 1924 that after the
failed insurrection Hitler was “tamed by prison” and would no longer be as serious a threat. See
Hitler Tamed by Prison.; Released on Parole, He is Expected to Return to Austria, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1924.
That would have been disqualifying in the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment,
Section 3. That is not an insignificant part of our Constitution.
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Is criminal conviction necessary under this provision? The express
language of the provision suggests that a person who has taken the oath of
office is immediately and automatically ineligible to hold further public
office—including the presidency—as soon as that person “shall have engaged
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof.” And that might suggest that no official determination of
any sort would be needed for the provision to apply. Could Congress pass
legislation that would allow, by a simple majority vote, a resolution that the
President had engaged in one of the enumerated acts? Would a majority
vote to “censure” the president, after a failed attempt to convict former
President Trump in the Senate following impeachment in the House, suffice
as a determination of insurrection to invoke the disqualification? Exploring
such questions further is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. For our
purposes, the relevance of the disqualification provision lies in its indication
that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated that a sitting
President could be criminally convicted of a crime of rebellion while in office.
And that further suggests that at least the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment, less than one hundred years after founding, believed that a
sitting President could be indicted and thereby barred from holding future
office.
CONCLUSION
The United States currently faces a crisis of accountability in
government, primarily located in the executive branch, but with
reverberations in the other two branches of the federal government.
Presidents have expanded legal doctrines defining presidential power beyond
all recognition, culminating with President Trump who seemed to push the
powers of the presidency to their outermost limits.
In this Article, we have examined one aspect of presidential power—the
question of presidential immunity from criminal process. Trump v. Vance
rejected presidential immunity from criminal investigations under state law,
building upon earlier holdings in United States v. Nixon, that the President is
not immune from federal criminal investigation, and Clinton v. Jones, that the
President is not immune from civil suits. From this pair of cases, and from
the constitutional text and history, we infer that a sitting President not only
can be investigated but can be indicted as well.
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This Article has focused on the permissibility of indicting a sitting
president, but it did not explore the many scenarios for how a criminal trial
of a President might actually unfold. There are of course procedural due
process issues, including venue, jury selection and pre-trial publicity, for the
trial of a sitting President or a former president, just as there are with criminal
trials of other high-profile defendants, including politicians, celebrities and
police officers criminally charged for unjustified killings. Courts have ample
opportunity based on due process jurisprudence to address these issues.
Immunity from criminal prosecution, however, is not a viable option for any
of these other defendants and should not be for Presidents either. It is also
possible that a criminal trial could unduly interfere with a President’s
execution of his duties under Article II, but this also turns on specific facts
such as the nature of the criminal charges, the involvement of other high
ranking government officials in the United States or other countries, and the
amount of time the President would need to spend on his own defense.
Article III courts are well-equipped to address these concerns. The
Supreme Court in both the Vance and Mazars cases recognized the
importance of ensuring that an investigation does not impose undue burdens
on the presidency, while at the same time avoiding a categorical rule that the
President is somehow immune from subpoena. Categorical presidential
immunity from criminal indictment or trial is a blunt instrument for
addressing specific burdens that a particular criminal trial might impose on
a President’s Article II powers. Judges can address these concerns on a caseby-case basis, and in rare instances might grant a President’s request that trial
of a criminal indictment be postponed until the conclusion of his presidency.
This is a critical moment to clarify the extent of executive authority and
the mechanisms for calling the President to account. The argument that the
President has broad immunity against criminal process, investigation, civil
suit, etc. has been advanced repeatedly for many years, with the aid of broad
doctrines of presidential privilege and the workings of the overly broad and
misused doctrine of the unitary executive theory, even as the Supreme Court
as well as lower courts, have consistently rejected such arguments in a string
of cases involving Presidents Nixon, Clinton and Trump.
The Department of Justice has been wrong for over five decades and
under three separate Presidents in its assertion that a sitting President is
constitutionally immune from prosecution, and the pragmatic arguments for
presidential immunity in the 1973 and 2000 OLC memos simply do not
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stand up to the consequences of failing to prosecute presidential crimes.
Presidential immunity undermines the Framers’ understanding of the ability
of the other branches of government and the states to call Presidents to
account and to deter corruption of democratic norms. Recent events have
demonstrated how dangerous presidential immunity can be, particularly if a
President commits crimes for the purpose of obstructing other methods of
accountability such as criminal or civil investigations, impeachments and
elections. The Department of Justice, with the support of Congress, should
explicitly reverse its position on prosecuting a sitting President and state
unequivocally that a President who commits a crime, can and should be
indicted by federal or state prosecutors. In that way, the Department could
reinforce the position of the Supreme Court in Trump v. Vance and earlier
cases, namely that in a functioning representative democracy, no person, not
even the president, is above the law.

